arXiv subjects

Matthias Mertens

Publications and source records attributed to Matthias Mertens.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Crashing Waves vs. Rising Tides: Findings on AI Automation from Thousands of Worker Evaluations of Labor Market Tasks

We characterize AI automation as a continuum between crashing waves, in which capabilities jump abruptly across narrow task sets, and rising tides, in which capabilities improve continuously and broadly. Using evidence from more than 6,000 text-based, LLM-addressable tasks derived from the U.S. Department of Labor's O*NET taxonomy and over 60,000 evaluations by experienced workers, we find little evidence of crashing waves (contrary to existing views). Instead, rising tides are the primary form of AI progress. AI performance is high and improving rapidly across many tasks. In 2024-Q2, models completed text-based tasks that take humans about 1.5 hours to complete with roughly 60% success, rising above 70% by 2025-Q3. If recent trends in AI capability growth persist, frontier LLMs will be able to complete most text-based tasks at minimally sufficient quality with 88%-97% success by 2030.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Is there "Secret Sauce'' in Large Language Model Development?

Do leading LLM developers possess a proprietary ``secret sauce'', or is LLM performance driven by scaling up compute? Using training and benchmark data for 809 models released between 2022 and 2025, we estimate scaling-law regressions with release-date and developer fixed effects. We find clear evidence of developer-specific efficiency advantages, but their importance depends on where models lie in the performance distribution. At the frontier, 80-90% of performance differences are explained by higher training compute, implying that scale--not proprietary technology--drives frontier advances. Away from the frontier, however, proprietary techniques and shared algorithmic progress substantially reduce the compute required to reach fixed capability thresholds. Some companies can systematically produce smaller models more efficiently. Strikingly, we also find substantial variation of model efficiency within companies; a firm can train two models with more than 40x compute efficiency difference. We also discuss the implications for AI leadership and capability diffusion.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

The Price of Progress: Price Performance and the Future of AI

Language models have seen enormous progress on advanced benchmarks in recent years, but much of this progress has only been possible by using more costly models. Benchmarks may therefore present a warped picture of progress in practical capabilities *per dollar*. To remedy this, we use data from Artificial Analysis and Epoch AI to form the largest dataset of current and historical prices to run benchmarks to date. We find that the price for a given level of benchmark performance has decreased remarkably fast, around $5\times$ to $10\times$ per year, for frontier models on knowledge, reasoning, math, and software engineering benchmarks. These reductions in the cost of AI inference are due to economic forces, hardware efficiency improvements, and algorithmic efficiency improvements. Isolating out open models to control for competition effects and dividing by hardware price declines, we estimate that algorithmic efficiency progress is around $3\times$ per year. However, at the same time, the price of running frontier models is rising between $3\times$ to $18\times$ per year due to bigger models and larger reasoning demands. Finally, we recommend that evaluators both publicize and take into account the price of benchmarking as an essential part of measuring the real-world impact of AI.

cs.LG↗