arXiv subjects

Maysara Alhindi

Publications and source records attributed to Maysara Alhindi.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Not quite a piece of CHERI-cake: Are new digital security by design architectures usable?

A digital security-by-design computer architecture, like CHERI, lets you program without fear of buffer overflows or other memory safety errors, but CHERI also rewrites some of the assumptions about how C works and how fundamental types (such as pointers) are implemented in hardware. We conducted a usability study to examine how developers react to the changes required by CHERI when porting software to run on it. We find that developers struggle with CHERI's display of warnings and errors and a lack of diverse documentation.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Threadbox: Sandboxing for Modular Security

There are many sandboxing mechanisms provided by operating systems to limit what resources applications can access, however, sometimes the use of these mechanisms requires developers to refactor their code to fit the sandboxing model. In this work, we investigate what makes existing sandboxing mechanisms challenging to apply to certain types of applications, and propose Threadbox, a sandboxing mechanism that enables having modular and independent sandboxes, and can be applied to threads and sandbox specific functions. We present case studies to illustrate the applicability of the idea and discuss its limitations.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Playing in the Sandbox: A Study on the Usability of Seccomp

Sandboxing restricts what applications do, and prevents exploited processes being abused; yet relatively few applications get sandboxed: why? We report a usability trial with 7 experienced Seccomp developers exploring how they approached sandboxing an application and the difficulties they faced. The developers each approached sandboxing the application differently and each came to different solutions. We highlight many challenges of using Seccomp, the sandboxing designs by the participants, and what developers think would make it easier for them to sandbox applications effectively.

cs.OS↗

arXiv2024

Sandboxing Adoption in Open Source Ecosystems

Sandboxing mechanisms allow developers to limit how much access applications have to resources, following the least-privilege principle. However, it's not clear how much and in what ways developers are using these mechanisms. This study looks at the use of Seccomp, Landlock, Capsicum, Pledge, and Unveil in all packages of four open-source operating systems. We found that less than 1% of packages directly use these mechanisms, but many more indirectly use them. Examining how developers apply these mechanisms reveals interesting usage patterns, such as cases where developers simplify their sandbox implementation. It also highlights challenges that may be hindering the widespread adoption of sandboxing mechanisms.

cs.SE↗