arXiv subjects

Matthias Fitzi

Publications and source records attributed to Matthias Fitzi.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2022

FairTraDEX: A Decentralised Exchange Preventing Value Extraction

We present FairTraDEX, a decentralized exchange (DEX) protocol based on frequent batch auctions (FBAs), which provides formal game-theoretic guarantees against extractable value. FBAs when run by a trusted third-party provide unique game-theoretic optimal strategies which ensure players are shown prices equal to the liquidity provider's fair price, excluding explicit, pre-determined fees. FairTraDEX replicates the key features of an FBA that provide these game-theoretic guarantees using a combination of set-membership in zero-knowledge protocols and an escrow-enforced commit-reveal protocol. We extend the results of FBAs to handle monopolistic and/or malicious liquidity providers. We provide real-world examples that demonstrate that the costs of executing orders in existing academic and industry-standard protocols become prohibitive as order size increases due to basic value extraction techniques, popularized as maximal extractable value. We further demonstrate that FairTraDEX protects against these execution costs, guaranteeing a fixed fee model independent of order size, the first guarantee of it's kind for a DEX protocol. We also provide detailed Solidity and pseudo-code implementations of FairTraDEX, making FairTraDEX a novel and practical contribution.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Minotaur: Multi-Resource Blockchain Consensus

Resource-based consensus is the backbone of permissionless distributed ledger systems. The security of such protocols relies fundamentally on the level of resources actively engaged in the system. The variety of different resources (and related proof protocols, some times referred to as PoX in the literature) raises the fundamental question whether it is possible to utilize many of them in tandem and build multi-resource consensus protocols. The challenge in combining different resources is to achieve fungibility between them, in the sense that security would hold as long as the cumulative adversarial power across all resources is bounded. In this work, we put forth Minotaur, a multi-resource blockchain consensus protocol that combines proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS), and we prove it optimally fungible. At the core of our design, Minotaur operates in epochs while continuously sampling the active computational power to provide a fair exchange between the two resources, work and stake. Further, we demonstrate the ability of Minotaur to handle a higher degree of work fluctuation as compared to the Bitcoin blockchain; we also generalize Minotaur to any number of resources. We demonstrate the simplicity of Minotaur via implementing a full stack client in Rust (available open source). We use the client to test the robustness of Minotaur to variable mining power and combined work/stake attacks and demonstrate concrete empirical evidence towards the suitability of Minotaur to serve as the consensus layer of a real-world blockchain.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2010

The non-locality of n noisy Popescu-Rohrlich boxes

We quantify the amount of non-locality contained in n noisy versions of so-called Popescu-Rohrlich boxes (PRBs), i.e., bipartite systems violating the CHSH Bell inequality maximally. Following the approach by Elitzur, Popescu, and Rohrlich, we measure the amount of non-locality of a system by representing it as a convex combination of a local behaviour, with maximal possible weight, and a non-signalling system. We show that the local part of n systems, each of which approximates a PRB with probability $1-ε$, is of order $Θ(ε^{\lceil n/2\rceil})$ in the isotropic, and equal to $(3ε)^n$ in the maximally biased case.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2001

A Quantum solution to the Byzantine agreement problem

We present a solution to an old and timely problem in distributed computing. Like Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), quantum channels make it possible to achieve taks classically impossible. However, unlike QKD, here the goal is not secrecy but agreement, and the adversary is not outside but inside the game, and the resources require qutrits.

quant-ph↗