arXiv subjects

Melih Bastopcu

Publications and source records attributed to Melih Bastopcu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Strategic Information Transmission over Gossip Networks

We consider a fully connected gossip network of $n$ nodes that track a binary continuous-time Markov source through a strategic sender transmitting updates under a communication budget at a rate that depends on the source state. The receivers exchange packets through gossip and decide whether to follow the sender. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game and analyze it through a stochastic hybrid systems (SHS) framework. We prove that the sender's budget constraint binds at every interior optimum, reducing its problem to a one-dimensional search on the budget line. When the sender pushes its preferred state at the higher rate, the receivers gossip at the highest available rate. Gossip has no direction of its own and works against the asymmetry in the sender's policy rather than reinforcing it. We prove that an optimistic Stackelberg equilibrium exists, and that it is unique and explicitly characterized whenever a policy on the strategic half of that line is feasible at the gossip cap. Monte Carlo simulations agree with the analytical recursion.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Keep, Customize, or Exit: Default Design and Token Pricing in LLM Reasoning Services

We study a large language model (LLM) service in which a provider chooses a per-token price and a default reasoning-token allocation, while a user may accept the default, customize the allocation, or exit. Larger allocations can improve accuracy but increase token cost and latency. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game and derive the user's unique optimal customized allocation in closed form. For any price, the acceptable defaults form either an empty set or a compact interval. We characterize the provider's optimal default through a three-regime rule, reduce equilibrium computation to a one-dimensional price optimization, and prove the existence of the equilibrium. We further show that defaults affect the implemented reasoning allocation only when users value the convenience of avoiding customization; otherwise, every service-providing outcome implements the user's optimal customized allocation. Experiments with two compact open-weight reasoning models on five mathematics and science benchmarks support the accuracy-token model and show how model and task characteristics determine equilibrium prices, defaults, and reasoning allocations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Strategic Persuasion Through Information Timeliness

We study a dynamic strategic communication problem in which a sender controls the timing of truthful updates from binary continuous-time Markov sources. The receiver chooses between a zero-order-hold estimator that follows the sender's updates and a prior-only default estimator, aiming to maximize a weighted correct-estimation utility. In contrast, the sender seeks to persuade the receiver to estimate the state as 1, regardless of the true state. This misalignment leads to a Stackelberg game in which the sender, as the leader, commits to state-dependent Poisson update rates, and the receiver, as the follower, decides whether to follow the sender's messages. The sender maximizes the long-term average time that the receiver's estimate equals 1, subject to a conditional intensity budget and a participation constraint (PC) ensuring that following the sender's messages does not degrade the receiver's average utility relative to its prior information. For a single source, we show that the sender's optimal policy allocates a minimum state-0 update intensity to the undesired state-0, just enough to satisfy the PC, and the remaining budget to the desired state-1. For multiple sources with heterogeneous minimum state-0 update intensities, we develop a branch-and-bound algorithm that typically avoids exhaustive search. Finally, we extend the solution to multiple receivers over dedicated channels. Our results show that controlling timeliness alone enables the sender to persuade the receiver and increase its utility.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2026

Characterizing Information Accuracy in Timeliness-Based Gossip Networks

We investigate information accuracy in timeliness-based gossip networks where the source evolves according to a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) with $M$ states and disseminates status updates to a network of $n$ nodes. In addition to direct source updates, nodes exchange their locally stored packets via gossip and accept incoming packets solely based on whether the incoming packet is fresher than their local copy. As a result, a node can possess the freshest packet in the network while still not having the current source state. To quantify the amount of accurate information flowing in the network under such a gossiping scheme, we introduce two accuracy metrics, average accuracy, defined as the expected fraction of nodes carrying accurate information in any given subset, and freshness-based accuracy, defined as the accuracy of the freshest node in any given subset. Using a stochastic hybrid systems (SHS) framework, we first derive steady-state balance equations and obtain matrix-valued recursions that characterize these metrics in fully connected gossip networks under binary CTMCs. We then extend our analysis to the general multi-state information source using a joint CTMC approach. Finally, we quantify the fraction of nodes whose information is accurate due to direct source pushes versus gossip exchanges. We verify our findings with numerical analyses and provide asymptotic insights.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2026

Don't Always Pick the Highest-Performing Model: An Information Theoretic View of LLM Ensemble Selection

