arXiv subjects

Matteo Castiglioni

Publications and source records attributed to Matteo Castiglioni.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2026

Toward Optimal Regret in Robust Pricing: Decoupling Corruption and Time

We design the first regret guarantees for robust dynamic pricing that decouple the dependence on the corruption $C$ and the time horizon $T$. In dynamic pricing, a seller with unlimited supply of a good interacts with a stream of buyers over $ T $ rounds, with the goal of maximizing revenue. At each round $t$, the seller posts a price $p_t$, and the buyer purchases the good only if their unknown valuation $v^\star$ exceeds this price. The seller observes only the binary feedback $\mathbb{I} \left\{ p_t \leq v^\star \right\}$, indicating whether a sale occurred. In the \emph{robust} pricing setting, a malicious adversary is allowed to corrupt this feedback in at most $C$ rounds. Even if the learner knows the corruption $C$, the best known regret bound is $\mathcal{O}(C\log\log T)$ by Gupta et al. [2025]. This leaves as an open problem to ``decouple'' the dependence on $C$ and $T$. In this work, we resolve this open problem. In particular, we develop a robust variant of binary search that achieves regret $\mathcal{O}(C+\log T)$ when the corruption $C$ is known and $\mathcal{O}(C+\log^2 T)$ when the corruption is unknown.

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arXiv2026

Nearly-Optimal Bandit Learning in Stackelberg Games with Side Information

We study the problem of online learning in Stackelberg games with side information between a leader and a sequence of followers. In every round the leader observes contextual information and commits to a mixed strategy, after which the follower best-responds. We provide learning algorithms for the leader which achieve $O(T^{1/2})$ regret under bandit feedback, an improvement from the previously best-known rates of $O(T^{2/3})$. Our algorithms rely on a reduction to linear contextual bandits in the utility space: In each round, a linear contextual bandit algorithm recommends a utility vector, which our algorithm inverts to determine the leader's mixed strategy. We extend our algorithms to the setting in which the leader's utility function is unknown, and also apply it to the problems of bidding in second-price auctions with side information and online Bayesian persuasion with public and private states. Finally, we observe that our algorithms empirically outperform previous results on numerical simulations.

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arXiv2026

Truly Adapting to Adversarial Constraints in Constrained MABs

We study the constrained variant of the \emph{multi-armed bandit} (MAB) problem, in which the learner aims not only at minimizing the total loss incurred during the learning dynamic, but also at controlling the violation of multiple \emph{unknown} constraints, under both \emph{full} and \emph{bandit feedback}. We consider a non-stationary environment that subsumes both stochastic and adversarial models and where, at each round, both losses and constraints are drawn from distributions that may change arbitrarily over time. In such a setting, it is provably not possible to guarantee both sublinear regret and sublinear violation. Accordingly, prior work has mainly focused either on settings with stochastic constraints or on relaxing the benchmark with fully adversarial constraints (\emph{e.g.}, via competitive ratios with respect to the optimum). We provide the first algorithms that achieve optimal rates of regret and \emph{positive} constraint violation when the constraints are stochastic while the losses may vary arbitrarily, and that simultaneously yield guarantees that degrade smoothly with the degree of adversariality of the constraints. Specifically, under \emph{full feedback} we propose an algorithm attaining $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ regret and $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ {positive} violation, where $C$ quantifies the amount of non-stationarity in the constraints. We then show how to extend these guarantees when only bandit feedback is available for the losses. Finally, when \emph{bandit feedback} is available for the constraints, we design an algorithm achieving $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ {positive} violation and $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C\sqrt{T})$ regret.

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arXiv2026

Replicable Constrained Bandits

Algorithmic \emph{replicability} has recently been introduced to address the need for reproducible experiments in machine learning. A \emph{replicable online learning} algorithm is one that takes the same sequence of decisions across different executions in the same environment, with high probability. We initiate the study of algorithmic replicability in \emph{constrained} MAB problems, where a learner interacts with an unknown stochastic environment for $T$ rounds, seeking not only to maximize reward but also to satisfy multiple constraints. Our main result is that replicability can be achieved in constrained MABs. Specifically, we design replicable algorithms whose regret and constraint violation match those of non-replicable ones in terms of $T$. As a key step toward these guarantees, we develop the first replicable UCB-like algorithm for \emph{unconstrained} MABs, showing that algorithms that employ the optimism in-the-face-of-uncertainty principle can be replicable, a result that we believe is of independent interest.

