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Mauro Conti

Publications and source records attributed to Mauro Conti.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Does Reasoning Mitigate Backdoor Attacks? A Neuro-Symbolic Perspective

Neuro-Symbolic (NeSy) AI has recently emerged as a novel paradigm to enable trustworthy AI, aiming at integrating sub-symbolic neural perception with grounded symbolic reasoning. The neuro-symbolic integration process that characterizes these models has been proven beneficial to achieve more transparent, explainable and efficient AI systems. Meanwhile, their properties under adversarial settings have been overlooked being frequently deemed robust-by-design. However, the neural-symbolic integration process they leverage constitutes an additional layer of complexity that may provide an attack entry-point. Therefore, in this paper, we claim that an in-depth investigation of the adversarial robustness of NeSy models is necessary and provide the first systematic evaluation of backdoor attacks against NeSy. To this end, we compare the most popular NeSy framework, namely DeepProbLog, against baseline neural networks across a total of eight backdoor settings and four reasoning tasks. Our experimental results show that while NeSy models are indeed more robust than their neural counterpart on average, their robustness vastly depend on the strictness of the reasoning process being enforced and its compatibility with the chosen adversarial target. The source code to reproduce our experiments is made available at https://github.com/marcoantoniocorallo/NeSy-Backdoor.

cs.CR

zk-ScalHard: Scalable and Hardware-Rooted Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Secure OTA Updates in Zonal SDVs

The automotive industry is transitioning to Zonal-oriented Architectures (ZoA) for Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs), enabling frequent over-the-air (OTA) updates for 100+ Electronic Control Units (ECUs). While OTA updates improve efficiency, they introduce safety-critical security risks. Current standards like Uptane and AUTOSAR Adaptive rely on Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, PKI-based authentication creates bandwidth bottlenecks in in-vehicle and vehicle-to-cloud (V2I) communication as ECU density increases. It also risks exposing sensitive vehicle configurations and passenger privacy due to centralized architectures. Next-generation Zonal SDVs require decentralized, scalable authentication with data privacy. To address this, we propose zk-ScalHard, a hardware-rooted, privacy-preserving authentication protocol. We introduce a decentralized, hierarchical trust-promotion model utilizing Silicon Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and two novel Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) circuits: (1) Zonal Identity and Integrity (ZIDI) and (2) High-Performance Computing Aggregation (HPCA). These circuits employ multi-party computation (MPC) and recursive aggregation to achieve decentralization and scalability. The integration of ZKPs and PUFs ensures 100% vehicle-level data sovereignty. Benchmarked against Uptane, zk-ScalHard achieves constant O(1) communication and verification complexity, improving upon the linear O(n) complexity of current systems. Evaluation shows a 99.2% reduction in authentication bandwidth and a 99.9% reduction in the temporal attack surface. Our results demonstrate that zk-ScalHard provides a scalable, secure, and GDPR-compliant architecture for future Zonal SDVs.

cs.CR

Toward Agentic SysAdmin: Rethinking System Administration with AI Agents

The growing complexity of computer networks, driven by cloud-native architectures, heterogeneous devices, and distributed systems, places increasing pressure on network administrators who must simultaneously manage configuration, troubleshooting, and security under tight operational constraints. Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a promising tool to assist and partially automate these tasks, yet their systematic evaluation in networking scenarios remains an open challenge. Existing benchmarks rely on static reference outputs or manual expert validation, neither of which scales to the diversity of real-world network states or to the variety of orchestration strategies -- from monolithic prompting to fully agentic pipelines --through which LLMs are increasingly deployed. In this paper, we present NetLLMeval, a framework for automatically evaluating LLM-based systems on network administration tasks by leveraging live network emulation to derive ground truth without human intervention. Through a full-factorial study of 24000 runs spanning 10 foundation models, 4 solver architectures, 10 task types, and 6 network topologies of increasing complexity, we show that solver design has a great impact on accuracy -- lifting a 14B open-weight model from 0.43 to 0.88 correctness -- and that such locally-deployable models can match trillion-parameter frontier systems under the right configuration. NetLLMeval is released open-source to support reproducible benchmarking of future models and solver designs.