Large language models (LLMs) are often ensembled together to improve overall reliability and robustness, but in practice models are strongly correlated. This raises a fundamental question: which models should be selected when forming an LLM ensemble? We formulate budgeted ensemble selection as maximizing the mutual information between the true label and predictions of the selected models. Furthermore, to explain why performance can saturate even with many models, we model the correlated errors of the models using Gaussian-copula and show an information-theoretic error floor for the performance of the ensemble. Motivated by these, we propose a simple greedy mutual-information selection algorithm that estimates the required information terms directly from data and iteratively builds an ensemble under a query budget. We test our approach in two question answering datasets and one binary sentiment classification dataset: MEDMCQA, MMLU, and IMDB movie reviews. Across all datasets, we observe that our method consistently outperforms strong baselines under the same query budget.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Queueing-Aware Optimization of Reasoning Tokens for Accuracy-Latency Trade-offs in LLM Servers

We consider a single large language model (LLM) server that serves a heterogeneous stream of queries belonging to $N$ distinct task types. Queries arrive according to a Poisson process, and each type occurs with a known prior probability. For each task type, the server allocates a fixed number of internal thinking tokens, which determines the computational effort devoted to that query. The token allocation induces an accuracy-latency trade-off: the service time follows an approximately affine function of the allocated tokens, while the probability of a correct response exhibits diminishing returns. Under a first-in, first-out (FIFO) service discipline, the system operates as an $M/G/1$ queue, and the mean system time depends on the first and second moments of the resulting service-time distribution. We formulate a constrained optimization problem that maximizes a weighted average accuracy objective penalized by the mean system time, subject to architectural token-budget constraints and queue-stability conditions. The objective function is shown to be strictly concave over the stability region, which ensures existence and uniqueness of the optimal token allocation. The first-order optimality conditions yield a coupled projected fixed-point characterization of the optimum, together with an iterative solution and an explicit sufficient condition for contraction. Moreover, a projected gradient method with a computable global step-size bound is developed to guarantee convergence beyond the contractive regime. Finally, integer-valued token allocations are attained via rounding of the continuous solution, and the resulting performance loss is evaluated in simulation results.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Timely Information for Strategic Persuasion

This work investigates a dynamic variant of Bayesian persuasion, in which a strategic sender seeks to influence a receiver's belief over time through controlling the timing of the information disclosure, under resource constraints. We consider a binary information source (i.e., taking values 0 or 1), where the source's state evolve according to a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC). In this setting, the receiver aims to estimate the source's state as accurately as possible. In contrast, the sender seeks to persuade the receiver to estimate the state to be 1, regardless of whether this estimate reflects the true state. This misalignment between their objectives naturally leads to a Stackelberg game formulation where the sender, acting as the leader, chooses an information-revelation policy, and the receiver, as the follower, decides whether to follow the sender's messages. As a result, the sender's objective is to maximize the long-term average time that the receiver's estimate equals 1, subject to a total sampling constraint and a constraint for the receiver to follow the sender's messages called incentive compatibility (IC) constraint. We first consider the single-source problem and show that the sender's optimal policy is to allocate a minimal sampling rate to the undesired state 0 (just enough to satisfy the IC constraint) and assign the remaining sampling rate to the desired state 1. Next, we extend the analysis to the multi-source case, where each source has a different minimal sampling rate. Our results show that the sender can leverage the timeliness of the revealed information to influence the receiver, thereby achieving a higher utility.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2025

A Soft Inducement Framework for Incentive-Aided Steering of No-Regret Players

In this work, we investigate a steering problem in a mediator-augmented two-player normal-form game, where the mediator aims to guide players toward a specific action profile through information and incentive design. We first characterize the games for which successful steering is possible. Moreover, we establish that steering players to any desired action profile is not always achievable with information design alone, nor when accompanied with sublinear payment schemes. Consequently, we derive a lower bound on the constant payments required per round to achieve this goal. To address these limitations incurred with information design, we introduce an augmented approach that involves a one-shot information design phase before the start of the repeated game, transforming the prior interaction into a Stackelberg game. Finally, we theoretically demonstrate that this approach improves the convergence rate of players' action profiles to the target point by a constant factor with high probability, and support it with empirical results.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Balancing Information Accuracy and Response Timeliness in Networked LLMs

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed many fields including scientific discovery, content generation, biomedical text mining, and educational technology. However, the substantial requirements for training data, computational resources, and energy consumption pose significant challenges for their practical deployment. A promising alternative is to leverage smaller, specialized language models and aggregate their outputs to improve overall response quality. In this work, we investigate a networked LLM system composed of multiple users, a central task processor, and clusters of topic-specialized LLMs. Each user submits categorical binary (true/false) queries, which are routed by the task processor to a selected cluster of $m$ LLMs. After gathering individual responses, the processor returns a final aggregated answer to the user. We characterize both the information accuracy and response timeliness in this setting, and formulate a joint optimization problem to balance these two competing objectives. Our extensive simulations demonstrate that the aggregated responses consistently achieve higher accuracy than those of individual LLMs. Notably, this improvement is more significant when the participating LLMs exhibit similar standalone performance.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Semantic Communication in Multi-team Dynamic Games: A Mean Field Perspective

