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Michalis Samaris

Publications and source records attributed to Michalis Samaris.

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Computing and Bounding the Number of Eulerian Orientations for Certain Classes of $4$-Regular Graphs

An Eulerian orientation of a $4$-regular undirected graph (simple or multigraph) $G=(V,E)$ with $n=|V|$ vertices is an assignment of directions to its edges such that every vertex $v \in V$ has the same indegree and outdegree. In the present article, we improve the bounds on the number of Eulerian orientations for certain classes of connected, loopless $4$-regular graphs. The previous bound is due to M. Las Vergnas (1983) and is exactly $9\cdot 2^{n-3}$, which is a sharp bound for a certain family of multigraphs with $n\geq 4$. Here, we show that the number of Eulerian orientations for all biconnected $4$-regular multigraphs is at most $2^n+2$, which is also sharp. We exhibit families of graphs that attain this maximum value. For simple graphs, we prove an upper bound of $\mathcal{O}(3^{n/2})$ in the biconnected case and $\mathcal{O}(6^{n/3})$ for the separable case. Additionally, we provide a divide-and-conquer algorithm that leverages structural properties to compute the exact number of Eulerian orientations for separable graphs without exhaustive enumeration. Finally, we analyze the effect of standard inductive construction operations, used to generate $4$-regular graphs from smaller ones, as shown by F.Bories et.al. (1983) for simple graphs and by G.Ding et.al. (2003) for multigraphs, on the number of Eulerian orientations.

math.CO

Leveraging Matchings in Constrained Fair Division with a Conflict Graph

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods under constraints, expressed via a conflict graph $G$. In such an instance, the $m$ items are the vertices of $G$ and connected items cannot be allocated in the same bundle. Under this model, it is already known that EF1 allocations may not exist. Our main contribution is an analysis parametrized by the maximum degree $\Delta(G)=\Delta$ on the existence and computation of complete EF1 allocations. We address this question in various cases by leveraging results from matching theory. First, we provide a tight existence result for agents with ordered valuations and for the broader class of tiered valuations. We present an algorithm that returns an EF1 allocation when then number of items does not exceed a specific bound. This bound is determined by $n$ and $\Delta$, and it is tight when $\Delta$ is greater than $2n/3$. We also construct an approximation algorithm when $m$ exceeds this bound. For general additive valuations the problem becomes more challenging. Given the current impossibility results, we focus on the case where the number of items is at most $2n$. For this case, we provide an almost complete picture for the instances that admit EF1 allocations, by combining Round Robin with matchings.

cs.GT

Pareto optimal exchange with indifferent endowments

We investigate a market without money in which agents can offer certain goods (or multiple copies of an agent-specific good) in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange must be balanced in the sense that each agent should receive a quantity of good(s) equal to the one she transfers to others. In addition, each agent has strict preferences over the agents from which she will receive goods, and there is an upper bound on the volume of each transaction and a weight reflecting its social importance or its cardinal utility for the two agents. We propose a simple variant of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism that finds a Pareto optimal balanced exchange. We then offer necessary and sufficient conditions for a balanced exchange to be Pareto optimal and exploit these to obtain a recognition procedure. This procedure can detect whether a given exchange is Pareto optimal and, if not, improve it to become Pareto optimal in polynomial time. Last, we show how to obtain a Pareto optimal balanced exchange of maximum weight in two special cases.

cs.DM