arXiv subjects

Melanie Mitchell

Publications and source records attributed to Melanie Mitchell.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Do AI Models Perform Human-like Abstract Reasoning Across Modalities?

OpenAI's o3-preview reasoning model exceeded human accuracy on the ARC-AGI-1 benchmark, but does that mean state-of-the-art models recognize and reason with the abstractions the benchmark was designed to test? Here we investigate abstraction abilities of AI models using the closely related but simpler ConceptARC benchmark. Our evaluations vary input modality (textual vs. visual), use of external Python tools, and reasoning effort. Beyond output accuracy, we evaluate the natural-language rules that models generate to explain their solutions, enabling us to assess whether models recognize the abstractions that ConceptARC was designed to elicit. We show that the best models' rules are frequently based on surface-level ``shortcuts,'' capturing intended abstractions considerably less often than humans. In the visual modality, AI models' output accuracy drops sharply; however, our rule-level analysis reveals that a substantial share of their rules capture the intended abstractions, even as the models struggle to apply these concepts to generate correct solutions. In short, we show that using accuracy alone to evaluate abstract reasoning can substantially overestimate AI capabilities in textual modalities and underestimate it in visual modalities. Our results offer a more faithful picture of AI models' abstract reasoning abilities and a more principled way to track progress toward human-like, abstraction-centered intelligence.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Large Language Models and Emergence: A Complex Systems Perspective

Emergence is a concept in complexity science that describes how many-body systems manifest novel higher-level properties, properties that can be described by replacing high-dimensional mechanisms with lower-dimensional effective variables and theories. This is captured by the idea "more is different". Intelligence is a consummate emergent property manifesting increasingly efficient -- cheaper and faster -- uses of emergent capabilities to solve problems. This is captured by the idea "less is more". In this paper, we first examine claims that Large Language Models exhibit emergent capabilities, reviewing several approaches to quantifying emergence, and secondly ask whether LLMs possess emergent intelligence.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Evaluating the Robustness of Analogical Reasoning in Large Language Models

LLMs have performed well on several reasoning benchmarks, including ones that test analogical reasoning abilities. However, there is debate on the extent to which they are performing general abstract reasoning versus employing non-robust processes, e.g., that overly rely on similarity to pre-training data. Here we investigate the robustness of analogy-making abilities previously claimed for LLMs on three of four domains studied by Webb, Holyoak, and Lu (2023): letter-string analogies, digit matrices, and story analogies. For each domain we test humans and GPT models on robustness to variants of the original analogy problems that test the same abstract reasoning abilities but are likely dissimilar from tasks in the pre-training data. The performance of a system that uses robust abstract reasoning should not decline substantially on these variants. On simple letter-string analogies, we find that while the performance of humans remains high for two types of variants we tested, the GPT models' performance declines sharply. This pattern is less pronounced as the complexity of these problems is increased, as both humans and GPT models perform poorly on both the original and variant problems requiring more complex analogies. On digit-matrix problems, we find a similar pattern but only on one out of the two types of variants we tested. On story-based analogy problems, we find that, unlike humans, the performance of GPT models are susceptible to answer-order effects, and that GPT models also may be more sensitive than humans to paraphrasing. This work provides evidence that LLMs often lack the robustness of zero-shot human analogy-making, exhibiting brittleness on most of the variations we tested. More generally, this work points to the importance of carefully evaluating AI systems not only for accuracy but also robustness when testing their cognitive capabilities.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Can Large Language Models generalize analogy solving like children can?

In people, the ability to solve analogies such as "body : feet :: table : ?" emerges in childhood, and appears to transfer easily to other domains, such as the visual domain "( : ) :: < : ?". Recent research shows that large language models (LLMs) can solve various forms of analogies. However, can LLMs generalize analogy solving to new domains like people can? To investigate this, we had children, adults, and LLMs solve a series of letter-string analogies (e.g., a b : a c :: j k : ?) in the Latin alphabet, in a near transfer domain (Greek alphabet), and a far transfer domain (list of symbols). Children and adults easily generalized their knowledge to unfamiliar domains, whereas LLMs did not. This key difference between human and AI performance is evidence that these LLMs still struggle with robust human-like analogical transfer.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Imagining and building wise machines: The centrality of AI metacognition

