arXiv subjects

Max R. P. Grossmann

Publications and source records attributed to Max R. P. Grossmann.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Paternalism and Deliberation: An Experiment on Making Formal Rules

Mandatory waiting periods have been instituted for medical procedures, gun purchases, and other high-stakes decisions. Are these softly paternalistic policies substitutes for harder restrictions, and are delayed decisions more respected? In a general population survey experiment, Choice Architects make rules for decision-makers facing a high-stakes Bomb Risk Elicitation Task. Treatments vary when the decision is made: on the spot or after one day, and whether the initial decision can be revised. Choice Architects set a cap on the decision-maker's risk taking; in one treatment, they can additionally implement a mandatory waiting period. Exogenous deliberation has no effect on the cap; equivalence testing (TOST) and Bayesian analysis ($\text{BF}_{01} \approx 12$) provide strong positive evidence for the absence of an effect. Endogenously prescribed waiting periods are add-on restrictions that do not substitute for the cap. Choice Architects believe that, with time, the average decision-maker will take less risk and -- because of the distribution of Choice Architects' bliss points -- come closer to Choice Architects' subjective ideal choice; the resulting reduction in forecasted errors is small. Soft and hard paternalistic instruments are not substitutes: waiting periods are deployed as add-on restrictions.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2025

Public Support for Environmental Regulation: When Ideology Trumps Knowledge

When environmental regulations are unpopular, policymakers often attribute resistance to information frictions and poor communication. We test this idea in the context of a major climate policy: Germany's Heating Law of 2023, which mandates the phase-out of fossil fuel heating. Through a survey experiment with property owners, we examine whether providing comprehensive information about the regulation's costs, requirements, and timeline affects adoption decisions and policy support. Despite successfully increasing factual knowledge, information provision has no significant effect on intended technology adoption, policy support, or incentivized measures of climate preferences. Instead, pre-existing environmental preferences and demographic characteristics emerge as the key predictors of responses to the regulation. A feeling that existing systems still work well and cost considerations dominate fossil fuel users' stated reasons for non-adoption, while independence from fossil fuels and perceived contributions to the common good drive adoption among switchers. Our findings suggest that opposition to climate policy stems from fundamental preference heterogeneity rather than information frictions. This has important implications for optimal policy design, highlighting potential limits of information provision in overcoming resistance to environmental regulation. The results also speak to broader questions in political economy about the relationship between knowledge, preferences, and support for policy reform.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2024

Knowledge and Freedom: Evidence on the Relationship Between Information and Paternalism

When is autonomy granted to a decision-maker based on their knowledge, and if no autonomy is granted, what form will the intervention take? A parsimonious theoretical framework shows how policymakers can exploit decision-maker mistakes and use them as a justification for intervention. In two experiments, policymakers ("Choice Architects") can intervene in a choice faced by a decision-maker. We vary the amount of knowledge decision-makers possess about the choice. Full decision-maker knowledge causes more than a 60% reduction in intervention rates. Beliefs have a small, robust correlation with interventions on the intensive margin. Choice Architects disproportionately prefer to have decision-makers make informed decisions. Interveners are less likely to provide information. As theory predicts, the same applies to Choice Architects who believe that decision-maker mistakes align with their own preference. When Choice Architects are informed about the decision-maker's preference, this information is used to determine the imposed option. However, Choice Architects employ their own preference to a similar extent. A riskless option is causally more likely to be imposed, being correlated with but conceptually distinct from Choice Architects' own preference. This is a qualification to what has been termed "projective paternalism."

econ.GN↗