cs.NI

ShellGames: Speculative LLM-Driven SSH Deception

Cyber deception and Moving Target Defense are promising strategies that aim to disrupt adversaries by increasing uncertainty. However, sustaining long-lived, credible interactive sessions with adversaries remains an open challenge. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a promising path toward more dynamic deception systems, but suffer from key limitations that fundamentally limit their applicability, including: lack of persistent state, output inconsistencies, hallucinations, latency, and susceptibility to behavioral subversion that may reveal the deception. We propose ShellGames, an SSH shell simulator based on LLM designed to address these limitations. ShellGames combines five complementary techniques: (i) Automatic Chain-of-Thought and few-shot learning to improve correctness; (ii) memory management to maintain system state coherency; (iii) speculative command execution to reduce response latency; (iv) smart routing of complex interactive commands to a sandboxed environment; and (v) subversion detection leveraging the constrained input-output domain of shell environments. To enable systematic evaluation, we introduce a standardized benchmarking protocol and dataset spanning correctness, consistency, state tracking, and robustness tasks. ShellGames achieves $0.898$ command accuracy on correctness ($+5.3pp$ over baselines), $0.918$ sequence-level accuracy on consistency ($+36pp$), $0.98$ state tracking accuracy ($+18.3pp$), and $0.95$ accuracy on robustness ($+37pp$). A user study with $n=20$ participants confirms that ShellGames achieves realism comparable to a real shell under free exploration and outperforms traditional honeypots on perceived command coverage.

cs.CR

FIDEM: A Standard-Compliant Framework for Secure Binding of MUD Profiles to IoT Devices

The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) enables enforcement of network restrictions for IoT devices based on their expected network traffic, as specified by manufacturers in a MUD file. Devices advertise a URL pointing to this file, yet the standard does not define how to securely bind the issuing device to its profile. As a result, malicious devices can manipulate network policy enforcement by advertising valid URLs referencing genuine MUD profiles, but not intended for that device. Although MUD defines a certificate-based secure issuance method, current deployments rely on the insecure DHCP-based extension due to simpler integration. Existing solutions either depend on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), break standard compliance, require excessive active manufacturer involvement, or overlook secure profile updates. In this paper, we present FIDEM, a standard-compliant framework for securing DHCP-based MUD URL issuance. FIDEM provides cryptographic binding between IoT devices and their MUD profiles by leveraging Zero-Knowledge-Proof authentication, without requiring device certificates or device-side PKI, minimizing manufacturers' involvement, and supporting secure profile updates. Formal analysis shows that FIDEM withstands stronger adversaries than in prior work, including supply-chain compromise and attacks using legitimate devices as cryptographic oracles. Our real-world evaluation on two reference constrained devices (ESP32-S3 and ESP32-C6) demonstrates minimal overhead compared to standard DHCP (~5 ms, 20 mJ) and significant improvements over certificate-based benchmarks (x21 faster, ~23\%\) less energy consumption) on an ESP32-C6 device.

cs.CR

Refusal Before Decoding: Detecting and Exploiting Refusal Signals in Intermediate LLM Activations

In this paper, we investigate whether refusal behavior can be predicted from LLM intermediate activations before decoding using linear probes trained on residual stream activations at each transformer block. We find that refusal is linearly decodable well before the final layer, indicating that safety-relevant behavior is represented in intermediate activations before output generation. To test whether this signal is actionable, we introduce Mechanistic AutoDAN, a probe-guided variant of AutoDAN that replaces full-model fitness evaluation with partial forward passes and probe-based scoring inside a genetic prompt search loop. Across the evaluated models, our method achieves attack success rates competitive with vanilla AutoDAN while reducing per-iteration search time by up to 72%, and probe-guided prompts match or exceed AutoDAN's cross-model transfer in several configurations. We further find that the usefulness of probe guidance increases with model scale. Our results suggest that refusal-relevant information is decodable from intermediate activations and can serve as an effective search signal in an AutoDAN-style discrete jailbreak optimization loop, especially for larger and more robust models.

cs.AI

From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists

The pervasive integration of AI has enabled Offensive AI: the exploitation of AI for malicious ends across the cyber-kill chain. A critical manifestation is the user attribute inference attack, where AI infers sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from innocuous public data. We explore how music streaming ecosystems, where users routinely release public playlists, can be exploited for Offensive AI. To quantify this threat, we developed musicPIIrate. This novel tool leverages deep learning architectures that utilize both standalone data representations and the structural information embedded in a user's playlist collection. Our design explores set-based approaches (e.g., Deep Sets) and methodologies modeling relationships between playlists (e.g., Graph Neural Networks), which we also combine to leverage both perspectives. Our approach addresses feature extraction from unordered, variable-length set data, enabling accurate PII prediction. Empirical evaluation demonstrates that musicPIIrate achieves state-of-the-art inference accuracy. The tool successfully infers a wide array of attributes, including: Demographics (Age, Country, Gender), Habits (Alcohol, Smoke, Sport), and Personality Traits (OCEAN scores). musicPIIrate outperforms existing methods, beating baselines in 9 out of 15 attribute inference tasks. To counter this vulnerability, we propose JamShield, a lightweight defensive framework. JamShield strategically injects dummy playlists into an account to dilute the PII-carrying signal. Our analysis indicates that JamShield represents a promising defense, lowering inference F1-scores by an average of 10%. This work provides an initial Offensive-AI benchmark for playlist-based PII inference using architectures that leverage set- and graph-structured data and introduces a defense showing encouraging mitigation effects.

