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Mauro Mobilia

Publications and source records attributed to Mauro Mobilia.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Stochastic population dynamics in spatially extended predator-prey systems

Spatially extended population dynamics models that incorporate intrinsic noise serve as case studies for the role of fluctuations and correlations in biological systems. Including spatial structure and stochastic noise in predator-prey competition invalidates the deterministic Lotka-Volterra picture of neutral population cycles. Stochastic models yield long-lived erratic population oscillations stemming from a resonant amplification mechanism. In spatially extended predator-prey systems, one observes noise-stabilized activity and persistent correlations. Fluctuation-induced renormalizations of the oscillation parameters can be analyzed perturbatively. The critical dynamics and the non-equilibrium relaxation kinetics at the predator extinction threshold are characterized by the directed percolation universality class. Spatial or environmental variability results in more localized patches which enhances both species densities. Affixing variable rates to individual particles and allowing for trait inheritance subject to mutations induces fast evolutionary dynamics for the rate distributions. Stochastic spatial variants of cyclic competition with rock-paper-scissors interactions illustrate connections between population dynamics and evolutionary game theory, and demonstrate how space can help maintain diversity. In two dimensions, three-species cyclic competition models of the May-Leonard type are characterized by the emergence of spiral patterns whose properties are elucidated by a mapping onto a complex Ginzburg-Landau equation. Extensions to general food networks can be classified on the mean-field level, which provides both a fundamental understanding of ensuing cooperativity and emergence of alliances. Novel space-time patterns emerge as a result of the formation of competing alliances, such as coarsening domains that each incorporate rock-paper-scissors competition games.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

Evolution of a Fluctuating Population in a Randomly Switching Environment

Environment plays a fundamental role in the competition for resources, and hence in the evolution of populations. Here, we study a well-mixed, finite population consisting of two strains competing for the limited resources provided by an environment that randomly switches between states of abundance and scarcity. Assuming that one strain grows slightly faster than the other, we consider two scenarios--one of pure resource competition, and one in which one strain provides a public good--and investigate how environmental randomness (external noise) coupled to demographic (internal) noise determines the population's fixation properties and size distribution. By analytical means and simulations, we show that these coupled sources of noise can significantly enhance the fixation probability of the slower-growing species. We also show that the population size distribution can be unimodal, bimodal or multimodal and undergoes noise-induced transitions between these regimes when the rate of switching matches the population's growth rate.

q-bio.PE↗

Large Fluctuations in Anti-Coordination Games on Scale-Free Graphs

We study the influence of the complex topology of scale-free graphs on the dynamics of anti-coordination games (e.g. snowdrift games). These reference models are characterized by the coexistence (evolutionary stable mixed strategy) of two competing species, say "cooperators" and "defectors", and, in finite systems, by metastability and large-fluctuation-driven fixation. In this work, we use extensive computer simulations and an effective diffusion approximation (in the weak selection limit) to determine under which circumstances, depending on the individual-based update rules, the topology drastically affects the long-time behavior of anti-coordination games. In particular, we compute the variance of the number of cooperators in the metastable state and the mean fixation time when the dynamics is implemented according to the voter model (death-first/birth-second process) and the link dynamics (birth/death or death/birth at random). For the voter update rule, we show that the scale-free topology effectively renormalizes the population size and as a result the statistics of observables depend on the network's degree distribution. In contrast, such a renormalization does not occur with the link dynamics update rule and we recover the same behavior as on complete graphs.

physics.soc-ph↗

A Heterogeneous Out-of-Equilibrium Nonlinear $q$-Voter Model with Zealotry

We study the dynamics of the out-of-equilibrium nonlinear q-voter model with two types of susceptible voters and zealots, introduced in [EPL 113, 48001 (2016)]. In this model, each individual supports one of two parties and is either a susceptible voter of type $q_1$ or $q_2$, or is an inflexible zealot. At each time step, a $q_i$-susceptible voter ($i = 1,2$) consults a group of $q_i$ neighbors and adopts their opinion if all group members agree, while zealots are inflexible and never change their opinion. This model violates detailed balance whenever $q_1 \neq q_2$ and is characterized by two distinct regimes of low and high density of zealotry. Here, by combining analytical and numerical methods, we investigate the non-equilibrium stationary state of the system in terms of its probability distribution, non-vanishing currents and unequal-time two-point correlation functions. We also study the switching times properties of the model by exploiting an approximate mapping onto the model of [Phys. Rev. E 92, 012803 (2015)] that satisfies the detailed balance, and also outline some properties of the model near criticality.

physics.soc-ph↗

The Influence of Mobility Rate on Spiral Waves in Spatial Rock-Paper-Scissors Games