Coordinating communication and control is a key component in the stability and performance of networked multi-agent systems. While single user networked control systems have gained a lot of attention within this domain, in this work, we address the more challenging problem of large population multi-team dynamic games. In particular, each team constitutes two decision makers (namely, the sensor and the controller) who coordinate over a shared network to control a dynamically evolving state of interest under costs on both actuation and sensing/communication. Due to the shared nature of the wireless channel, the overall cost of each team depends on other teams' policies, thereby leading to a noncooperative game setup. Due to the presence of a large number of teams, we compute approximate decentralized Nash equilibrium policies for each team using the paradigm of (extended) mean-field games, which is governed by (1) the mean traffic flowing over the channel, and (2) the value of information at the sensor, which highlights the semantic nature of the ensuing communication. In the process, we compute optimal controller policies and approximately optimal sensor policies for each representative team of the mean-field system to alleviate the problem of general non-contractivity of the mean-field fixed point operator associated with the finite cardinality of the sensor action space. Consequently, we also prove the $ε$--Nash property of the mean-field equilibrium solution which essentially characterizes how well the solution derived using mean-field analysis performs on the finite-team system. Finally, we provide extensive numerical simulations, which corroborate the theoretical findings and lead to additional insights on the properties of the results presented.

math.OC↗

arXiv2025

How to Maximize Efficiency in Systems with Exhausted Workers

We consider the problem of assigning tasks efficiently to a set of workers that can exhaust themselves as a result of processing tasks. If a worker is exhausted, it will take a longer time to recover. To model efficiency of workers with exhaustion, we use a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC). By taking samples from the internal states of the workers, the source assigns tasks to the workers when they are found to be in their efficient states. We consider two different settings where (i) the source can assign tasks to the workers only when they are in their most efficient state, and (ii) it can assign tasks to workers when they are also moderately efficient in spite of a potentially reduced success probability. In the former case, we find the optimal policy to be a threshold-based sampling policy where the thresholds depend on the workers' recovery and exhaustion rates. In the latter case, we solve a non-convex sum-of-ratios problem using a branch-and-bound approach which performs well compared with the globally optimal solution.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2025

Distributed Offloading in Multi-Access Edge Computing Systems: A Mean-Field Perspective

Multi-access edge computing (MEC) technology is a promising solution to assist power-constrained IoT devices by providing additional computing resources for time-sensitive tasks. In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal task offloading in MEC systems with due consideration of the timeliness and scalability issues under two scenarios of equitable and priority access to the edge server (ES). In the first scenario, we consider a MEC system consisting of $N$ devices assisted by one ES, where the devices can split task execution between a local processor and the ES, with equitable access to the ES. In the second scenario, we consider a MEC system consisting of one primary user, $N$ secondary users and one ES. The primary user has priority access to the ES while the secondary users have equitable access to the ES amongst themselves. In both scenarios, due to the power consumption associated with utilizing the local resource and task offloading, the devices must optimize their actions. Additionally, since the ES is a shared resource, other users' offloading activity serves to increase latency incurred by each user. We thus model both scenarios using a non-cooperative game framework. However, the presence of a large number of users makes it nearly impossible to compute the equilibrium offloading policies for each user, which would require a significant information exchange overhead between users. Thus, to alleviate such scalability issues, we invoke the paradigm of mean-field games to compute approximate Nash equilibrium policies for each user using their local information, and further study the trade-offs between increasing information freshness and reducing power consumption for each user. Using numerical evaluations, we show that our approach can recover the offloading trends displayed under centralized solutions, and provide additional insights into the results obtained.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2025

Fully Decentralized Computation Offloading in Priority-Driven Edge Computing Systems

We develop a novel framework for fully decentralized offloading policy design in multi-access edge computing (MEC) systems. The system comprises $N$ power-constrained user equipments (UEs) assisted by an edge server (ES) to process incoming tasks. Tasks are labeled with urgency flags, and in this paper, we classify them under three urgency levels, namely, high, moderate, and low urgency. We formulate the problem of designing computation decisions for the UEs within a large population noncooperative game framework, where each UE selfishly decides on how to split task execution between its local onboard processor and the ES. We employ the weighted average age of information (AoI) metric to quantify information freshness at the UEs. Increased onboard processing consumes more local power, while increased offloading may potentially incur a higher average AoI due to other UEs' packets being offloaded to the same ES. Thus, we use the mean-field game (MFG) formulation to compute approximate decentralized Nash equilibrium offloading and local computation policies for the UEs to balance between the information freshness and local power consumption. Finally, we provide a projected gradient descent-based algorithm to numerically assess the merits of our approach.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2024