cs.CR

I can't recognize (yet): Delayed Rendering to Defeat Visual Phishing Detectors

Phishing webpages are continuously polluting the Web. Plenty of countermeasures have been proposed and the most advanced techniques leverage machine-learning methods that infer whether a webpage is benign or not by inspecting its visual representation. Yet, despite the demonstrated effectiveness of such detection methods, this class of defenses is, by design, susceptible to a kind of subtle-but-cheap timing-based attacks which -- worryingly, and perhaps surprisingly -- have never been investigated so far. Such an oversight questions the overall reliability of these defenses in the wild. First, we show that timing-based evasion attacks have not been accounted for by prior work on visual phishing websites detectors. Then, we elucidate the intrinsic vulnerability of these detectors: they can be bypassed by delaying the rendering of webpage elements. Practically, these detectors must compute the visual similarity between a target webpage and a known legitimate one. This requires taking a "snapshot" of the target webpage before the similarity computation. Attackers can deliberately delay the rendering of key elements, such as the logo, so that these elements appear fully only after the snapshot has been taken. This simple tactic misleads the visual-similarity module, leading the system to incorrectly classify the phishing page as benign. We empirically show that state-of-the-art detectors can be completely defeated (detection rate dropping from 100% to 0%) by employing easy-to-apply problem-space techniques such as curtain effects. We also carry out a user study, evaluating the effectiveness of these attacks against real humans, and find that end users are unable to reliably identify our "perturbations" (p<.05). Finally, we propose mitigations, including a browser-extension that, without making any call to remote services, warns users that they may have landed on a phishing webpage.

cs.CR

QUACK! Making the (Rubber) Ducky Talk: A Systematic Study of Keystroke Dynamics for HID Injection Detection

Modern computing systems implicitly trust human input devices, allowing USB Human Interface Device (HID) emulators, such as the USB Rubber Ducky, to inject arbitrary keystrokes while bypassing conventional defenses. Speed- and regularity-based heuristics are easily evaded through slower or randomized timing. Keystroke dynamics offers a behavioral alternative, but prior work primarily addresses user authentication rather than user-agnostic detection of automated input. Moreover, detectors that process or retain key identities may expose sensitive content. In this paper, we investigate whether timing alone can distinguish human from machine-generated keystrokes without per-user enrollment or semantic input features. We systematically evaluate lightweight classifiers using only hold and flight times in a controlled offline setting. Across progressively structured synthetic attacker families, we examine cross-generator transfer, mixed-generator training, attacker sophistication, and the effect of observation-window length on discrimination performance and decision delay. Our results show that lightweight models can effectively discriminate human from machine-generated input across the evaluated generators without content access or user profiling. Our analysis also suggests that greater synthesis sophistication does not monotonically improve evasion. Moreover, detection performance primarily depends on exposure to structurally distinct generation strategies rather than model complexity. This finding can reduce the number of attacker models required for training and supports the feasibility of content-independent, user-agnostic HID-injection detection, while physical HID validation remains necessary.

cs.CR

Strengthening security and noise resistance in one-way quantum key distribution protocols through hypercube-based quantum walks

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a foundational cryptographic protocol that ensures information-theoretic security. However, classical protocols such as BB84, though favored for their simplicity, offer limited resistance to eavesdropping, and perform poorly under realistic noise conditions. Recent research has explored the use of discrete-time Quantum Walks (QWs) to enhance QKD schemes. In this work, we specifically focus on a one-way QKD protocol, where security depends exclusively on the underlying Quantum Walk (QW) topology, rather than the details of the protocol itself. Our paper introduces a novel protocol based on QWs over a hypercube topology and demonstrates that, under identical parameters, it provides significantly enhanced security and noise resistance compared to the circular topology (i.e., state-of-the-art), thereby strengthening protection against eavesdropping. Furthermore, we introduce an efficient and extensible simulation framework for one-way QKD protocols based on QWs, supporting both circular and hypercube topologies. Implemented with IBM's software development kit for quantum computing (i.e., Qiskit), our toolkit enables noise-aware analysis under realistic noise models. To support reproducibility and future developments, we release our entire simulation framework as open-source. This contribution establishes a foundation for the design of topology-aware QKD protocols that combine enhanced noise tolerance with topologically driven security.