Although AI has become increasingly smart, its wisdom has not kept pace. In this article, we examine what is known about human wisdom and sketch a vision of its AI counterpart. We analyze human wisdom as a set of strategies for solving intractable problems-those outside the scope of analytic techniques-including both object-level strategies like heuristics [for managing problems] and metacognitive strategies like intellectual humility, perspective-taking, or context-adaptability [for managing object-level strategies]. We argue that AI systems particularly struggle with metacognition; improved metacognition would lead to AI more robust to novel environments, explainable to users, cooperative with others, and safer in risking fewer misaligned goals with human users. We discuss how wise AI might be benchmarked, trained, and implemented.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Using Counterfactual Tasks to Evaluate the Generality of Analogical Reasoning in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) have performed well on several reasoning benchmarks, including ones that test analogical reasoning abilities. However, it has been debated whether they are actually performing humanlike abstract reasoning or instead employing less general processes that rely on similarity to what has been seen in their training data. Here we investigate the generality of analogy-making abilities previously claimed for LLMs (Webb, Holyoak, & Lu, 2023). We take one set of analogy problems used to evaluate LLMs and create a set of "counterfactual" variants-versions that test the same abstract reasoning abilities but that are likely dissimilar from any pre-training data. We test humans and three GPT models on both the original and counterfactual problems, and show that, while the performance of humans remains high for all the problems, the GPT models' performance declines sharply on the counterfactual set. This work provides evidence that, despite previously reported successes of LLMs on analogical reasoning, these models lack the robustness and generality of human analogy-making.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Perspectives on the State and Future of Deep Learning - 2023

The goal of this series is to chronicle opinions and issues in the field of machine learning as they stand today and as they change over time. The plan is to host this survey periodically until the AI singularity paperclip-frenzy-driven doomsday, keeping an updated list of topical questions and interviewing new community members for each edition. In this issue, we probed people's opinions on interpretable AI, the value of benchmarking in modern NLP, the state of progress towards understanding deep learning, and the future of academia.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Comparing Humans, GPT-4, and GPT-4V On Abstraction and Reasoning Tasks

We explore the abstract reasoning abilities of text-only and multimodal versions of GPT-4, using the ConceptARC benchmark [10], which is designed to evaluate robust understanding and reasoning with core-knowledge concepts. We extend the work of Moskvichev et al. [10] by evaluating GPT-4 on more detailed, one-shot prompting (rather than simple, zero-shot prompts) with text versions of ConceptARC tasks, and by evaluating GPT-4V, the multimodal version of GPT-4, on zero- and one-shot prompts using image versions of the simplest tasks. Our experimental results support the conclusion that neither version of GPT-4 has developed robust abstraction abilities at humanlike levels.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

The ConceptARC Benchmark: Evaluating Understanding and Generalization in the ARC Domain

The abilities to form and abstract concepts is key to human intelligence, but such abilities remain lacking in state-of-the-art AI systems. There has been substantial research on conceptual abstraction in AI, particularly using idealized domains such as Raven's Progressive Matrices and Bongard problems, but even when AI systems succeed on such problems, the systems are rarely evaluated in depth to see if they have actually grasped the concepts they are meant to capture. In this paper we describe an in-depth evaluation benchmark for the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), a collection of few-shot abstraction and analogy problems developed by Chollet [2019]. In particular, we describe ConceptARC, a new, publicly available benchmark in the ARC domain that systematically assesses abstraction and generalization abilities on a number of basic spatial and semantic concepts. ConceptARC differs from the original ARC dataset in that it is specifically organized around "concept groups" -- sets of problems that focus on specific concepts and that are vary in complexity and level of abstraction. We report results on testing humans on this benchmark as well as three machine solvers: the top two programs from a 2021 ARC competition and OpenAI's GPT-4. Our results show that humans substantially outperform the machine solvers on this benchmark, showing abilities to abstract and generalize concepts that are not yet captured by AI systems. We believe that this benchmark will spur improvements in the development of AI systems for conceptual abstraction and in the effective evaluation of such systems.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

The Debate Over Understanding in AI's Large Language Models

We survey a current, heated debate in the AI research community on whether large pre-trained language models can be said to "understand" language -- and the physical and social situations language encodes -- in any important sense. We describe arguments that have been made for and against such understanding, and key questions for the broader sciences of intelligence that have arisen in light of these arguments. We contend that a new science of intelligence can be developed that will provide insight into distinct modes of understanding, their strengths and limitations, and the challenge of integrating diverse forms of cognition.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Gathering Strength, Gathering Storms: The One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence (AI100) 2021 Study Panel Report