We consider a two-dimensional model of three species in rock-paper-scissors competition and study the self-organisation of the population into fascinating spiraling patterns. Within our individual-based metapopulation formulation, the population composition changes due to cyclic dominance (dominance-removal and dominance-replacement), mutations, and pair-exchange of neighboring individuals. Here, we study the influence of mobility on the emerging patterns and investigate when the pair-exchange rate is responsible for spiral waves to become elusive in stochastic lattice simulations. In particular, we show that the spiral waves predicted by the system's deterministic partial equations are found in lattice simulations only within a finite range of the mobility rate. We also report that in the absence of mutations and dominance-replacement, the resulting spiraling patterns are subject to convective instability and far-field breakup at low mobility rate. Possible applications of these resolution and far-field breakup phenomena are discussed.

q-bio.PE↗

Characterization of the Nonequilibrium Steady State of a Heterogeneous Nonlinear $q$-Voter Model with Zealotry

We introduce an heterogeneous nonlinear $q$-voter model with zealots and two types of susceptible voters, and study its non-equilibrium properties when the population is finite and well mixed. In this two-opinion model, each individual supports one of two parties and is either a zealot or a susceptible voter of type $q_1$ or $q_2$. While here zealots never change their opinion, a $q_i$-susceptible voter ($i=1,2$) consults a group of $q_i$ neighbors at each time step, and adopts their opinion if all group members agree. We show that this model violates the detailed balance whenever $q_1 \neq q_2$ and has surprisingly rich properties. Here, we focus on the characterization of the model's non-equilibrium stationary state (NESS) in terms of its probability distribution and currents in the distinct regimes of low and high density of zealotry. We unveil the NESS properties in each of these phases by computing the opinion distribution and the circulation of probability currents, as well as the two-point correlation functions at unequal times (formally related to a "probability angular momentum"). Our analytical calculations obtained in the realm of a linear Gaussian approximation are compared with numerical results.

physics.soc-ph↗

Influence of Luddism on innovation diffusion

We generalize the classical Bass model of innovation diffusion to include a new class of agents --- Luddites --- that oppose the spread of innovation. Our model also incorporates ignorants, susceptibles, and adopters. When an ignorant and a susceptible meet, the former is converted to a susceptible at a given rate, while a susceptible spontaneously adopts the innovation at a constant rate. In response to the \emph{rate} of adoption, an ignorant may become a Luddite and permanently reject the innovation. Instead of reaching complete adoption, the final state generally consists of a population of Luddites, ignorants, and adopters. The evolution of this system is investigated analytically and by stochastic simulations. We determine the stationary distribution of adopters, the time needed to reach the final state, and the influence of the network topology on the innovation spread. Our model exhibits an important dichotomy: when the rate of adoption is low, an innovation spreads slowly but widely; in contrast, when the adoption rate is high, the innovation spreads rapidly but the extent of the adoption is severely limited by Luddites.

physics.soc-ph↗

Nonlinear $q$-voter model with inflexible zealots

We study the dynamics of the nonlinear $q$-voter model with inflexible zealots in a finite well-mixed population. In this system, each individual supports one of two parties and is either a susceptible voter or an inflexible zealot. At each time step, a susceptible adopts the opinion of a neighbor if this belongs to a group of $q\geq 2$ neighbors all in the same state, whereas inflexible zealots never change their opinion. In the presence of zealots of both parties the model is characterized by a fluctuating stationary state and, below a zealotry density threshold, the distribution of opinions is bimodal. After a characteristic time, most susceptibles become supporters of the party having more zealots and the opinion distribution is asymmetric. When the number of zealots of both parties is the same, the opinion distribution is symmetric and, in the long run, susceptibles endlessly swing from the state where they all support one party to the opposite state. Above the zealotry density threshold, when there is an unequal number of zealots of each type, the probability distribution is single-peaked and non-Gaussian. These properties are investigated analytically and with stochastic simulations. We also study the mean time to reach a consensus when zealots support only one party.

physics.soc-ph↗

Characterization of spiraling patterns in spatial rock-paper-scissors games

The spatio-temporal arrangement of interacting populations often influences the maintenance of species diversity and is a subject of intense research. Here, we study the spatio-temporal patterns arising from the cyclic competition between three species in two dimensions. Inspired by recent experiments, we consider a generic metapopulation model comprising "rock-paper-scissors" interactions via dominance removal and replacement, reproduction, mutations, pair-exchange and hopping of individuals. By combining analytical and numerical methods, we obtain the model's phase diagram near its Hopf bifurcation and quantitatively characterize the properties of the spiraling patterns arising in each phase. The phases characterizing the cyclic competition away far from the Hopf bifurcation (at low mutation rate) are also investigated. Our analytical approach relies on the careful analysis of the properties of the complex Ginzburg-Landau equation derived through a controlled (perturbative) multiscale expansion around the model's Hopf bifurcation. Our results allows us to clarify when spatial "rock-paper-scissors" competition leads to stable spiral waves and under which circumstances they are influenced by nonlinear mobility.

