arXiv subjects

Michelle Yeo

Publications and source records attributed to Michelle Yeo.

16 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Liquid democracy under vote correlation: On the fallacies of averaging and the excluded middle

Liquid democracy permits voters to vote directly or delegate their votes to others. Existing algorithmic analyses assign each voter a single scalar parameter, interpreted as an independent probability of voting for the ground truth. This representation is inadequate when delegation is fixed before public information changes different voters' reliability in different ways. In this work, we study a minimal common-signal model of this phenomenon. Delegation occurs before a public binary signal is realised, while voting occurs afterwards. Conditional on the signal, sink votes are independent, and each voter has a signal-specific competence; marginally, correctness events are correlated through the common signal. We show that delegation based on average competence is not a safe scalarisation: it can violate do-no-harm, and a beneficial delegation rule may send votes to voters with lower average competence. We present and analyse three novel delegation mechanisms for this setting. The first is a conservative intersection mechanism that delegates only to neighbours whose competence exceeds the delegator's by a prescribed margin in every signal state; the conservative intersection mechanism inherits all the guarantees of delegation in the scalar competence setting. The next mechanism is a confounded-set mechanism that enable the delegation to neighbours who are favoured in one state and worse by at most a prescribed tolerance in the other. For this mechanism, we prove expected-margin bounds, and identify the weight-dispersion and mechanism-concentration conditions needed to obtain majority-correctness guarantees. Finally, on bounded-in-degree graphs, a multi-round certified-path mechanism propagates nonnegative two-dimensional path certificates; it is acyclic, yields statewise terminal competence improvement, and gives uniform bounds on path length and terminal voting weight.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

A contribution to the critique of blockchain censorship

We study the blockchain censorship attack introduced in [21], which shows that joining the attack is a dominant strategy. We show that, by introducing certain detectability threshold, joining the attack can lead to strictly less reward for whales, which are defined to be a small number of validators that hold significantly more voting power than the rest (henceforth known as minnows). This leads to a change of the equilibrium: With whales unwilling to participate in the attack, it is difficult for minnows alone to launch the attack. We also perform Monte Carlo simulation to show the existence of reduction for whales' reward in Ethereum and Solana.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Track me if you can: Ephemeral coin tracing

Privacy-preserving payment systems are well understood, yet their adoption in regulated settings, such as central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), institutional stablecoins, and other compliant payment infrastructures, has been limited by concerns over their potential misuse for illicit activities. Regulators counter financial crime with a toolbox of complementary measures to identify, trace, and stop criminal actors. Tracing is one key tool: acting on outside evidence that a user is implicated in a crime such as money laundering, law enforcement follows the suspect's funds through the ledger to uncover laundering routes and accomplices. The tracing schemes proposed in the literature, however, grant authorities unbounded capabilities: once initiated, tracing propagates through the transaction graph or persists across all future transactions of a user, and may eventually deanonymize the entire ledger. Only the goodwill of the authority, or the honesty of a committee, keeps surveillance targeted and temporary. We introduce ephemeral coin tracing (ECT), a primitive whose tracing capacity is bounded by construction, both in the number of simultaneously traced users and in the number of hops each trace survives. The authority issues tracing tags that degrade at each hop; after a protocol-defined number of hops, a tag collapses into a value indistinguishable from that of an untagged coin. Within a tracing period the bound is absolute: no authority, however motivated, can follow a tag past its budget. We formalize ECT, define its security and privacy guarantees, and give two constructions, one over exponential ElGamal and one over Damg{\aa}rd--Jurik encryption.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Foundations of Fiat-Denominated Loans Collateralized by Cryptocurrencies

The rising importance of cryptocurrencies as financial assets pushed their applicability from an object of speculation closer to standard financial instruments such as loans. In this work, we initiate the study of secure protocols that enable fiat-denominated loans collateralized by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. We provide limited-custodial protocols for such loans relying only on trusted arbitration and provide their game-theoretical analysis. We also highlight various interesting directions for future research.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Boosting Payment Channel Network Liquidity with Topology Optimization and Transaction Selection

Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising technology that alleviates blockchain scalability by shifting the transaction load from the blockchain to the PCN. Nevertheless, the network topology has to be carefully designed to maximise the transaction throughput in PCNs. Additionally, users in PCNs also have to make optimal decisions on which transactions to forward and which to reject to prolong the lifetime of their channels. In this work, we consider an input sequence of transactions over $p$ parties. Each transaction consists of a transaction size, source, and target, and can be either accepted or rejected (entailing a cost). The goal is to design a PCN topology among the $p$ cooperating parties, along with the channel capacities, and then output a decision for each transaction in the sequence to minimise the cost of creating and augmenting channels, as well as the cost of rejecting transactions. Our main contribution is an $\mathcal{O}(p)$ approximation algorithm for the problem with $p$ parties. We further show that with some assumptions on the distribution of transactions, we can reduce the approximation ratio to $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{p})$. We complement our theoretical analysis with an empirical study of our assumptions and approach in the context of the Lightning Network.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2025

Rational Censorship Attack: Breaking Blockchain with a Blackboard

Censorship resilience is a fundamental assumption underlying the security of blockchain protocols. Additionally, the analysis of blockchain security from an economic and game theoretic perspective has been growing in popularity in recent years. In this work, we present a surprising rational censorship attack on blockchain censorship resilience when we adopt the analysis of blockchain security from a game theoretic lens and assume all users are rational. In our attack, a colluding group with sufficient voting power censors the remainder nodes such that the group alone can gain all the rewards from maintaining the blockchain. We show that if nodes are rational, coordinating this attack just requires a public read and write blackboard and we formally model the attack using a game theoretic framework. Furthermore, we note that to ensure the success of the attack, nodes need to know the total true voting power held by the colluding group. We prove that the strategy to join the rational censorship attack and also for nodes to honestly declare their power is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding extensive form game induced by our attack. Finally, we discuss the implications of the attack on blockchain users and protocol designers as well as some potential countermeasures.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Fully Automated Selfish Mining Analysis in Efficient Proof Systems Blockchains

We study selfish mining attacks in longest-chain blockchains like Bitcoin, but where the proof of work is replaced with efficient proof systems -- like proofs of stake or proofs of space -- and consider the problem of computing an optimal selfish mining attack which maximizes expected relative revenue of the adversary, thus minimizing the chain quality. To this end, we propose a novel selfish mining attack that aims to maximize this objective and formally model the attack as a Markov decision process (MDP). We then present a formal analysis procedure which computes an $\epsilon$-tight lower bound on the optimal expected relative revenue in the MDP and a strategy that achieves this $\epsilon$-tight lower bound, where $\epsilon>0$ may be any specified precision. Our analysis is fully automated and provides formal guarantees on the correctness. We evaluate our selfish mining attack and observe that it achieves superior expected relative revenue compared to two considered baselines. In concurrent work [Sarenche FC'24] does an automated analysis on selfish mining in predictable longest-chain blockchains based on efficient proof systems. Predictable means the randomness for the challenges is fixed for many blocks (as used e.g., in Ouroboros), while we consider unpredictable (Bitcoin-like) chains where the challenge is derived from the previous block.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Eating sandwiches: Modular and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks

Traditional blockchains grant the miner of a block full control not only over which transactions but also their order. This constitutes a major flaw discovered with the introduction of decentralized finance and allows miners to perform MEV attacks. In this paper, we address the issue of sandwich attacks by providing a construction that takes as input a blockchain protocol and outputs a new blockchain protocol with the same security but in which sandwich attacks are not profitable. Furthermore, our protocol is fully decentralized with no trusted third parties or heavy cryptography primitives and carries a linear increase in latency and minimum computation overhead.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2023

