arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Mikhail V. Zhitlukhin.
The paper bridges two vast areas of research: stochastic team decision problems and convex stochastic programming. New methods developed in the latter are applied to the study of fundamental problems in the former. The main results are concerned with the Lagrangian relaxation of informational and material constraints in convex stochastic team problems.
The paper compares two types of industrial organization in the Cournot duopoly: (a) the classical one, where the market players maximize profits and the outcome of the game is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium; (b) a contest in which players strive to win a fixed prize/bonus employing unbeatable strategies. Passing from (a) to (b) leads to a perfect competition with zero profits of the players (Schaffer's paradox). Transition from (b) to (a) results in a substantial decline in the production output, which also seems paradoxical, as it is commonly accepted that competition increases efficiency. We examine these phenomena in two versions of the Cournot model: with a homogeneous good and with differentiated goods.