q-bio.PE↗

Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: A review

Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors, and scissors are crushed by rock. This simple game is popular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that have no obvious winner, but cyclic dominance is also at the heart of predator-prey interactions, the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards, the overgrowth of marine sessile organisms, and the competition in microbial populations. Cyclical interactions also emerge spontaneously in evolutionary games entailing volunteering, reward, punishment, and in fact are common when the competing strategies are three or more regardless of the particularities of the game. Here we review recent advances on the rock-paper-scissors and related evolutionary games, focusing in particular on pattern formation, the impact of mobility, and the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. We also review mean-field and zero-dimensional rock-paper-scissors models and the application of the complex Ginzburg-Landau equation, and we highlight the importance and usefulness of statistical physics for the successful study of large-scale ecological systems. Directions for future research, related for example to dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules and invasion reversals due to multi-point interactions, are outlined as well.

physics.soc-ph↗

Facilitators on networks reveal the optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity

Reciprocity is firmly established as an important mechanism that promotes cooperation. An efficient information exchange is likewise important, especially on structured populations, where interactions between players are limited. Motivated by these two facts, we explore the role of facilitators in social dilemmas on networks. Facilitators are here mirrors to their neighbors -- they cooperate with cooperators and defect with defectors -- but they do not participate in the exchange of strategies. As such, in addition to introducing direct reciprocity, they also obstruct information exchange. In well-mixed populations, facilitators favor the replacement and invasion of defection by cooperation as long as their number exceeds a critical value. In structured populations, on the other hand, there exists a delicate balance between the benefits of reciprocity and the deterioration of information exchange. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations of social dilemmas on various interaction networks reveal that there exists an optimal interplay between reciprocity and information exchange, which sets in only when a small number of facilitators occupies the main hubs of the scale-free network. The drawbacks of missing cooperative hubs are more than compensated by reciprocity and, at the same time, the compromised information exchange is routed via the auxiliary hubs with only marginal losses in effectivity. These results indicate that it is not always optimal for the main hubs to become ''leaders of the masses'', but rather to exploit their highly connected state to promote tit-for-tat-like behavior.

physics.soc-ph↗

Cooperation dilemma in finite populations under fluctuating environments

We present a novel approach allowing the study of rare events like fixation under fluctuating environments, modeled as extrinsic noise, in evolutionary processes characterized by the dominance of one species. Our treatment consists of mapping the system onto an auxiliary model, exhibiting metastable species coexistence, that can be analyzed semiclassically. This approach enables us to study the interplay between extrinsic and demographic noise on the statistics of interest. We illustrate our theory by considering the paradigmatic prisoner's dilemma game whose evolution is described by the probability that cooperators fixate the population and replace all defectors. We analytically and numerically demonstrate that extrinsic noise may drastically enhance the cooperation fixation probability and even change its functional dependence on the population size. These results, which generalize earlier works in population genetics, indicate that extrinsic noise may help sustain and promote a much higher level of cooperation than static settings.

q-bio.PE↗

Evolutionary games with facilitators: When does selection favor cooperation?

We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that support cooperation by enhancing the reproductive potential of cooperators relative to the fitness of defectors. By computing the fixation probability of a single cooperator in finite and well-mixed populations that include a fixed number of facilitators, and by using mean field analysis, we determine when selection promotes cooperation in the important classes of prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift and stag-hunt games. In particular, we identify the circumstances under which selection favors the replacement and invasion of defection by cooperation. Our findings, corroborated by stochastic simulations, show that the spread of cooperation can be promoted through various scenarios when the density of facilitators exceeds a critical value whose dependence on the population size and selection strength is analyzed. We also determine under which conditions cooperation is more likely to replace defection than vice versa. Keywords: Evolutionary games; dynamics of cooperation; social dilemmas; fixation; population dynamics.

q-bio.PE↗

When does cyclic dominance lead to stable spiral waves?

