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Michal Mankowski

Publications and source records attributed to Michal Mankowski.

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A Few Teacher Steps Go a Long Way: Cost-Efficient On-Policy Data Augmentation for Agent Post-Training

For LLM agents, supervised fine-tuning is not only about teacher labels' quality, but also about which interaction contexts those labels condition on. Pure behavioral cloning uses full teacher demonstrations, creating a mismatch between teacher-induced contexts seen in training and student-induced contexts encountered at test time. Recent work addresses this mismatch by querying a teacher at contexts reached by the student, often with increasingly elaborate filtering of the teacher's continuations. We instead frame on-policy data construction as a budget-allocation problem: under matched supervision resources, should teacher output be spent on more start-to-finish demos, longer continuations, outcome filtering, or broader coverage of learner-induced contexts? We formalize this design space through the rollout policy, switch-time distribution, continuation horizon, filtering rules, and two complementary costs: teacher inference generated before filtering and teacher supervision retained for SFT. Across HotpotQA, ALFWorld, and Terminal-Bench-Dev, bounded unfiltered teacher continuations at learner-induced contexts improve over pure behavioral cloning at matched budgets. On HotpotQA and ALFWorld, where we run the full comparison, few-step continuations match or exceed success-filtered and critical-context-filtered alternatives. Our findings suggest that a few teacher steps, placed at learner-induced contexts, can be a more cost-efficient supervision allocation than longer or more heavily curated teacher completions.

cs.LG

Maximum Matchings in Graphs for Allocating Kidney Paired Donation

Relatives and friends of an end-stage renal disease patient who offer to donate a kidney are often found to be incompatible with their intended recipients. Kidney paired donation matches one patient and his incompatible donor with another patient and donor in the same situation for an organ exchange. Let patient- donor pairs be the vertices of an undirected graph G, with an edge connecting any two reciprocally compatible vertices. A matching in G is a feasible set of paired donations. We describe various optimization problems on kidney paired donation graphs G and the merits of each in clinical transplantation. Because some matches are geographically undesirable, and the expected lifespan of a transplanted kidney depends on the immunologic concordance of donor and recipient, we weight the edges of G and seek a maximum edge-weight matching. Unfortunately, such matchings might not have the maximum cardinality; there is a risk of an unpredictable trade-off between the quality and quantity of paired donations. We propose an edge-weighting of G which guarantees that every matching with maximum weight also has maximum cardinality, and also maximizes the number of transplants for an exceptional subset of recipients, while reducing travel and favoring immunologic concordance.

cs.GT