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Michelle Blom

Publications and source records attributed to Michelle Blom.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Advances in STV Margin Computation

Single transferable vote (STV) is a multi-winner preferential proportional electoral system. The margin is the smallest number of ballots that need to be manipulated to alter the set of winners. If we can compute the margin of an STV election, or a reasonable lower bound on the margin, we can use recent advances in auditing research to conduct a risk-limiting audit of the election's winners. Knowledge of the margin also provides insight into whether uncovered mistakes, or a known error rate in ballot interpretation, could have influenced the outcome. This paper presents substantial improvements on an existing algorithm for computing lower bounds on the margin of an STV election. These improvements allow us to compute higher lower bounds for real STV elections, making mismatch-based risk-limiting audits more practical.

cs.GT

To whom did my vote go?

Single Transferable Vote (STV) counting, used in several jurisdictions in Australia, is a system for choosing multiple election winners given voters' preferences among candidates. The system is complex and it is not always obvious how an individual's vote contributes to candidates' tallies across rounds of tabulation. This short paper presents a demonstration system that allows voters to enter an example vote in a past Australian STV election, and see: (i)~how that vote would have been transferred between candidates; and (ii)~how much that vote would have contributed to the tallies of relevant candidates, across rounds of tabulation.

cs.CY

Doing More With Less: Mismatch-Based Risk-Limiting Audits

One approach to risk-limiting audits (RLAs) compares randomly selected cast vote records (CVRs) to votes read by human auditors from the corresponding ballot cards. Historically, such methods reduce audit sample sizes by considering how each sampled CVR differs from the corresponding true vote, not merely whether they differ. Here we investigate the latter approach, auditing by testing whether the total number of mismatches in the full set of CVRs exceeds the minimum number of CVR errors required for the reported outcome to be wrong (the "CVR margin"). This strategy makes it possible to audit more social choice functions and simplifies RLAs conceptually, which makes it easier to explain than some other RLA approaches. The cost is larger sample sizes. "Mismatch-based RLAs" only require a lower bound on the CVR margin, which for some social choice functions is easier to calculate than the effect of particular errors. When the population rate of mismatches is low and the lower bound on the CVR margin is close to the true CVR margin, the increase in sample size is small. However, the increase may be very large when errors include errors that, if corrected, would widen the CVR margin rather than narrow it; errors affect the margin between candidates other than the reported winner with the fewest votes and the reported loser with the most votes; or errors that affect different margins.

cs.CY

3+ Seat Risk-Limiting Audits for Single Transferable Vote Elections

Constructing efficient risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for multiwinner single transferable vote (STV) elections is a challenging problem. An STV RLA is designed to statistically verify that the reported winners of an election did indeed win according to the voters' expressed preferences and not due to mistabulation or interference, while limiting the risk of accepting an incorrect outcome to a desired threshold (the risk limit). Existing methods have shown that it is possible to form RLAs for two-seat STV elections in the context where the first seat has been awarded to a candidate in the first round of tabulation. This is called the first winner criterion. We present an assertion-based approach to conducting full or partial RLAs for STV elections with three or more seats, in which the first winner criterion is satisfied. Although the chance of forming a full audit that verifies all winners drops substantially as the number of seats increases, we show that we can quite often form partial audits that verify most, and sometimes all, of the reported winners. We evaluate our method on a dataset of over 500 three- and four-seat STV elections from the 2017 and 2022 local council elections in Scotland.

cs.CY

Efficient Lower Bounding of Single Transferable Vote Election Margins

The single transferable vote (STV) is a system of preferential proportional voting employed in multi-seat elections. Each ballot cast by a voter is a (potentially partial) ranking over a set of candidates. The margin of victory, or simply 'margin', is the smallest number of ballots that need to be manipulated to alter the set of winners. Knowledge of the margin of an election gives greater insight into both how much time and money should be spent on auditing the election, and whether uncovered mistakes throw the election result into doubt -- requiring a costly repeat election -- or can be safely ignored without compromising the integrity of the result. Lower bounds on the margin can also be used for this purpose, in cases where exact margins are difficult to compute. There is one existing approach to computing lower bounds on the margin of STV elections, while there are multiple approaches to finding upper bounds. In this paper, we present improvements to this existing lower bound computation method for STV margins. The improvements lead to increased computational efficiency and, in many cases, to the algorithm computing tighter (higher) lower bounds.

cs.GT

Idiosyncratic properties of Australian STV election counting

Single Transferable Vote (STV) counting, used in several jurisdictions in Australia, is a system for choosing multiple election winners given voters' preferences over candidates. There are a variety of different versions of STV legislated and/or applied across Australia. This paper shows some of the unintuitive properties of some of these systems.