cs.CR

The CTI Echo Chamber: Fragmentation, Overlap, and Vendor Specificity in Twenty Years of Cyber Threat Reporting

Despite the high volume of open-source Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), our understanding of long-term threat actor-victim dynamics remains fragmented due to inconsistent reporting standards and the lack of structured datasets containing comprehensive analytic information. In this paper, we present a large-scale automated analysis of open-source CTI reports spanning two decades. We develop a high-precision, LLM-based pipeline to ingest and structure 16,096 reports, extracting key entities such as attributed threat actors, motivations, victims, reporting vendors, and technical indicators (IoCs and TTPs). Our analysis quantifies the evolution of CTI information density and specialization, characterizing patterns that relate specific threat actors to motivations and victim profiles. Furthermore, we perform a meta-analysis of the CTI industry itself. We identify a fragmented ecosystem of distinct silos where vendors demonstrate significant geographic and sectoral reporting biases. Our marginal coverage analysis reveals that intelligence overlap between vendors is typically low: while a few core providers may offer broad situational awareness, additional sources yield diminishing returns. Overall, our findings characterize the structural biases inherent in the CTI ecosystem, enabling practitioners and researchers to better evaluate the completeness of their intelligence sources.

cs.CR

ORCA - An Automated Threat Analysis Pipeline for O-RAN Continuous Development

The Open-Radio Access Network (O-RAN) integrates numerous software components in a cloud-like deployment, opening the radio access network to previously unconsidered security threats. With the ever-evolving threat landscape, integrating security practices through a DevSecOps approach is essential for fast and secure releases. Current vulnerability assessment practices often rely on manual, labor-intensive, and subjective investigations, leading to inconsistencies in the threat analysis. To mitigate these issues, we establish an automated pipeline that leverages Natural Language Processing (NLP) to minimize human intervention and associated biases. By mapping real-world vulnerabilities to predefined threat lists with a standardized input format, our approach is the first to enable iterative, quantitative, and efficient assessments, generating reliable threat scores for both individual vulnerabilities and entire system components within O-RAN. We illustrate the effectiveness of our framework through an example implementation for O-RAN, showcasing how continuous security testing can integrate into automated testing pipelines to address the unique security challenges of this paradigm shift in telecommunications.

cs.CR

A Practical Solution to Systematically Monitor Inconsistencies in SBOM-based Vulnerability Scanners

Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) provides new opportunities for automated vulnerability identification in software products. While the industry is adopting SBOM-based Vulnerability Scanning (SVS) to identify vulnerabilities, we increasingly observe inconsistencies and unexpected behavior, that result in false negatives and silent failures. In this work, we present the background necessary to understand the underlying complexity of SVS and introduce SVS-TEST, a method and tool to analyze the capability, maturity, and failure conditions of SVS-tools in real-world scenarios. We showcase the utility of SVS-TEST in a case study evaluating seven real-world SVS-tools using 16 precisely crafted SBOMs and their respective ground truth. Our results unveil significant differences in the reliability and error handling of SVS-tools; multiple SVS-tools silently fail on valid input SBOMs, creating a false sense of security. We conclude our work by highlighting implications for researchers and practitioners, including how organizations and developers of SVS-tools can utilize SVS-TEST to monitor SVS capability and maturity. All results and research artifacts are made publicly available and all findings were disclosed to the SVS-tool developers ahead of time.

cs.SE

The Hidden Dangers of Public Serverless Repositories: An Empirical Security Assessment

Serverless computing has rapidly emerged as a prominent cloud paradigm, enabling developers to focus solely on application logic without the burden of managing servers or underlying infrastructure. Public serverless repositories have become key to accelerating the development of serverless applications. However, their growing popularity makes them attractive targets for adversaries. Despite this, the security posture of these repositories remains largely unexplored, exposing developers and organizations to potential risks. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive analysis of the security landscape of serverless components hosted in public repositories. We analyse 2,758 serverless components from five widely used public repositories popular among developers and enterprises, and 125,936 Infrastructure as Code (IaC) templates across three widely used IaC frameworks. Our analysis reveals systemic vulnerabilities including outdated software packages, misuse of sensitive parameters, exploitable deployment configurations, susceptibility to typo-squatting attacks and opportunities to embed malicious behaviour within compressed serverless components. Finally, we provide practical recommendations to mitigate these threats.