Remote Estimation Games with Random Walk Processes: Stackelberg Equilibrium

Remote estimation is a crucial element of real time monitoring of a stochastic process. While most of the existing works have concentrated on obtaining optimal sampling strategies, motivated by malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems, we model sensing under surveillance as a game between an attacker and a defender. This introduces strategic elements to conventional remote estimation problems. Additionally, inspired by increasing detection capabilities, we model an element of information leakage for each player. Parameterizing the game in terms of uncertainty on each side, information leakage, and cost of sampling, we consider the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) concept where one of the players acts as the leader and the other one as the follower. By focusing our attention on stationary probabilistic sampling policies, we characterize the SE of this game and provide simulations to show the efficacy of our results.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2024

Fully Decentralized Task Offloading in Multi-Access Edge Computing Systems

We consider the problem of task offloading in multi-access edge computing (MEC) systems constituting $N$ devices assisted by an edge server (ES), where the devices can split task execution between a local processor and the ES. Since the local task execution and communication with the ES both consume power, each device must judiciously choose between the two. We model the problem as a large population non-cooperative game among the $N$ devices. Since computation of an equilibrium in this scenario is difficult due to the presence of a large number of devices, we employ the mean-field game framework to reduce the finite-agent game problem to a generic user's multi-objective optimization problem, with a coupled consistency condition. By leveraging the novel age of information (AoI) metric, we invoke techniques from stochastic hybrid systems (SHS) theory and study the tradeoffs between increasing information freshness and reducing power consumption. In numerical simulations, we validate that a higher load at the ES may lead devices to upload their task to the ES less often.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2024

Age of Coded Updates In Gossip Networks Under Memory and Memoryless Schemes

We consider an information update system on a gossip network, where a source node encodes information into $n$ total keys such that any subset of at least $k+1$ keys can fully reconstruct the original information. This encoding process follows the principles of a $k$-out-of-$n$ threshold system. The encoded updates are then disseminated across the network through peer-to-peer communication. We have two different types of nodes in a network: subscriber nodes, which receive a unique key from the source node for every status update instantaneously, and nonsubscriber nodes, which receive a unique key for an update only if the node is selected by the source, and this selection is renewed for each update. For the message structure between nodes, we consider two different schemes: a memory scheme (in which the nodes keep the source's current and previous encrypted messages) and a memoryless scheme (in which the nodes are allowed to only keep the source's current message). We measure the timeliness of information updates by using a recent performance metric, the version age of information. We present explicit formulas for the time average AoI in a scalable homogeneous network as functions of the network parameters under a memoryless scheme. Additionally, we provide strict lower and upper bounds for the time average AoI under a memory scheme.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2024

Age of $k$-out-of-$n$ Systems on a Gossip Network

We consider information update systems on a gossip network, which consists of a single source and $n$ receiver nodes. The source encrypts the information into $n$ distinct keys with version stamps, sending a unique key to each node. For decoding the information in a $k$-out-of-$n$ system, each receiver node requires at least $k+1$ different keys with the same version, shared over peer-to-peer connections. Each node determines $k$ based on a given function, ensuring that as $k$ increases, the precision of the decoded information also increases. We consider two different schemes: a memory scheme (in which the nodes keep the source's current and previous encrypted messages) and a memoryless scheme (in which the nodes are allowed to only keep the source's current message). We measure the ''timeliness'' of information updates by using the $k$-keys version age of information. Our work focuses on determining closed-form expressions for the time average age of information in a heterogeneous random graph under both with memory and memoryless schemes.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2024

Policy Optimization finds Nash Equilibrium in Regularized General-Sum LQ Games

In this paper, we investigate the impact of introducing relative entropy regularization on the Nash Equilibria (NE) of General-Sum $N$-agent games, revealing the fact that the NE of such games conform to linear Gaussian policies. Moreover, it delineates sufficient conditions, contingent upon the adequacy of entropy regularization, for the uniqueness of the NE within the game. As Policy Optimization serves as a foundational approach for Reinforcement Learning (RL) techniques aimed at finding the NE, in this work we prove the linear convergence of a policy optimization algorithm which (subject to the adequacy of entropy regularization) is capable of provably attaining the NE. Furthermore, in scenarios where the entropy regularization proves insufficient, we present a $δ$-augmentation technique, which facilitates the achievement of an $ε$-NE within the game.

cs.GT↗