cs.CY

Improving the Computational Efficiency of Adaptive Audits of IRV Elections

AWAIRE is one of two extant methods for conducting risk-limiting audits of instant-runoff voting (IRV) elections. In principle AWAIRE can audit IRV contests with any number of candidates, but the original implementation incurred memory and computation costs that grew superexponentially with the number of candidates. This paper improves the algorithmic implementation of AWAIRE in three ways that make it practical to audit IRV contests with 55 candidates, compared to the previous 6 candidates. First, rather than trying from the start to rule out all candidate elimination orders that produce a different winner, the algorithm starts by considering only the final round, testing statistically whether each candidate could have won that round. For those candidates who cannot be ruled out at that stage, it expands to consider earlier and earlier rounds until either it provides strong evidence that the reported winner really won or a full hand count is conducted, revealing who really won. Second, it tests a richer collection of conditions, some of which can rule out many elimination orders at once. Third, it exploits relationships among those conditions, allowing it to abandon testing those that are unlikely to help. We provide real-world examples with up to 36 candidates and synthetic examples with up to 55 candidates, showing how audit sample size depends on the margins and on the tuning parameters. An open-source Python implementation is publicly available.

cs.CY

Long-Term Open-Pit Mine Planning with Large Neighbourhood Search

We present a Large Neighbourhood Search based approach for solving complex long-term open-pit mine planning problems. An initial feasible solution, generated by a sliding windows heuristic, is improved through repeated solves of a restricted mixed-integer program. Each iteration leaves only a subset of the variables in the planning model free to take on new values. We form these subsets through the use of neighbourhood formation strategies that exploit model structure. We show that our approach is able to find near-optimal solutions to problems that cannot be solved by an off-the-shelf solver in a reasonable time frame, or with reasonable computational resources. Our method substantially reduces the solve times required for large models, allowing mine planners to explore multiple scenarios in a timely fashion. Our approach is being used by Rio Tinto to solve large long-term mine planning problems, and has been responsible for generating millions of dollars in value insights.

math.OC

Analysing Guarantees in Australian Senate Outcomes

Single Transferable Vote (STV) is used to elect candidates to the 76 seat Australian Senate across six states and two territories. These eight STV contests are counted using a combination of ballot scanners, manual data entry and tabulation software. On election night, some properties of the set of cast ballots are determined by hand. This includes the first preference tallies of each party. This technical report considers whether there are some properties, such as individual candidates' first preference tallies, that, if assumed to be accurate, imply a portion of the election outcome. The paper also presents an interesting example showing that the rules of STV tabulation used for the Australian Senate can allow bizarre behaviour, such as votes increasing in value over time.

cs.CY

Explainable agency: human preferences for simple or complex explanations

Research in cognitive psychology has established that whether people prefer simpler explanations to complex ones is context dependent, but the question of `simple vs. complex' becomes critical when an artificial agent seeks to explain its decisions or predictions to humans. We present a model for abstracting causal reasoning chains for the purpose of explanation. This model uses a set of rules to progressively abstract different types of causal information in causal proof traces. We perform online studies using 123 Amazon MTurk participants and with five industry experts over two domains: maritime patrol and weather prediction. We found participants' satisfaction with generated explanations was based on the consistency of relationships among the causes (coherence) that explain an event; and that the important question is not whether people prefer simple or complex explanations, but what types of causal information are relevant to individuals in specific contexts.

cs.HC

RLAs for 2-Seat STV Elections: Revisited

Single Transferable Vote (STV) elections are a principled approach to electing multiple candidates in a single election. Each ballot has a starting value of 1, and a candidate is elected if they gather a total vote value more than a defined quota. Votes over the quota have their value reduced by a transfer value so as to remove the quota, and are passed to the next candidate on the ballot. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are a statistically sound approach to election auditing which guarantees that failure to detect an error in the result is bounded by a limit. A first approach to RLAs for 2-seat STV elections has been defined. In this paper we show how we can improve this approach by reasoning about lower bounds on transfer values, and how we can extend the approach to partially audit an election, if the method does not support a full audit.

cs.GT

Strategy Extraction in Single-Agent Games

The ability to continuously learn and adapt to new situations is one where humans are far superior compared to AI agents. We propose an approach to knowledge transfer using behavioural strategies as a form of transferable knowledge influenced by the human cognitive ability to develop strategies. A strategy is defined as a partial sequence of events - where an event is both the result of an agent's action and changes in state - to reach some predefined event of interest. This information acts as guidance or a partial solution that an agent can generalise and use to make predictions about how to handle unknown observed phenomena. As a first step toward this goal, we develop a method for extracting strategies from an agent's existing knowledge that can be applied in multiple contexts. Our method combines observed event frequency information with local sequence alignment techniques to find patterns of significance that form a strategy. We show that our method can identify plausible strategies in three environments: Pacman, Bank Heist and a dungeon-crawling video game. Our evaluation serves as a promising first step toward extracting knowledge for generalisation and, ultimately, transfer learning.