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arXiv2026

A Stronger Benchmark for Online Bilateral Trade: From Fixed Prices to Distributions

We study online bilateral trade, where a learner facilitates repeated exchanges between a buyer and a seller to maximize the Gain From Trade (GFT), i.e., the social welfare. In doing so, the learner must guarantee not to subsidize the market. This constraint is usually imposed per round through Weak Budget Balance (WBB). Despite that, Bernasconi et al. [2024] show that a Global Budget Balance (GBB) constraint on the profit -- enforced over the entire time horizon -- can improve the GFT by a multiplicative factor of two. While this might appear to be a marginal relaxation, this implies that all existing WBB-focused algorithms suffer linear regret when measured against the GBB optimum. In this work, we provide the first algorithm to achieve sublinear regret against the GBB benchmark in stochastic environments under one-bit feedback. In particular, we show that when the joint distribution of valuations has a bounded density, our algorithm achieves $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4})$ regret. Our result shows that there is no separation between the one-dimensional problem of learning the optimal WBB price and the two-dimensional problem of learning the optimal GBB distribution over pairs of prices.

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arXiv2026

The Complexity of Min-Max Optimization with Product Constraints

We study the computational complexity of the problem of computing local min-max equilibria of games with a nonconvex-nonconcave utility function $f$. From the work of Daskalakis, Skoulakis, and Zampetakis [DSZ21], this problem was known to be hard in the restrictive case in which players are required to play strategies that are jointly constrained, leaving open the question of its complexity under more natural constraints. In this paper, we settle the question and show that the problem is PPAD-hard even under product constraints and, in particular, over the hypercube.

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arXiv2026

Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games With Unknown Follower's Types

We study online learning in Bayesian Stackelberg games, where a leader repeatedly interacts with a follower whose unknown private type is independently drawn at each round from an unknown probability distribution. The goal is to design algorithms that minimize the leader's regret with respect to always playing an optimal commitment computed with knowledge of the game. We consider, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, the most realistic case in which the leader does not know anything about the follower's types, i.e., the possible follower payoffs. This raises considerable additional challenges compared to the commonly studied case in which the payoffs of follower types are known. First, we prove a strong negative result: no-regret is unattainable under action feedback, i.e., when the leader only observes the follower's best response at the end of each round. Thus, we focus on the easier type feedback model, where the follower's type is also revealed. In such a setting, we propose a no-regret algorithm that achieves a regret of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$, when ignoring the dependence on other parameters.

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arXiv2025

Safe Online Bid Optimization with Return on Investment and Budget Constraints

In online marketing, the advertisers aim to balance achieving high volumes and high profitability. The companies' business units address this tradeoff by maximizing the volumes while guaranteeing a minimum Return On Investment (ROI) level. Such a task can be naturally modeled as a combinatorial optimization problem subject to ROI and budget constraints that can be solved online. In this picture, the learner's uncertainty over the constraints' parameters plays a crucial role since the algorithms' exploration choices might lead to their violation during the entire learning process. Such violations represent a major obstacle to adopting online techniques in real-world applications. Thus, controlling the algorithms' exploration during learning is paramount to making humans trust online learning tools. This paper studies the nature of both optimization and learning problems. In particular, we show that the learning problem is inapproximable within any factor (unless P = NP) and provide a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm to solve its discretized version. Subsequently, we prove that no online learning algorithm can violate the (ROI or budget) constraints a sublinear number of times during the learning process while guaranteeing a sublinear regret. We provide the $GCB$ algorithm that guarantees sublinear regret at the cost of a linear number of constraint violations and $GCB_{safe}$ that guarantees w.h.p. a constant upper bound on the number of constraint violations at the cost of a linear regret. Moreover, we designed $GCB_{safe}(ψ,ϕ)$, which guarantees both sublinear regret and safety w.h.p. at the cost of accepting tolerances $ψ$ and $ϕ$ in the satisfaction of the ROI and budget constraints, respectively. Finally, we provide experimental results to compare the regret and constraint violations of $GCB$, $GCB_{safe}$, and $GCB_{safe}(ψ,ϕ)$.

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arXiv2025

The Complexity of Correlated Equilibria in Generalized Games

Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $Φ$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of equilibrium computation are well-understood in some settings, fundamental questions are still open in generalized games, that is, games in which the set of strategies allowed to each player depends on the other players' strategies. These classes of games model fundamental settings in economics and have been a cornerstone of economics research since the seminal paper of Arrow and Debreu [1954]. Recently, there has been growing interest, both in economics and in computer science, in studying correlated equilibria in generalized games. It is known that finding a social welfare maximizing correlated equilibrium in generalized games is NP-hard. However, the existence of efficient algorithms to find any equilibrium remains an important open question. In this paper, we answer this question negatively, showing that this problem is PPAD-complete.

