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Mihály Fazekas

Publications and source records attributed to Mihály Fazekas.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Learning from sanctioned government suppliers: A machine learning and network science approach to detecting fraud and corruption in Mexico

Detecting fraud and corruption in public procurement remains a major challenge for governments worldwide. Most research to-date builds on domain-knowledge-based corruption risk indicators of individual contract-level features and some also analyzes contracting network patterns. A critical barrier for supervised machine learning is the absence of confirmed non-corrupt, negative, examples, which makes conventional machine learning inappropriate for this task. Using publicly available data on federally funded procurement in Mexico and company sanction records, this study implements positive-unlabeled (PU) learning algorithms that integrate domain-knowledge-based red flags with network-derived features to identify likely corrupt and fraudulent contracts. The best-performing PU model on average captures 32 percent more known positives and performs on average 2.3 times better than random guessing, substantially outperforming approaches based solely on traditional red flags. The analysis of the Shapley Additive Explanations reveals that network-derived features, particularly those associated with contracts in the network core or suppliers with high eigenvector centrality, are the most important. Traditional red flags further enhance model performance in line with expectations, albeit mainly for contracts awarded through competitive tenders. This methodology can support law enforcement in Mexico, and it can be adapted to other national contexts too.

cs.LG↗

Corruption Risk in Contracting Markets: A Network Science Perspective

We use methods from network science to analyze corruption risk in a large administrative dataset of over 4 million public procurement contracts from European Union member states covering the years 2008-2016. By mapping procurement markets as bipartite networks of issuers and winners of contracts we can visualize and describe the distribution of corruption risk. We study the structure of these networks in each member state, identify their cores and find that highly centralized markets tend to have higher corruption risk. In all EU countries we analyze, corruption risk is significantly clustered. However, these risks are sometimes more prevalent in the core and sometimes in the periphery of the market, depending on the country. This suggests that the same level of corruption risk may have entirely different distributions. Our framework is both diagnostic and prescriptive: it roots out where corruption is likely to be prevalent in different markets and suggests that different anti-corruption policies are needed in different countries.

q-fin.GN↗