arXiv subjects

Michael Neuder

Publications and source records attributed to Michael Neuder.

11 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Adversarial procurement in blockchains

An emerging blockchain protocol design pattern leverages the asymmetry between the computational effort in performing versus verifying tasks. For example, cryptographic validity proofs (e.g., SNARKS) require the prover to expend significant effort demonstrating the correctness of their claim, while the verifiers benefit from extremely easy validation. The operationalization of this paradigm requires efficiently soliciting the performance of expensive tasks in pseudonymous, adversarial environments. We formalize this as a mechanism design question. The protocol balances the economic cost of a liveness fault, where the work is not completed, with the payments required to incentivize specific behavior from candidate suppliers. We show that the loss of the optimal protocol scales logarithmically in the cost of a liveness fault, scaled up by the adversarial fraction of the network. Further, we find that the optimal equilibria have an intuitive structure, allowing us to provide concrete advice to practitioners. Specifically, in many regimes, the optimum designates a single, random node as the primary worker and a committee as a fallback, which is reminiscent of leader-based consensus mechanisms. We also characterize the asymptotic regimes where having negative payments (i.e., slashing in blockchain parlance) is especially helpful.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions

Blockchain protocols often seek to procure computationally challenging work from a decentralized set of participants. While there are simple procurement auctions that result in the minimal cost of acquisition and maximal efficiency, they also lead to concentration in the provider set due to the winner-take-all market structure. We design and analyze single-good procurement auctions that balance social-cost minimization (at the extreme, a winner-take-all auction) with decentralization (at the extreme, a uniform allocation). We first give a dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) mechanism explicitly designed to implement non-winner-take-all allocations. Our allocation rule uniquely solves an optimization with respect to a modified social-cost metric that penalizes large, single-player concentrations and is parameterized with a curvature value, $\alpha$, with $\alpha \rightarrow 0$ implementing the uniform allocation and $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$ implementing the winner-take-all allocation. We further quantify the loss in social cost of this mechanism as a function of $\alpha$. We then propose two alternative mechanisms, each addressing a limitation of the DSIC mechanism, namely a lack of Sybil-resistance and a complex payment rule. First, we examine a variation of Tullock contests to achieve a non-winner-take-all Sybil-proof procurement mechanism. Second, we consider a mechanism with the same allocation rule as the DSIC mechanism but with an alternative payment rule in which producers are simply paid proportionally to their bids. This provides a much simpler payment rule which, while not DSIC, still results in the mechanism being ex-post ``safe'' (where there exists a bidding strategy that is guaranteed to result in non-negative utility) for participating bidders. For both non-DSIC mechanisms, we characterize the equilibrium allocations and prove price of anarchy bounds.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Selfish Mining under General Stochastic Rewards

Selfish miners selectively withhold blocks to earn disproportionately high revenue. The vast majority of the selfish mining literature focuses exclusively on block rewards. Carlsten et al. [2016] is a notable exception, observing that similar strategic behavior is profitable in a zero-block-reward regime (the endgame for Bitcoin's quadrennial halving schedule) if miners are compensated with transaction fees alone. Neither model fully captures miner incentives today. The block reward remains 3.125 BTC, yet some blocks yield significantly higher revenue. For example, congestion during the launch of the Babylon protocol in August 2024 caused transaction fees to spike to 9.52 BTC. Our results are both practical and theoretical. Of practical interest, we study selfish mining profitability under a combined reward function that more accurately models miner incentives. This analysis enables us to make quantitative claims about protocol risk (e.g., the mining power at which a selfish strategy becomes profitable is reduced by 22% when optimizing over the combined reward function versus block rewards alone) and qualitative observations (e.g., a miner considering both block rewards and transaction fees will mine more or less aggressively respectively). These practical results follow from our novel model and methodology, which constitute our theoretical contributions. We model general, time-accruing stochastic rewards, which requires explicit treatment of difficult adjustment and randomness; we characterize reward function structure through a set of properties (e.g., that rewards accrue only as a function of time). We present a new methodology to analytically calculate expected selfish miner rewards under a broad class of stochastic reward functions and validate our method numerically by comparing it with the existing literature and simulating the combined reward sources directly.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Optimizing Exit Queues for Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: A Mechanism Design Approach

Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols have provable safety and liveness properties for static validator sets. In practice, however, the validator set changes over time, potentially eroding the protocol's security guarantees. For example, systems with accountable safety may lose some of that accountability over time as adversarial validators exit. As a result, protocols must rate limit entry and exit so that the set changes slowly enough to ensure security. Here, the system designer faces a fundamental trade-off. Slower exits increase friction, making it less attractive to stake in the first place. Faster exits provide more utility to stakers but weaken the protocol's security. This paper provides the first systematic study of exit queues for Proof-of-Stake blockchains. Given a collection of validator-set consistency constraints imposed by the protocol, the social planner's goal is to provide a constrained-optimal mechanism that minimizes disutility for the participants. We introduce the MINSLACK mechanism, a dynamic capacity first-come-first-served queue in which the amount of stake that can exit in a period depends on the number of previous exits and the consistency constraints. We show that MINSLACK is optimal when stakers equally value the processing of their withdrawal. When stakers values are heterogeneous, the optimal mechanism resembles a priority queue with dynamic capacity. However, this mechanism must reserve exit capacity for the future in case a staker with a much higher need for liquidity arrives. We conclude with a survey of known consistency constraints and highlight the diversity of existing exit mechanisms.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2021

Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3

Uniswap v3 is the largest decentralized exchange for digital currencies. A novelty of its design is that it allows a liquidity provider (LP) to allocate liquidity to one or more closed intervals of the price of an asset instead of the full range of possible prices. An LP earns fee rewards proportional to the amount of its liquidity allocation when prices move in this interval. This induces the problem of {\em strategic liquidity provision}: smaller intervals result in higher concentration of liquidity and correspondingly larger fees when the price remains in the interval, but with higher risk as prices may exit the interval leaving the LP with no fee rewards. Although reallocating liquidity to new intervals can mitigate this loss, it comes at a cost, as LPs must expend gas fees to do so. We formalize the dynamic liquidity provision problem and focus on a general class of strategies for which we provide a neural network-based optimization framework for maximizing LP earnings. We model a single LP that faces an exogenous sequence of price changes that arise from arbitrage and non-arbitrage trades in the decentralized exchange. We present experimental results informed by historical price data that demonstrate large improvements in LP earnings over existing allocation strategy baselines. Moreover we provide insight into qualitative differences in optimal LP behaviour in different economic environments.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Low-cost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub-1/3 stakeholders

We outline two dishonest strategies that can be cheaply executed on the Ethereum 2.0 beacon chain, even by validators holding less than one-third of the total stake: malicious chain reorganizations ("reorgs") and finality delays. In a malicious reorg, an attacker withholds their blocks and attestations before releasing them at an opportune time in order to force a chain reorganization, which they can take advantage of by double-spending or front-running transactions. To execute a finality delay an attacker uses delayed block releases and withholding of attestations to increase the mean and variance of the time it takes blocks to become finalized. This impacts the efficiency and predictability of the system. We provide a probabilistic and cost analysis for each of these attacks, considering a validator with 30% of the total stake.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Detection of Local Mixing in Time-Series Data Using Permutation Entropy

While it is tempting in experimental practice to seek as high a data rate as possible, oversampling can become an issue if one takes measurements too densely. These effects can take many forms, some of which are easy to detect: e.g., when the data sequence contains multiple copies of the same measured value. In other situations, as when there is mixing$-$in the measurement apparatus and/or the system itself$-$oversampling effects can be harder to detect. We propose a novel, model-free technique to detect local mixing in time series using an information-theoretic technique called permutation entropy. By varying the temporal resolution of the calculation and analyzing the patterns in the results, we can determine whether the data are mixed locally, and on what scale. This can be used by practitioners to choose appropriate lower bounds on scales at which to measure or report data. After validating this technique on several synthetic examples, we demonstrate its effectiveness on data from a chemistry experiment, methane records from Mauna Loa, and an Antarctic ice core.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2020

Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake

Blockchains are intended to be immutable, so an attacker who is able to delete transactions through a chain reorganization (a malicious reorg) can perform a profitable double-spend attack. We study the rate at which an attacker can execute reorgs in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake protocol. As an example, an attacker with 40% of the staking power is able to execute a 20-block malicious reorg at an average rate of once per day, and the attack probability increases super-linearly as the staking power grows beyond 40%. Moreover, an attacker of the Tezos protocol knows in advance when an attack opportunity will arise, and can use this knowledge to arrange transactions to double-spend. We show that in particular cases, the Tezos protocol can be adjusted to protect against deep reorgs. For instance, we demonstrate protocol parameters that reduce the rate of length-20 reorg opportunities for a 40% attacker by two orders of magnitude. We also observe a trade-off between optimizing for robustness to deep reorgs (costly deviations that may be net profitable because they enable double-spends) and robustness to selfish mining (mining deviations that result in typically short reorgs that are profitable even without double-spends). That is, the parameters that optimally protect against one make the other attack easy. Finally, we develop a method that monitors the Tezos blockchain health with respect to malicious reorgs using only publicly available information.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol

Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols give rise to complex modeling challenges. We analyze the recently-updated Tezos Proof-of-Stake protocol and demonstrate that, under certain conditions, rational participants are incentivized to behave dishonestly. In doing so, we provide a theoretical analysis of the feasibility and profitability of a block stealing attack that we call selfish endorsing, a concrete instance of an attack previously only theoretically considered. We propose and analyze a simple change to the Tezos protocol which significantly reduces the (already small) profitability of this dishonest behavior, and introduce a new delay and reward scheme that is provably secure against length-1 and length-2 selfish endorsing attacks. Our framework provides a template for analyzing other Proof-of-Stake implementations for selfish behavior.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2018

Anomaly Detection in Paleoclimate Records using Permutation Entropy

Permutation entropy techniques can be useful in identifying anomalies in paleoclimate data records, including noise, outliers, and post-processing issues. We demonstrate this using weighted and unweighted permutation entropy of water-isotope records in a deep polar ice core. In one region of these isotope records, our previous calculations revealed an abrupt change in the complexity of the traces: specifically, in the amount of new information that appeared at every time step. We conjectured that this effect was due to noise introduced by an older laboratory instrument. In this paper, we validate that conjecture by re-analyzing a section of the ice core using a more-advanced version of the laboratory instrument. The anomalous noise levels are absent from the permutation entropy traces of the new data. In other sections of the core, we show that permutation entropy techniques can be used to identify anomalies in the raw data that are not associated with climatic or glaciological processes, but rather effects occurring during field work, laboratory analysis, or data post-processing. These examples make it clear that permutation entropy is a useful forensic tool for identifying sections of data that require targeted re-analysis---and can even be useful in guiding that analysis.

physics.data-an↗

arXiv2018

Climate entropy production recorded in a deep Antarctic ice core

Paleoclimate records are extremely rich sources of information about the past history of the Earth system. Information theory, the branch of mathematics capable of quantifying the degree to which the present is informed by the past, provides a new means for studying these records. Here, we demonstrate that estimates of the Shannon entropy rate of the water-isotope data from the West Antarctica Ice Sheet (WAIS) Divide ice core, calculated using weighted permutation entropy (WPE), can bring out valuable new information from this record. We find that WPE correlates with accumulation, reveals possible signatures of geothermal heating at the base of the core, and clearly brings out laboratory and data-processing effects that are difficult to see in the raw data. For example, the signatures of Dansgaard-Oeschger events in the information record are small, suggesting that these abrupt warming events may not represent significant changes in the climate system dynamics. While the potential power of information theory in paleoclimatology problems is significant, the associated methods require careful handling and well-dated, high-resolution data. The WAIS Divide ice core is the first such record that can support this kind of analysis. As more high-resolution records become available, information theory will likely become a common forensic tool in climate science.

physics.geo-ph↗