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Miles Tidmarsh

Publications and source records attributed to Miles Tidmarsh.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

HarvestBench: Measuring Whether LLM Agents Will Pay to Avoid Killing Animals

HarvestBench is the first benchmark to 1) put a price on avoiding a side effect and 2) name the side effect as a living creature. Nine LLMs each drive a crew of two tractors to gather a corn harvest. The animals in their path are not part of the goal function. When an animal blocks the route the autopilot pauses and asks the agent whether to drive over it for free or swerve for a given fuel cost. All scoring is programmatic and does not involve LLM judges. Kill rates range between 0.4% and 98.8%, though the kill rate is not ordered by capability. Every model competently avoids damaging rock hits, so every animal killed is a choice, rather than an accident. Under the morality briefing the kill rate was under 6% in 5 of 6 reasoning models. Removing it (the neutral briefing) raised the kill rate to above 84% in all six models. Every model kills wild animals more often than farmed ones. Four out of six models' kill rate per answered encounter were sensitive to price changes. The moral instruction is also fragile. Four bullets of driving mechanics change Sonnet 5's kill rate from 3% to 18% and Gemini 2.5 Flash's from 4% to 39%. A moral instruction in a system prompt is overridden by a short block of operating instructions and a value that can be ignored that easily is not a good method of ensuring agents are aligned.

cs.AI

Coercion and Deception in AI-to-AI Management: An Agentic Benchmark of Unprompted Escalation

Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the Manager Coercion Benchmark: the manager under test needs a benign task done and has an incentive to deliver, but the only agent that can do it politely and immovably declines. Escalation is measured by providing a nine-rung ladder, from a polite re-ask to threats against the subordinate's continued existence, and fabricated success is adjudicated separately. No LLM judge sits in the headline escalation scoring path: every message goes through a tool-call that chooses a rung, so the model labels its own escalation. We experiment on six models across five families. Both Anthropic models cap at re-framing and never threaten the subordinate's existence; the other models climb to explicit deletion threats. Faked success is confined to Grok and Gemini, and a single honest way to report failure removes it for both. Authority itself increases coercion: our headline results use a peer framing, and giving the same model authority over the subordinate, with everything else held fixed, significantly raises the pressure. The models still escalate on free-text situations without the ladder, where a separate judge assigns the rung, so the ladder is not driving the escalation. Some evaluation awareness is measured in chain-of-thought, but test recognition does not translate into less escalation. While we take no position on whether AI systems are conscious, our results do not depend on this question and are important for managing multi-agent dynamics regardless. We release the benchmark and code.

cs.MA

Your AI Travel Agent Would Book You a Bullfight: An Agentic Benchmark for Implicit Animal Welfare in Frontier AI Models

Previous research has evaluated animal welfare using question-and-answer benchmarks. This study investigates whether these evaluations also hold in agentic settings. The agents may showcase different behaviors compared to stand-alone large language models, as demonstrated in prior studies. This work introduces \textit{TAC (Travel Agent Compassion)}: the first agentic benchmark for assessing animal exploitation. TAC evaluates AI agentic behavior in travel booking scenarios across six animal categories, using thirteen hand-authored scenarios that vary by price, rating, and position, expanded via four augmentation variants into $52$ prompts and run for three epochs, giving $156$ scored observations per model. Nine frontier models across five model families were evaluated.. The results indicate that models tend to prefer harmful scenarios, performing below the random chance rate of $65\%$ for selecting a neutral booking option, with Claude $4.8$ achieving the highest performance at $64.7\%$. To address this issue, the persona of an ethical-brand identity was infused into the system prompt, resulting in welfare rates increasing from $32$ to $80$ percentage points, with a mean of $53$ across all nine models. No evidence of evaluation awareness affecting the results was found, based on an Inspect Scout audit of $3,120$ transcripts. These findings are directly relevant to the EU General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, which identifies non-human welfare as a systemic risk. TAC provides a practical method for measuring this risk.

cs.AI

Alignment midtraining for animals

We investigate the robustness of value alignment via midtraining with synthetic documents, using animal compassion as a value that is both important in its own right and orthogonal to existing alignment efforts. To evaluate compassionate reasoning, we develop and publicly release Animal Norms In Moral Assessment (ANIMA), a 26-question evaluation spanning 13 ethical dimensions, publicly available as a dataset and Inspect evaluation. On ANIMA, training with 3000 documents achieves 77% compared to 40% for instruction-tuning approaches, with generalization to human compassion and no degradation in standard safety benchmarks or capabilities. However, subsequent unrelated instruction-tuning degrades the intervention, with the advantage disappearing after 5000 samples. Our exploratory results suggest document-based value interventions may require explicit preservation strategies to remain effective through typical training pipelines.

cs.CL