Species diversity in ecosystems is often accompanied by the self-organisation of the population into fascinating spatio-temporal patterns. Here, we consider a two-dimensional three-species population model and study the spiralling patterns arising from the combined effects of generic cyclic dominance, mutation, pair-exchange and hopping of the individuals. The dynamics is characterised by nonlinear mobility and a Hopf bifurcation around which the system's phase diagram is inferred from the underlying complex Ginzburg-Landau equation derived using a perturbative multiscale expansion. While the dynamics is generally characterised by spiralling patterns, we show that spiral waves are stable in only one of the four phases. Furthermore, we characterise a phase where nonlinearity leads to the annihilation of spirals and to the spatially uniform dominance of each species in turn. Away from the Hopf bifurcation, when the coexistence fixed point is unstable, the spiralling patterns are also affected by nonlinear diffusion.

q-bio.PE↗

Commitment versus persuasion in the three-party constrained voter model

In the framework of the three-party constrained voter model, where voters of two radical parties (A and B) interact with "centrists" (C and Cz), we study the competition between a persuasive majority and a committed minority. In this model, A's and B's are incompatible voters that can convince centrists or be swayed by them. Here, radical voters are more persuasive than centrists, whose sub-population consists of susceptible agents C and a fraction zeta of centrist zealots Cz. Whereas C's may adopt the opinions A and B with respective rates 1+delta_A and 1+delta_B (with delta_A>=delta_B>0), Cz's are committed individuals that always remain centrists. Furthermore, A and B voters can become (susceptible) centrists C with a rate 1. The resulting competition between commitment and persuasion is studied in the mean field limit and for a finite population on a complete graph. At mean field level, there is a continuous transition from a coexistence phase when zeta = Delta_c. In a finite population of size N, demographic fluctuations lead to centrism consensus and the dynamics is characterized by the mean consensus time tau. Because of the competition between commitment and persuasion, here consensus is reached much slower (zeta =Delta_c) than in the absence of zealots (when tau\simN). In fact, when zeta delta_B, whereas all species coexist when delta_A=delta_B. When zeta>=Delta_c and the initial density of centrists is low, one finds tau\simln N (when N>>1). Our analytical findings are corroborated by stochastic simulations.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

Metastability and anomalous fixation in evolutionary games on scale-free networks

We study the influence of complex graphs on the metastability and fixation properties of a set of evolutionary processes. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, where the fitness and selection are frequency-dependent and vary with the population composition, we analyze the dynamics of snowdrift games (characterized by a metastable coexistence state) on scale-free networks. Using an effective diffusion theory in the weak selection limit, we demonstrate how the scale-free structure affects the system's metastable state and leads to anomalous fixation. In particular, we analytically and numerically show that the probability and mean time of fixation are characterized by stretched exponential behaviors with exponents depending on the network's degree distribution.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

Stochastic dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with cooperation facilitators

In the framework of the paradigmatic prisoner's dilemma, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in the presence of "cooperation facilitators". In our model, cooperators and defectors interact as in the classical prisoner's dilemma game, where selection favors defection. However, here the presence of a small number of cooperation facilitators enhances the fitness (reproductive potential) of cooperators, while it does not alter that of defectors. In a finite population of size N, the dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with facilitators is characterized by the probability that cooperation takes over (fixation probability) and by the mean times to reach the absorbing states. These quantities are computed exactly and using Fokker-Planck equations. Our findings, corroborated by stochastic simulations, demonstrate that the influence of facilitators crucially depends on the difference between their density z and the game's cost-to-benefit ratio r. When z>r, the fixation of cooperators is likely in a large population and, under weak selection pressure, invasion and replacement of defection by cooperation is favored by selection if b(z-r)(1-z)>1/N, where 0<b<= 1 is the cooperation payoff benefit. When z<r, the fixation probability of cooperators is exponentially enhanced by the presence of facilitators but defection is the dominating strategy.

q-bio.PE↗

Fixation and Polarization in a Three-Species Opinion Dynamics Model

Motivated by the dynamics of cultural change and diversity, we generalize the three-species constrained voter model on a complete graph introduced in [J. Phys. A 37, 8479 (2004)]. In this opinion dynamics model, a population of size N is composed of "leftists" and "rightists" that interact with "centrists": a leftist and centrist can both become leftists with rate (1+q)/2 or centrists with rate (1-q)/2 (and similarly for rightists and centrists), where q denotes the bias towards extremism (q>0) or centrism (q<0). This system admits three absorbing fixed points and a "polarization" line along which a frozen mixture of leftists and rightists coexist. In the realm of Fokker-Planck equation, and using a mapping onto a population genetics model, we compute the fixation probability of ending in every absorbing state and the mean times for these events. We therefore show, especially in the limit of weak bias and large population size when |q|~1/N and N>>1, how fluctuations alter the mean field predictions: polarization is likely when q>0, but there is always a finite probability to reach a consensus; the opposite happens when q<0. Our findings are corroborated by stochastic simulations.

physics.soc-ph↗