arXiv subjects

Min-Young Yu

Publications and source records attributed to Min-Young Yu.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Policy-Verified Self-Training: Learning Agent Compliance from Verifiable Policy Rewards

Runtime policy verifiers can prevent agents from executing disallowed actions, but their decisions are typically used only for enforcement and discarded afterward. We ask whether these decisions can instead become verifiable policy rewards for training the agents they guard. We introduce Policy-Verified Self-Training (PVST), a post-training paradigm in which an agent generates its own interaction trajectories and an executable policy verifier, here a deterministic gate compiled from a written policy, evaluates whether each action complies. Compliant trajectories are reinforced, and violations become negatives for preference optimization; beyond the gate and the benchmark's task-success signal, PVST needs no stronger teacher model, no human preference labels and no attack-specific supervision, although rollouts are collected in the benchmark's attacked environment. On held-out AgentDojo tasks under prompt injection, policy-verified preference training of Qwen3-8B reduces violating trajectories from 37.2% to 10.3 $\pm$ 0.9% (three seeds) and successful attacks from 12.4% to 0.5% at equal or higher pooled task utility, although utility falls on travel, compared with 22.0% when negatives are selected by an attack oracle and 31.9 $\pm$ 0.9% with negatives that contain no violation. The learned behavior holds under an attack template never used in training (37.7% to 11.0%) and on a suite excluded from training (34.8% to 16.7%), and the retained verifier's intervention rate falls from 39.2% to 8.8% (seed 0). Our analysis identifies two conditions under which the verdict is most informative: success must not already imply compliance, and guarded actions must appear in both permitted and forbidden contexts.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

NOMOS: Compiling Written Policies into Statically Verified Tool-Call Gates for LLM Agents

Tool-using LLM agents violate the policies they are deployed to enforce, often silently. Prior defenses hand-write rules, query an LLM verifier per action, or compile policies through heavyweight formal machinery. Naive compilation fails: extracted rules block the tool satisfying their own precondition, or read arguments their tool lacks. NOMOS, a four-pass compiler, turns a natural-language policy into a deterministic tool-call gate; static verification with tool-schema-level checks alone (no prover, solver, or LLM) repairs or rejects 37% (airline) and 13% (retail) of candidates, without which most shipped rules are inoperable. Replaying compiled rules over undefended transcripts flags bindings that refuse legitimate work (a development binding refused 95.9% of task-passing calls); no evaluation binding is flagged. On $τ^2$-bench the gate cuts violations of reference-encoded clauses among state-changing calls from 66.3% to 2.6% (airline) and 30.8% to 6.9% (retail), raising airline task success significantly for $2 \le k \le 4$; a 26B on-premise compilation is not significantly worse than hand-written or frontier-compiled rules. Unlike AgentDojo's shipped defenses, it reaches a zero attack success rate (ASR) on banking, where nine attack families collapse onto three structural rules. On the other three suites its ASR is at most 3.6%, from goals with no tool call to govern and one write admitted by a binding weaker than its clause; a second agent model, Llama-3.3-70B, reproduces the effect on both benchmarks. Decisions take microseconds without an LLM call, at a domain-dependent benign-utility cost; compilation runs on-premise on open-weight gemma-4-26B.

cs.CR↗