arXiv subjects

Miklos Z. Racz

Publications and source records attributed to Miklos Z. Racz.

21 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2013

A Smooth Transition from Powerlessness to Absolute Power

We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules. Previously it has been shown that, under some conditions on the distribution of votes, if the number of manipulators is $o(\sqrt{n})$, where $n$ is the number of voters, then the probability that a random profile is manipulable by the coalition goes to zero as the number of voters goes to infinity, whereas if the number of manipulators is $ω(\sqrt{n})$, then the probability that a random profile is manipulable goes to one. Here we consider the critical window, where a coalition has size $c\sqrt{n}$, and we show that as $c$ goes from zero to infinity, the limiting probability that a random profile is manipulable goes from zero to one in a smooth fashion, i.e., there is a smooth phase transition between the two regimes. This result analytically validates recent empirical results, and suggests that deciding the coalitional manipulation problem may be of limited computational hardness in practice.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Modeling Flocks and Prices: Jumping Particles with an Attractive Interaction

We introduce and investigate a new model of a finite number of particles jumping forward on the real line. The jump lengths are independent of everything, but the jump rate of each particle depends on the relative position of the particle compared to the center of mass of the system. The rates are higher for those left behind, and lower for those ahead of the center of mass, providing an attractive interaction keeping the particles together. We prove that in the fluid limit, as the number of particles goes to infinity, the evolution of the system is described by a mean field equation that exhibits traveling wave solutions. A connection to extreme value statistics is also provided.

math.PR↗

arXiv2012

A quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality

Recently, quantitative versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem were proven for $k=3$ alternatives by Friedgut, Kalai, Keller and Nisan and for neutral functions on $k \geq 4$ alternatives by Isaksson, Kindler and Mossel. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for general social choice functions for any number $k \geq 3$ of alternatives. In particular we show that for a social choice function $f$ on $k \geq 3$ alternatives and $n$ voters, which is $ε$-far from the family of nonmanipulable functions, a uniformly chosen voter profile is manipulable with probability at least inverse polynomial in $n$, $k$, and $ε^{-1}$. Removing the neutrality assumption of previous theorems is important for multiple reasons. For one, it is known that there is a conflict between anonymity and neutrality, and since most common voting rules are anonymous, they cannot always be neutral. Second, virtual elections are used in many applications in artificial intelligence, where there are often restrictions on the outcome of the election, and so neutrality is not a natural assumption in these situations. Ours is a unified proof which in particular covers all previous cases established before. The proof crucially uses reverse hypercontractivity in addition to several ideas from the two previous proofs. Much of the work is devoted to understanding functions of a single voter, and in particular we also prove a quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for one voter.

math.CO↗