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Michael Harre

Publications and source records attributed to Michael Harre.

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Designing escalation criteria for international AI incident response: criteria, triggers, and thresholds

AI incident reporting requirements are emerging in regulation and policy, yet no operational criteria exist for determining when a detected AI incident warrants escalation beyond national handling to international coordination. This paper proposes an escalation framework to address this gap, intended as a common reference point across jurisdictions that enables aligned escalation while preserving flexibility in how actors respond within their own legal and policy contexts. We review SB 53, the EU AI Act, the GPAI Code of Practice, and incident frameworks from other industries to derive eight criteria for assessing whether an incident warrants escalation, translated into a sequential flowchart with gated decision points and threshold checks. For each criterion, we map how it interplays with these regulatory frameworks, identifying where their design choices support or undermine effective detection. We test the framework against ten documented AI incidents and structured variants to identify where criteria under-detect or misclassify incidents in practice. We find three design patterns that may lead to systematic under-detection in regimes where model developers are responsible for escalation: a. where escalation requires confirmed harm, events such as model weight exfiltration risk detection only after severe, irreversible harm has propagated; b. where incidents are assessed individually, systemic harms emerging from accumulation risk being under-detected; and c. where thresholds align with legal instruments rather than quantitatively testable terms, criteria risk being impractical to apply under time pressure. We also find that escalation rules are only one component of a broader framework: the underlying definitions against which thresholds are set, and the data available to the responsible actor, create interdependencies that can themselves drive under-detection.

cs.CY

Explaining herding and volatility in the cyclical price dynamics of urban housing markets using a large scale agent-based model

Urban housing markets, along with markets of other assets, universally exhibit periods of strong price increases followed by sharp corrections. The mechanisms generating such non-linearities are not yet well understood. We develop an agent-based model populated by a large number of heterogeneous households. The agents' behavior is compatible with economic rationality, with the trend-following behavior found to be essential in replicating market dynamics. The model is calibrated using several large and distributed datasets of the Greater Sydney region (demographic, economic and financial) across three specific and diverse periods since 2006. The model is not only capable of explaining price dynamics during these periods, but also reproduces the novel behavior actually observed immediately prior to the market peak in 2017, namely a sharp increase in the variability of prices. This novel behavior is related to a combination of trend-following aptitude of the household agents (rational herding) and their propensity to borrow.

q-fin.CP

Closed-form solutions for the Lévy-stable distribution

The Lévy-stable distribution is the attractor of distributions which hold power laws with infinite variance. This distribution has been used in a variety of research areas, for example in economics it is used to model financial market fluctuations and in statistical mechanics as a numerical solution of fractional kinetic equations of anomalous transport. This function does not have an explicit expression and no uniform solution has been proposed yet. This paper presents a uniform analytical approximation for the Lévy-stable distribution based on matching power series expansions. For this solution, the trans-stable function is defined as an auxiliary function which removes the numerical issues of the calculations of the Lévy-stable. Then, the uniform solution is proposed as a result of an asymptotic matching between two types of approximations called "the inner solution" and "the outer solution". Finally, the results of analytical approximation are compared to the numerical results of the Lévy-stable distribution function, making this uniform solution valid to be applied as an analytical approximation.

cond-mat.stat-mech

Hysteresis effects of changing parameters of noncooperative games

We adapt the method used by Jaynes to derive the equilibria of statistical physics to instead derive equilibria of bounded rational game theory. We analyze the dependence of these equilibria on the parameters of the underlying game, focusing on hysteresis effects. In particular, we show that by gradually imposing individual-specific tax rates on the players of the game, and then gradually removing those taxes, the players move from a poor equilibrium to one that is better for all of them.

cs.GT