cs.CR

Disc-Cover Complexity Trends in Music Illustrations from Sinatra to Swift

The study of art evolution has provided valuable insights into societal change, often revealing long-term patterns of simplification and transformation. Album covers represent a distinctive yet understudied form of visual art that has both shaped and been shaped by cultural, technological, and commercial dynamics over the past century. As highly visible artifacts at the intersection of art and commerce, they offer a unique lens through which to study cultural evolution. In this work, we examine the visual complexity of album covers spanning 75 years and 11 popular musical genres. Using a diverse set of computational measures that capture multiple dimensions of visual complexity, our analysis reveals a broad shift toward minimalism across most genres, with notable exceptions that highlight the heterogeneity of aesthetic trends. At the same time, we observe growing variance over time, with many covers continuing to display high levels of abstraction and intricacy. Together, these findings position album covers as a rich, quantifiable archive of cultural history and underscore the value of computational approaches in the systematic study of the arts, bridging quantitative analysis with aesthetic and cultural inquiry.

cs.CY

Merge Now, Regret Later: The Hidden Cost of Model Merging Is Adversarial Transferability

Model Merging (MM) has proven to be an effective alternative to multi-task learning, where several fine-tuned models are merged, without access to the tasks' training data, into one model that retains performance across different tasks. Recent works have explored the security of MM, showing how MM can confer robustness against various adversarial attacks. However, none of them has sufficiently explored its impact on transfer attacks using transferable adversarial examples. In this work, we study the effect of MM on the transferability of adversarial examples. We perform comprehensive evaluations and statistical analysis consisting of eight MM methods, seven datasets, and six attack methods, sweeping over 336 distinct attack settings. Through it, we first challenge the prevailing notion of MM conferring free adversarial robustness, and show that MM cannot reliably defend against transfer attacks, with over 80% transfer rate. Moreover, we reveal two key insights for machine-learning practitioners regarding MM and transferability for a robust system design: (1) stronger MM methods increase vulnerability to transfer attacks and (2) mitigating representation bias increases vulnerability to transfer attacks. We also find weight averaging as an exception to (1), i.e., it is found to be the most vulnerable method to transfer attacks, despite being the weakest MM method. Finally, we analyze the underlying reasons for these findings, show how an adversary with limited information could launch an attack, and provide potential solutions. These findings offer actionable insights for deploying MM in security-sensitive machine-learning systems.

cs.LG

Preventing Robotic Jailbreaking via Multimodal Domain Adaptation

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in robotic environments but remain vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that bypass safety mechanisms and drive unsafe or physically harmful behaviors in the real world. Data-driven defenses such as jailbreak classifiers show promise, yet they struggle to generalize in domains where specialized datasets are scarce, limiting their effectiveness in robotics and other safety-critical contexts. To address this gap, we introduce J-DAPT, a lightweight framework for multimodal jailbreak detection through attention-based fusion and domain adaptation. J-DAPT integrates textual and visual embeddings to capture both semantic intent and environmental grounding, while aligning general-purpose jailbreak datasets with domain-specific reference data. Evaluations across autonomous driving, maritime robotics, and quadruped navigation show that J-DAPT boosts detection accuracy to nearly 100% with minimal overhead. These results demonstrate that J-DAPT provides a practical defense for securing VLMs in robotic applications. Additional materials are made available at: https://j-dapt.github.io.

cs.RO

Inference Attacks on Encrypted Online Voting via Traffic Analysis

Online voting enables individuals to participate in elections remotely, offering greater efficiency and accessibility in both governmental and organizational settings. As this method gains popularity, ensuring the security of online voting systems becomes increasingly vital, as the systems supporting it must satisfy a demanding set of security requirements. Most research in this area emphasizes the design and verification of cryptographic protocols to protect voter integrity and system confidentiality. However, other vectors, such as network traffic analysis, remain relatively understudied, even though they may pose significant threats to voter privacy and the overall trustworthiness of the system. In this paper, we examine how adversaries can exploit metadata from encrypted network traffic to uncover sensitive information during online voting. Our analysis reveals that, even without accessing the encrypted content, it is possible to infer critical voter actions, such as whether a person votes, the exact moment a ballot is submitted, and whether the ballot is valid or spoiled. We test these attacks with both rule-based techniques and machine learning methods. We evaluate our attacks on two widely used online voting platforms, one proprietary and one partially open source, achieving classification accuracy as high as 99.5%. These results expose a significant privacy vulnerability that threatens key properties of secure elections, including voter secrecy and protection against coercion or vote-buying. We explore mitigations to our attacks, demonstrating that countermeasures such as payload padding and timestamp equalization can substantially limit their effectiveness.

cs.CR