Lightning Creation Games

Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising solution to the scalability problem of cryptocurrencies. Any two users connected by a payment channel in the network can theoretically send an unbounded number of instant, costless transactions between them. Users who are not directly connected can also transact with each other in a multi-hop fashion. In this work, we study the incentive structure behind the creation of payment channel networks, particularly from the point of view of a single user that wants to join the network. We define a utility function for a new user in terms of expected revenue, expected fees, and the cost of creating channels, and then provide constant factor approximation algorithms that optimise the utility function given a certain budget. Additionally, we take a step back from a single user to the whole network and examine the parameter spaces under which simple graph topologies form a Nash equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Cross-client Label Propagation for Transductive and Semi-Supervised Federated Learning

We present Cross-Client Label Propagation(XCLP), a new method for transductive federated learning. XCLP estimates a data graph jointly from the data of multiple clients and computes labels for the unlabeled data by propagating label information across the graph. To avoid clients having to share their data with anyone, XCLP employs two cryptographically secure protocols: secure Hamming distance computation and secure summation. We demonstrate two distinct applications of XCLP within federated learning. In the first, we use it in a one-shot way to predict labels for unseen test points. In the second, we use it to repeatedly pseudo-label unlabeled training data in a federated semi-supervised setting. Experiments on both real federated and standard benchmark datasets show that in both applications XCLP achieves higher classification accuracy than alternative approaches.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Online Admission Control and Rebalancing in Payment Channel Networks

Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising technology to improve the scalability of cryptocurrencies. PCNs, however, face the challenge that the frequent usage of certain routes may deplete channels in one direction, and hence prevent further transactions. In order to reap the full potential of PCNs, recharging and rebalancing mechanisms are required to provision channels, as well as an admission control logic to decide which transactions to reject in case capacity is insufficient. This paper presents a formal model of this optimisation problem. In particular, we consider an online algorithms perspective, where transactions arrive over time in an unpredictable manner. Our main contributions are competitive online algorithms which come with provable guarantees over time. We empirically evaluate our algorithms on randomly generated transactions to compare the average performance of our algorithms to our theoretical bounds. We also show how this model and approach differs from related problems in classic communication networks.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2022

Wiser: Increasing Throughput in Payment Channel Networks with Transaction Aggregation

Payment channel networks (PCNs) are one of the most prominent solutions to the limited transaction throughput of blockchains. Nevertheless, PCNs suffer themselves from a throughput limitation due to the capital constraints of their channels. A similar dependence on high capital is also found in inter-bank payment settlements, where the so-called netting technique is used to mitigate liquidity demands. In this work, we alleviate this limitation by introducing the notion of transaction aggregation: instead of executing transactions sequentially through a PCN, we enable senders to aggregate multiple transactions and execute them simultaneously to benefit from several amounts that may "cancel out". Two direct advantages of our proposal is the decrease in intermediary fees paid by senders as well as the obfuscation of the transaction data from the intermediaries. We formulate the transaction aggregation as a computational problem, a generalization of the Bank Clearing Problem. We present a generic framework for the transaction aggregation execution, and thereafter we propose Wiser as an implementation of this framework in a specific hub-based setting. To overcome the NP-hardness of the transaction aggregation problem, in Wiser we propose a fixed-parameter linear algorithm for a special case of transaction aggregation as well as the Bank Clearing Problem. Wiser can also be seen as a modern variant of the Hawala money transfer system, as well as a decentralized implementation of the overseas remittance service of Wise.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Weighted Packet Selection for Rechargeable Links: Complexity and Approximation

We consider a natural problem dealing with weighted packet selection across a rechargeable link, which e.g., finds applications in cryptocurrency networks. The capacity of a link $(u,v)$ is determined by how much players $u$ and $v$ allocate for this link. Specifically, the input is a finite ordered sequence of packets that arrive in both directions along a link. Given $(u, v)$ and a packet of weight $x$ going from $u$ to $v$, player $u$ can either accept or reject the packet. If player $u$ accepts the packet, their capacity on link $(u,v)$ decreases by $x$. Correspondingly, player $v$ capacity on $(u,v)$ increases by $x$. If a player rejects the packet, this will entail a cost linear in the weight of the packet. A link is "rechargeable" in the sense that the total capacity of the link has to remain constant, but the allocation of capacity at the ends of the link can depend arbitrarily on players' decisions. The goal is to minimise the sum of the capacity injected into the link and the cost of rejecting packets. We show the problem is NP-hard, but can be approximated efficiently with a ratio of $(1+ \varepsilon)\cdot (1+\sqrt{3})$ for some arbitrary $\varepsilon >0$.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2021