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arXiv2025

Better Regret Rates in Bilateral Trade via Sublinear Budget Violation

Bilateral trade is a central problem in algorithmic economics, and recent work has explored how to design trading mechanisms using no-regret learning algorithms. However, no-regret learning is impossible when budget balance has to be enforced at each time step. Bernasconi et al. [Ber+24] show how this impossibility can be circumvented by relaxing the budget balance constraint to hold only globally over all time steps. In particular, they design an algorithm achieving regret of the order of $\tilde O(T^{3/4})$ and provide a lower bound of $Ω(T^{5/7})$. In this work, we interpolate between these two extremes by studying how the optimal regret rate varies with the allowed violation of the global budget balance constraint. Specifically, we design an algorithm that, by violating the constraint by at most $T^β$ for any given $β\in [\frac{3}{4}, \frac{6}{7}]$, attains regret $\tilde O(T^{1 - β/3})$. We complement this result with a matching lower bound, thus fully characterizing the trade-off between regret and budget violation. Our results show that both the $\tilde O(T^{3/4})$ upper bound in the global budget balance case and the $Ω(T^{5/7})$ lower bound under unconstrained budget balance violation obtained by Bernasconi et al. [Ber+24] are tight.

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arXiv2025

Data-Dependent Regret Bounds for Constrained MABs

This paper initiates the study of data-dependent regret bounds in constrained MAB settings. These bounds depend on the sequence of losses that characterize the problem instance. Thus, they can be much smaller than classical $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bounds, while being equivalent to them in the worst case. Despite this, data-dependent regret bounds have been completely overlooked in constrained MAB settings. The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: Can data-dependent regret bounds be derived in the presence of constraints? We answer this question affirmatively in constrained MABs with adversarial losses and stochastic constraints. Specifically, our main focus is on the most challenging and natural settings with hard constraints, where the learner must ensure that the constraints are always satisfied with high probability. We design an algorithm with a regret bound consisting of two data-dependent terms. The first term captures the difficulty of satisfying the constraints, while the second one encodes the complexity of learning independently of the presence of constraints. We also prove a lower bound showing that these two terms are not artifacts of our specific approach and analysis, but rather the fundamental components that inherently characterize the complexities of the problem. Finally, in designing our algorithm, we also derive some novel results in the related (and easier) soft constraints settings, which may be of independent interest.

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arXiv2025

No-Regret Learning Under Adversarial Resource Constraints: A Spending Plan Is All You Need!

We study online decision making problems under resource constraints, where both reward and cost functions are drawn from distributions that may change adversarially over time. We focus on two canonical settings: $(i)$ online resource allocation where rewards and costs are observed before action selection, and $(ii)$ online learning with resource constraints where they are observed after action selection, under full feedback or bandit feedback. It is well known that achieving sublinear regret in these settings is impossible when reward and cost distributions may change arbitrarily over time. To address this challenge, we analyze a framework in which the learner is guided by a spending plan--a sequence prescribing expected resource usage across rounds. We design general (primal-)dual methods that achieve sublinear regret with respect to baselines that follow the spending plan. Crucially, the performance of our algorithms improves when the spending plan ensures a well-balanced distribution of the budget across rounds. We additionally provide a robust variant of our methods to handle worst-case scenarios where the spending plan is highly imbalanced. To conclude, we study the regret of our algorithms when competing against benchmarks that deviate from the prescribed spending plan.

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arXiv2025

Multi-Project Contracts

We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each project is a combinatorial function of the agents working on it. Each agent has limited capacity and can work on at most one project, and the agents are heterogeneous, with different costs and contributions for participating in different projects. The main challenge of the principal is to decide how to allocate the agents to projects when the number of projects grows in scale. We analyze this problem under different assumptions on the structure of the expected reward functions. As our main result, for XOS functions we show how to derive a constant approximation to the optimal multi-project contract in polynomial time, given access to value and demand oracles. Along the way (and of possible independent interest), we develop approximate demand queries for \emph{capped} subadditive functions, by reducing to demand queries for the original functions. Our work paves the way to combinatorial contract design in richer settings.

