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Minfeng Qi

Publications and source records attributed to Minfeng Qi.

16 recordsLinked to original sources

When LLMs Team Up: A Coordinated Attack Framework for Automated Cyber Intrusions

Automated intrusion-style workflows require LLM agents to reason over partial observations, tool outputs, and executable artifacts under bounded budgets. A single LLM instance often compresses evidence extraction, planning, execution, and validation into one context, which increases the risk of context drift and error propagation. Existing LLM-based multi-agent systems support general collaboration, but they do not explicitly model the role boundaries, artifact provenance, and cost constraints that characterize multi-stage intrusion workflows. This paper presents CAESAR, a coordinated multi-agent framework for controlled analysis of LLM-agent behavior in intrusion-style tasks. CAESAR decomposes the workflow into five typed roles and coordinates them through a bounded round protocol with a persistent knowledge base, a per-round workspace, validator-gated knowledge promotion, and capability-token write isolation. We evaluate CAESAR on 25 CTF tasks across five categories and four LLM backends. Compared with a single-agent baseline under matched budgets and tool access, CAESAR improves task success and reduces performance variance, with larger gains on tasks requiring multi-step exploit composition. A secondary simulated interactional-security study suggests that the role structure can transfer beyond code-native surfaces. The results indicate that role transitions, artifact provenance, and knowledge-promotion events provide useful structural signals for monitoring coordinated LLM-agent behavior beyond individual prompt and output inspection. The dataset, implementation, and evaluation logs are released at https://github.com/Xu-Qiu/CMAS.

cs.CR

DAO to (Anonymous) DAO Transactions

Blockchain assets are increasingly controlled by organizations rather than individuals. DAO treasuries, consortium wallets, and custodial exchanges rely on threshold authorization and multi-party key management, yet existing payment mechanisms still target single-user wallets, leaving no unified solution for organizational transfers. We formalize the problem of \emph{DAO-to-(anonymous)-DAO} transactions and present \textsc{Dao$^2$}, a framework that enables one threshold-controlled organization to pay another, optionally with recipient anonymity, while keeping received funds under distributed control. \textsc{Dao$^2$} combines three components: \emph{distributed key derivation} (DKD) for non-stealth child addresses, \emph{distributed stealth-address generation} (DSAG) for unlinkable one-time destinations, and \qw{\emph{threshold ECDSA}} for authorization. For ordinary transfers, the receiver derives a non-stealth address via DKD; for anonymous transfers, it derives a stealth address via DSAG. The sender then threshold-signs the payment, and the receiver redeems the funds without reconstructing any master secret. We formally prove its security and evaluate a prototype. The core of an anonymous DAO-to-DAO transaction for a typical-sized (e.g., 7-member) DAO finishes in under 28\,ms with about 2.8\,KB of communication, and scales linearly with DAO size.

cs.CR

In the Margins: An Empirical Study of Ethereum Inscriptions

Ethereum Inscriptions (Ethscriptions) repurpose Ethereum calldata into a persistent inscription channel by embedding \texttt{data:}~URI payloads. These transactions typically target externally owned accounts, allowing the payload to bypass EVM execution while remaining permanently replicated across full nodes. Although calldata was originally designed for compact smart-contract parameters, this repurposing enables structured data embedding with long-term storage consequences. We present the first large-scale empirical study of Ethscriptions, treating them as a distinct \emph{calldata-resident workload} rather than merely a subset of general calldata usage. Our analysis focuses on the \textit{Ethscription} operational subset, which consists of payloads that decode to JSON and conform to a token-operation grammar (e.g., \texttt{p}, \texttt{op}, \texttt{tick}, \texttt{amt}). From $6.27$ million Ethscription candidates (\Uone), we extract $4.75$ million Ethscription operations (\Utwo, $75.8\%$ of \Uone). This result shows that structured token-like activity dominates the ecosystem. Our measurements further reveal (i) a complete workload lifecycle compressed into nine months (bootstrap, expansion, saturation), (ii) proliferation of $30$+ competing protocols without convergence toward a dominant standard, (iii) a lifecycle funnel exhibiting $201\times$ deploy-to-mint amplification and a $57.6{:}1$ mint-to-transfer collapse indicative of speculative minting, (iv) extreme participation inequality (Gini~$0.86$), and (v) a measurable permanent data footprint imposed on the Ethereum network.

