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Mengjing Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Mengjing Chen.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

Collab-Solver: Collaborative Solving Policy Learning for Mixed-Integer Linear Programming

Mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) has been a fundamental problem in combinatorial optimization. Conventional MILP solving mainly relies on carefully designed heuristics embedded in the branch-and-bound framework. Driven by the strong capabilities of neural networks, recent research is exploring the value of machine learning alongside conventional MILP solving. Although learning-based MILP methods have shown great promise, existing works typically learn policies for individual modules in MILP solvers in isolation, without considering their interdependence, which limits both solving efficiency and solution quality. To address this limitation, we propose Collab-Solver, a novel multi-agent-based policy learning framework for MILP that enables collaborative policy optimization for multiple modules. Specifically, we formulate the collaboration between cut selection and branching in MILP solving as a Stackelberg game. Under this formulation, we develop a two-phase learning paradigm to stabilize collaborative policy learning: the first phase performs data-communicated policy pretraining, and the second phase further orchestrates the policy learning for various modules. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and large-scale real-world MILP datasets demonstrate that the jointly learned policies significantly improve solving performance. Moreover, the policies learned by Collab-Solver have also demonstrated excellent generalization abilities across different instance sets.

cs.AI

DHEvo: Data-Algorithm Based Heuristic Evolution for Generalizable MILP Solving

Primal heuristics play a critical role in improving the efficiency of mixed integer programming (MILP) solvers. As large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated superior code generation abilities, recent MILP works are devoted to leveraging the evolutionary computation approaches with LLMs to generate effective primal heuristics. Although the generated heuristics have achieved better solving performance than the hand-crafted ones with little adaptability, the advantage of current LLM-based methods is limited to few MILP instances in one problem class, as they fail to capture the instance characteristics in the problem class (the MILP instances generated from the same mathematical model are defined as a problem class). Since MILP instances often differ significantly in structure and feature distribution, the neglect of their characteristics in the evolution process results in poor generalization within the same problem class. To overcome this challenge, we propose a data-algorithm co-evolution framework (DHEvo) that iteratively selects representative instances and evolves corresponding heuristics. With the initial instance distribution, we develop an LLM-based multi-agent system to generate data-code pairs simultaneously. These data-code pairs are iteratively refined based on their fitness scores, leading to the identification of the most effective heuristic over the entire problem class. Extensive experiments across diverse MILP benchmarks demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms both human-designed heuristics and existing LLM-based methods.

cs.NE

Optimal Anonymous Independent Reward Scheme Design

We consider designing reward schemes that incentivize agents to create high-quality content (e.g., videos, images, text, ideas). The problem is at the center of a real-world application where the goal is to optimize the overall quality of generated content on user-generated content platforms. We focus on anonymous independent reward schemes (AIRS) that only take the quality of an agent's content as input. We prove the general problem is NP-hard. If the cost function is convex, we show the optimal AIRS can be formulated as a convex optimization problem and propose an efficient algorithm to solve it. Next, we explore the optimal linear reward scheme and prove it has a 1/2-approximation ratio, and the ratio is tight. Lastly, we show the proportional scheme can be arbitrarily bad compared to AIRS.

cs.GT

A Game-theoretical Approach to Analyze Film Release Time

Film release dates play an important part in box office revenues because of the facts of obvious seasonality demand in the film industry and severe competition among films shown at the same time. In this paper, we study how film studios choose release time for movies they produce to maximize their box offices. We first formalize this problem as an attraction competition game where players (film studios) consider both potential profits and competitors' choices when deciding the release time. Then we prove that there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium and give the sufficient condition of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Our model can be generalized to an extensive game and we compute the subgame-perfect equilibrium for homogeneous players. For the case that one film studio could have multiple movies to release, we prove that finding a player's best response is NP-hard and it does not guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Experiments are provided to support the soundness of our model. In the final state, most of film studios, accounting for 84 percent of the market, would not change their release time. The behaviors of film studios imply they are following some strategies to reach a Nash equilibrium.

cs.GT

Mechanism Design for Multi-Party Machine Learning

In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning is the incentive issue. For example, if there is competition among the parties, one may strategically hide his data to prevent other parties from getting better models. In this paper, we study the problem through the lens of mechanism design and incorporate the features of multi-party learning in our setting. First, each agent's valuation has externalities that depend on others' types and actions. Second, each agent can only misreport a type lower than his true type, but not the other way round. We call this setting interdependent value with type-dependent action spaces. We provide the optimal truthful mechanism in the quasi-monotone utility setting. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for truthful mechanisms in the most general case. Finally, we show the existence of such mechanisms is highly affected by the market growth rate and provide empirical analysis.

cs.MA

Optimal Common Contract with Heterogeneous Agents

We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many circumstances, these contracts need to be identical for the sake of fairness. We investigate the optimal common contract problem. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to consider this natural and important generalization. We first show this problem is NP-complete. Then we provide a dynamic programming algorithm to compute the optimal contract in $O(n^2m)$ time, where $n,m$ are the number of agents and actions, under the assumption that the agents' cost functions obey increasing difference property. At last, we generalize the setting such that each agent can choose to directly produce a reward in $[0,1]$. We provide an $O(\log n)$-approximate algorithm for this generalization.

cs.MA

Optimal mechanisms with budget for user generated contents

In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites. We show that, the proportional division mechanism, which is widely used in practice, can perform arbitrarily bad in the worst case. The problem can be formulated using a linear program with bounded and increasing variables. We then present an $O(n\log n)$ algorithm to find the optimal mechanism, where n is the number of players.

cs.GT

Optimal Vehicle Dispatching Schemes via Dynamic Pricing

Over the past few years, ride-sharing has emerged as an effective way to relieve traffic congestion. A key problem for these platforms is to come up with a revenue-optimal (or GMV-optimal) pricing scheme and an induced vehicle dispatching policy that incorporate geographic and temporal information. In this paper, we aim to tackle this problem via an economic approach. Modeled naively, the underlying optimization problem may be non-convex and thus hard to compute. To this end, we use a so-called "ironing" technique to convert the problem into an equivalent convex optimization one via a clean Markov decision process (MDP) formulation, where the states are the driver distributions and the decision variables are the prices for each pair of locations. Our main finding is an efficient algorithm that computes the exact revenue-optimal (or GMV-optimal) randomized pricing schemes. We characterize the optimal solution of the MDP by a primal-dual analysis of a corresponding convex program. We also conduct empirical evaluations of our solution through real data of a major ride-sharing platform and show its advantages over fixed pricing schemes as well as several prevalent surge-based pricing schemes.

eess.SY