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arXiv2025

Online Two-Sided Markets: Many Buyers Enhance Learning

We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the mechanism designer runs a second-price auction among the buyers -- extending the fixed-price mechanism used in bilateral trade -- before proposing a price to the seller. While this setting introduces new challenges compared to bilateral trade, it also provides an informational advantage. Indeed, the presence of multiple buyers enhances competition, inducing them to reveal their valuations in order to win the auction. However, as in bilateral trade, the seller faces a binary decision: whether to accept the proposed price or not. We show that this asymmetric feedback, which is more informative than in bilateral trade, allows us to break some lower bounds on regret minimization with a single buyer. In particular, we provide a $\tilde O(T^{2/3})$ regret upper bound with respect to an optimal strong budget-balanced mechanism, without any assumptions on the distribution of valuations. Our main tool for achieving this result is the design of an adaptive grid that approximates the optimal gain from trade across the continuum of possible mechanisms. Furthermore, we attain the same regret bound with respect to an optimal global budget-balanced mechanism, under two possible conditions: (i) buyers' and seller's valuations are independent, or (ii) valuations are drawn from a distribution with bounded density. In doing so, we provide some novel technical results on constrained MABs with feedback graphs, which may be of independent interest.

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arXiv2025

Contract Design Under Approximate Best Responses

Principal-agent problems model scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to take costly, unobservable actions through the provision of payments. Such problems are ubiquitous in several real-world applications, ranging from blockchain to the delegation of machine learning tasks. In this paper, we initiate the study of hidden-action principal-agent problems under approximate best responses, in which the agent may select any action that is not too much suboptimal given the principal's payment scheme (a.k.a. contract). Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal contract under approximate best responses. This positive result is perhaps surprising, since, in Stackelberg games, computing an optimal commitment under approximate best responses is computationally intractable. We also investigate the learnability of contracts under approximate best responses, by providing a no-regret learning algorithm for a natural application scenario where the principal has no prior knowledge about the environment.

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arXiv2025

Single-dimensional Contract Design: Efficient Algorithms and Learning

We study a Bayesian contract design problem in which a principal interacts with an unknown agent. We consider the single-parameter uncertainty model introduced by Alon et al. [2021], in which the agent's type is described by a single parameter, i.e., the cost per unit-of-effort. Despite its simplicity, several works have shown that single-dimensional contract design is not necessarily easier than its multi-dimensional counterpart in many respects. Perhaps the most surprising result is the reduction by Castiglioni et al . [2025] from multi- to single-dimensional contract design. However, their reduction preserves only multiplicative approximations, leaving open the question of whether additive approximations are easier to obtain than multiplicative ones. In this paper, we answer this question -- to some extent -- positively. In particular, we provide an additive PTAS for these problems while also ruling out the existence of an additive FPTAS. This, in turn, implies that no reduction from multi- to single-dimensional contracts can preserve additive approximations. Moreover, we show that single-dimensional contract design is fundamentally easier than its multi-dimensional counterpart from a learning perspective. Under mild assumptions, we show that optimal contracts can be learned efficiently, providing results on both regret and sample complexity.

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arXiv2025

Learning Adversarial MDPs with Stochastic Hard Constraints

We study online learning in constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) with adversarial losses and stochastic hard constraints, under bandit feedback. We consider three scenarios. In the first one, we address general CMDPs, where we design an algorithm attaining sublinear regret and cumulative positive constraints violation. In the second scenario, under the mild assumption that a policy strictly satisfying the constraints exists and is known to the learner, we design an algorithm that achieves sublinear regret while ensuring that constraints are satisfied at every episode with high probability. In the last scenario, we only assume the existence of a strictly feasible policy, which is not known to the learner, and we design an algorithm attaining sublinear regret and constant cumulative positive constraints violation. Finally, we show that in the last two scenarios, a dependence on the Slater's parameter is unavoidable. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study CMDPs involving both adversarial losses and hard constraints. Thus, our algorithms can deal with general non-stationary environments subject to requirements much stricter than those manageable with existing ones, enabling their adoption in a much wider range of applications.

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arXiv2025

Best-of-Both-Worlds Policy Optimization for CMDPs with Bandit Feedback

We study online learning in constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) in which rewards and constraints may be either stochastic or adversarial. In such settings, Stradi et al.(2024) proposed the first best-of-both-worlds algorithm able to seamlessly handle stochastic and adversarial constraints, achieving optimal regret and constraint violation bounds in both cases. This algorithm suffers from two major drawbacks. First, it only works under full feedback, which severely limits its applicability in practice. Moreover, it relies on optimizing over the space of occupancy measures, which requires solving convex optimization problems, an highly inefficient task. In this paper, we provide the first best-of-both-worlds algorithm for CMDPs with bandit feedback. Specifically, when the constraints are stochastic, the algorithm achieves $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret and constraint violation, while, when they are adversarial, it attains $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ constraint violation and a tight fraction of the optimal reward. Moreover, our algorithm is based on a policy optimization approach, which is much more efficient than occupancy-measure-based methods.

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