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Mikayla Kelley

Publications and source records attributed to Mikayla Kelley.

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Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model

There is an extensive literature in social choice theory studying the consequences of weakening the assumptions of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Much of this literature suggests that there is no escape from Arrow-style impossibility theorems, while remaining in an ordinal preference setting, unless one drastically violates the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). In this paper, we present a more positive outlook. We propose a model of comparing candidates in elections, which we call the Advantage-Standard (AS) model. The requirement that a collective choice rule (CCR) be representable by the AS model captures a key insight of IIA but is weaker than IIA; yet it is stronger than what is known in the literature as weak IIA (two profiles alike on $x,y$ cannot have opposite strict social preferences on $x$ and $y$). In addition to motivating violations of IIA, the AS model makes intelligible violations of another Arrovian assumption: the negative transitivity of the strict social preference relation $P$. While previous literature shows that only weakening IIA to weak IIA or only weakening negative transitivity of $P$ to acyclicity still leads to impossibility theorems, we show that jointly weakening IIA to AS representability and weakening negative transitivity of $P$ leads to no such impossibility theorems. Indeed, we show that several appealing CCRs are AS representable, including even transitive CCRs.

econ.TH

On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets

There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974, Joyce 2009, Predd et al. 2009, Schervish et al. 2009, Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this paper, we establish connections between accuracy dominance and coherence when credence functions are defined on an infinite set of propositions. In particular, we establish the necessary results to extend the classic accuracy argument for probabilism originally due to Joyce (1998) to certain classes of infinite sets of propositions including countably infinite partitions.

math.ST