cs.AI

Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections

Elections where electors rank the candidates (or a subset of the candidates) in order of preference allow the collection of more information about the electors' intent. The most widely used election of this type is Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV), where candidates are eliminated one by one, until a single candidate holds the majority of the remaining ballots. Condorcet elections treat the election as a set of simultaneous decisions about each pair of candidates. The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in these pairwise contests. There are various proposals to determine a winner if no Condorcet winner exists. In this paper we show how we can efficiently audit Condorcet elections for a number of variations. We also compare the audit efficiency (how many ballots we expect to sample) of IRV and Condorcet elections.

cs.CY

Ballot-Polling Audits of Instant-Runoff Voting Elections with a Dirichlet-Tree Model

Instant-runoff voting (IRV) is used in several countries around the world. It requires voters to rank candidates in order of preference, and uses a counting algorithm that is more complex than systems such as first-past-the-post or scoring rules. An even more complex system, the single transferable vote (STV), is used when multiple candidates need to be elected. The complexity of these systems has made it difficult to audit the election outcomes. There is currently no known risk-limiting audit (RLA) method for STV, other than a full manual count of the ballots. A new approach to auditing these systems was recently proposed, based on a Dirichlet-tree model. We present a detailed analysis of this approach for ballot-polling Bayesian audits of IRV elections. We compared several choices for the prior distribution, including some approaches using a Bayesian bootstrap (equivalent to an improper prior). Our findings include that the bootstrap-based approaches can be adapted to perform similarly to a full Bayesian model in practice, and that an overly informative prior can give counter-intuitive results. Via carefully chosen examples, we show why creating an RLA with this model is challenging, but we also suggest ways to overcome this. As well as providing a practical and computationally feasible implementation of a Bayesian IRV audit, our work is important in laying the foundation for an RLA for STV elections.

stat.AP

Auditing Ranked Voting Elections with Dirichlet-Tree Models: First Steps

Ranked voting systems, such as instant-runoff voting (IRV) and single transferable vote (STV), are used in many places around the world. They are more complex than plurality and scoring rules, presenting a challenge for auditing their outcomes: there is no known risk-limiting audit (RLA) method for STV other than a full hand count. We present a new approach to auditing ranked systems that uses a statistical model, a Dirichlet-tree, that can cope with high-dimensional parameters in a computationally efficient manner. We demonstrate this approach with a ballot-polling Bayesian audit for IRV elections. Although the technique is not known to be risk-limiting, we suggest some strategies that might allow it to be calibrated to limit risk.

stat.AP

Assessing the accuracy of the Australian Senate count: Key steps for a rigorous and transparent audit

This paper explains the main principles and some of the technical details for auditing the scanning and digitisation of the Australian Senate ballot papers. We give a short summary of the motivation for auditing paper ballots, explain the necessary supporting steps for a rigorous and transparent audit, and suggest some statistical methods that would be appropriate for the Australian Senate. 22 June 2022 Update: The update includes analysis of Senate preference data from the 2022 Australian election.

stat.AP

A First Approach to Risk-Limiting Audits for Single Transferable Vote Elections

Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are an increasingly important method for checking that the reported outcome of an election is, in fact, correct. Indeed, their use is increasingly being legislated. While effective methods for RLAs have been developed for many forms of election -- for example: first-past-the-post, instant-runoff voting, and D'Hondt elections -- auditing methods for single transferable vote (STV) elections have yet to be developed. STV elections are notoriously hard to reason about since there is a complex interaction of votes that change their value throughout the process. In this paper we present the first approach to risk-limiting audits for STV elections, restricted to the case of 2-seat STV elections.

cs.CY

Assertion-Based Approaches to Auditing Complex Elections, with Application to Party-List Proportional Elections

Risk-limiting audits (RLAs), an ingredient in evidence-based elections, are increasingly common. They are a rigorous statistical means of ensuring that electoral results are correct, usually without having to perform an expensive full recount -- at the cost of some controlled probability of error. A recently developed approach for conducting RLAs, SHANGRLA, provides a flexible framework that can encompass a wide variety of social choice functions and audit strategies. Its flexibility comes from reducing sufficient conditions for outcomes to be correct to canonical `assertions' that have a simple mathematical form. Assertions have been developed for auditing various social choice functions including plurality, multi-winner plurality, super-majority, Hamiltonian methods, and instant runoff voting. However, there is no systematic approach to building assertions. Here, we show that assertions with linear dependence on transformations of the votes can easily be transformed to canonical form for SHANGRLA. We illustrate the approach by constructing assertions for party-list elections such as Hamiltonian free list elections and elections using the D'Hondt method, expanding the set of social choice functions to which SHANGRLA applies directly.

cs.CY