HIDE & SEEK: Privacy-Preserving Rebalancing on Payment Channel Networks

Payment channels effectively move the transaction load off-chain thereby successfully addressing the inherent scalability problem most cryptocurrencies face. A major drawback of payment channels is the need to ``top up'' funds on-chain when a channel is depleted. Rebalancing was proposed to alleviate this issue, where parties with depleting channels move their funds along a cycle to replenish their channels off-chain. Protocols for rebalancing so far either introduce local solutions or compromise privacy. In this work, we present an opt-in rebalancing protocol that is both private and globally optimal, meaning our protocol maximizes the total amount of rebalanced funds. We study rebalancing from the framework of linear programming. To obtain full privacy guarantees, we leverage multi-party computation in solving the linear program, which is executed by selected participants to maintain efficiency. Finally, we efficiently decompose the rebalancing solution into incentive-compatible cycles which conserve user balances when executed atomically. Keywords: Payment Channel Networks, Privacy and Rebalancing.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

LightPIR: Privacy-Preserving Route Discovery for Payment Channel Networks

Payment channel networks are a promising approach to improve the scalability of cryptocurrencies: they allow to perform transactions in a peer-to-peer fashion, along multi-hop routes in the network, without requiring consensus on the blockchain. However, during the discovery of cost-efficient routes for the transaction, critical information may be revealed about the transacting entities. This paper initiates the study of privacy-preserving route discovery mechanisms for payment channel networks. In particular, we present LightPIR, an approach which allows a source to efficiently discover a shortest path to its destination without revealing any information about the endpoints of the transaction. The two main observations which allow for an efficient solution in LightPIR are that: (1) surprisingly, hub labelling algorithms - which were developed to preprocess "street network like" graphs so one can later efficiently compute shortest paths - also work well for the graphs underlying payment channel networks, and that (2) hub labelling algorithms can be directly combined with private information retrieval. LightPIR relies on a simple hub labeling heuristic on top of existing hub labeling algorithms which leverages the specific topological features of cryptocurrency networks to further minimize storage and bandwidth overheads. In a case study considering the Lightning network, we show that our approach is an order of magnitude more efficient compared to a privacy-preserving baseline based on using private information retrieval on a database that stores all pairs shortest paths.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2017

StarCraft II: A New Challenge for Reinforcement Learning

This paper introduces SC2LE (StarCraft II Learning Environment), a reinforcement learning environment based on the StarCraft II game. This domain poses a new grand challenge for reinforcement learning, representing a more difficult class of problems than considered in most prior work. It is a multi-agent problem with multiple players interacting; there is imperfect information due to a partially observed map; it has a large action space involving the selection and control of hundreds of units; it has a large state space that must be observed solely from raw input feature planes; and it has delayed credit assignment requiring long-term strategies over thousands of steps. We describe the observation, action, and reward specification for the StarCraft II domain and provide an open source Python-based interface for communicating with the game engine. In addition to the main game maps, we provide a suite of mini-games focusing on different elements of StarCraft II gameplay. For the main game maps, we also provide an accompanying dataset of game replay data from human expert players. We give initial baseline results for neural networks trained from this data to predict game outcomes and player actions. Finally, we present initial baseline results for canonical deep reinforcement learning agents applied to the StarCraft II domain. On the mini-games, these agents learn to achieve a level of play that is comparable to a novice player. However, when trained on the main game, these agents are unable to make significant progress. Thus, SC2LE offers a new and challenging environment for exploring deep reinforcement learning algorithms and architectures.

cs.LG↗