In September 2021, the "One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence" project (AI100) issued the second report of its planned long-term periodic assessment of artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on society. It was written by a panel of 17 study authors, each of whom is deeply rooted in AI research, chaired by Michael Littman of Brown University. The report, entitled "Gathering Strength, Gathering Storms," answers a set of 14 questions probing critical areas of AI development addressing the major risks and dangers of AI, its effects on society, its public perception and the future of the field. The report concludes that AI has made a major leap from the lab to people's lives in recent years, which increases the urgency to understand its potential negative effects. The questions were developed by the AI100 Standing Committee, chaired by Peter Stone of the University of Texas at Austin, consisting of a group of AI leaders with expertise in computer science, sociology, ethics, economics, and other disciplines.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Embodied, Situated, and Grounded Intelligence: Implications for AI

In April of 2022, the Santa Fe Institute hosted a workshop on embodied, situated, and grounded intelligence as part of the Institute's Foundations of Intelligence project. The workshop brought together computer scientists, psychologists, philosophers, social scientists, and others to discuss the science of embodiment and related issues in human intelligence, and its implications for building robust, human-level AI. In this report, we summarize each of the talks and the subsequent discussions. We also draw out a number of key themes and identify important frontiers for future research.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Frontiers in Collective Intelligence: A Workshop Report

In August of 2021, the Santa Fe Institute hosted a workshop on collective intelligence as part of its Foundations of Intelligence project. This project seeks to advance the field of artificial intelligence by promoting interdisciplinary research on the nature of intelligence. The workshop brought together computer scientists, biologists, philosophers, social scientists, and others to share their insights about how intelligence can emerge from interactions among multiple agents--whether those agents be machines, animals, or human beings. In this report, we summarize each of the talks and the subsequent discussions. We also draw out a number of key themes and identify important frontiers for future research.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Evaluating Understanding on Conceptual Abstraction Benchmarks

A long-held objective in AI is to build systems that understand concepts in a humanlike way. Setting aside the difficulty of building such a system, even trying to evaluate one is a challenge, due to present-day AI's relative opacity and its proclivity for finding shortcut solutions. This is exacerbated by humans' tendency to anthropomorphize, assuming that a system that can recognize one instance of a concept must also understand other instances, as a human would. In this paper, we argue that understanding a concept requires the ability to use it in varied contexts. Accordingly, we propose systematic evaluations centered around concepts, by probing a system's ability to use a given concept in many different instantiations. We present case studies of such an evaluations on two domains -- RAVEN (inspired by Raven's Progressive Matrices) and the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC) -- that have been used to develop and assess abstraction abilities in AI systems. Our concept-based approach to evaluation reveals information about AI systems that conventional test sets would have left hidden.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Abstraction for Deep Reinforcement Learning

We characterise the problem of abstraction in the context of deep reinforcement learning. Various well established approaches to analogical reasoning and associative memory might be brought to bear on this issue, but they present difficulties because of the need for end-to-end differentiability. We review developments in AI and machine learning that could facilitate their adoption.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

A Little Robustness Goes a Long Way: Leveraging Robust Features for Targeted Transfer Attacks

Adversarial examples for neural network image classifiers are known to be transferable: examples optimized to be misclassified by a source classifier are often misclassified as well by classifiers with different architectures. However, targeted adversarial examples -- optimized to be classified as a chosen target class -- tend to be less transferable between architectures. While prior research on constructing transferable targeted attacks has focused on improving the optimization procedure, in this work we examine the role of the source classifier. Here, we show that training the source classifier to be "slightly robust" -- that is, robust to small-magnitude adversarial examples -- substantially improves the transferability of class-targeted and representation-targeted adversarial attacks, even between architectures as different as convolutional neural networks and transformers. The results we present provide insight into the nature of adversarial examples as well as the mechanisms underlying so-called "robust" classifiers.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Frontiers in Evolutionary Computation: A Workshop Report

In July of 2021, the Santa Fe Institute hosted a workshop on evolutionary computation as part of its Foundations of Intelligence in Natural and Artificial Systems project. This project seeks to advance the field of artificial intelligence by promoting interdisciplinary research on the nature of intelligence. The workshop brought together computer scientists and biologists to share their insights about the nature of evolution and the future of evolutionary computation. In this report, we summarize each of the talks and the subsequent discussions. We also draw out a number of key themes and identify important frontiers for future research.

cs.NE↗

arXiv2021

Abstraction and Analogy-Making in Artificial Intelligence

Conceptual abstraction and analogy-making are key abilities underlying humans' abilities to learn, reason, and robustly adapt their knowledge to new domains. Despite of a long history of research on constructing AI systems with these abilities, no current AI system is anywhere close to a capability of forming humanlike abstractions or analogies. This paper reviews the advantages and limitations of several approaches toward this goal, including symbolic methods, deep learning, and probabilistic program induction. The paper concludes with several proposals for designing challenge tasks and evaluation measures in order to make quantifiable and generalizable progress in this area.

cs.AI↗