cs.CE

From Spark to Fire: Modeling and Mitigating Error Cascades in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Collaboration

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) are increasingly applied to complex collaborative scenarios. However, their collaborative mechanisms may cause minor inaccuracies to gradually solidify into system-level false consensus through iteration. Such risks are difficult to trace since errors can propagate and amplify through message dependencies. Existing protections often rely on single-agent validation or require modifications to the collaboration architecture, which can weaken effective information flow and may not align with natural collaboration processes in real tasks. To address this, we propose a propagation dynamics model tailored for LLM-MAS that abstracts collaboration as a directed dependency graph and provides an early-stage risk criterion to characterize amplification risk. Through experiments on six mainstream frameworks, we identify three vulnerability classes: cascade amplification, topological sensitivity, and consensus inertia. We further instantiate an attack where injecting just a single atomic error seed leads to widespread failure. In response, we introduce a genealogy-graph-based governance layer, implemented as a message-layer plugin, that suppresses both endogenous and exogenous error amplification without altering the collaboration architecture. Experiments show that this approach prevents final infection in at least 89% of runs across operating modes and significantly mitigates the cascading spread of minor errors.

cs.MA

Counted NFT Transfers

Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) on Ethereum currently follow a binary mobility paradigm: ERC-721 enables unrestricted transfers, whereas SBTs (ERC-5192) prohibit transfers entirely. We identify a design gap in which no standard mechanism supports bounded transferability, where ownership mobility is allowed but limited to a finite number of programmable transfers. We study counted NFT transfers and introduce ERC-7634 as a minimal realization compatible with ERC-721. The design augments each token with a transfer counter and configurable cap L, allowing ownership to evolve under a finite transfer budget. ERC-7634 defines a minimal extension interface with three lightweight functions (transferCountOf, setTransferLimit, and transferLimitOf), two events, and native-transfer hooks, requiring fewer than 60 additional lines of Solidity while preserving full backward compatibility with existing NFT infrastructure. We analyze behavioral and economic consequences of counted transfers. Our results reveal (i) a mobility premium induced by remaining transfer capacity, (ii) a protocol-level costing signal that can deter wash trading in cap-aware markets through irreversible budget consumption, (iii) bounded recursive collateralization enabled by limited ownership turnover, and (iv) associated security and gas-cost implications, including wrapper-bypass trade-offs. Evaluation on calibrated simulations shows that moderate limits (e.g., L = 10) affect fewer than 15% of tokens under representative transfer distributions, while repeated manipulation becomes unprofitable after a few cycles in a cap-aware pricing model; the additional gas overhead remains below 11% per transfer. We further position ERC-7634 within the NFT mobility design space, derive practical cap-selection guidelines, and discuss post-cap ownership outcomes including soulbound conversion, auto-burn, and provenance freeze.

cs.CR

VIPER Strike: Defeating Visual Reasoning CAPTCHAs via Structured Vision-Language Inference

Visual Reasoning CAPTCHAs (VRCs) combine visual scenes with natural-language queries that demand compositional inference over objects, attributes, and spatial relations. They are increasingly deployed as a primary defense against automated bots. Existing solvers fall into two paradigms: vision-centric, which rely on template-specific detectors but fail on novel layouts, and reasoning-centric, which leverage LLMs but struggle with fine-grained visual perception. Both lack the generality needed to handle heterogeneous VRC deployments. We present ViPer, a unified attack framework that integrates structured multi-object visual perception with adaptive LLM-based reasoning. ViPer parses visual layouts, grounds attributes to question semantics, and infers target coordinates within a modular pipeline. Evaluated on six major VRC providers (VTT, Geetest, NetEase, Dingxiang, Shumei, Xiaodun), ViPer achieves up to 93.2% success, approaching human-level performance across multiple benchmarks. Compared to prior solvers, GraphNet (83.2%), Oedipus (65.8%), and the Holistic approach (89.5%), ViPer consistently outperforms all baselines. The framework further maintains robustness across alternative LLM backbones (GPT, Grok, DeepSeek, Kimi), sustaining accuracy above 90%. To anticipate defense, we further introduce Template-Space Randomization (TSR), a lightweight strategy that perturbs linguistic templates without altering task semantics. TSR measurably reduces solver (i.e., attacker) performance. Our proposed design suggests directions for human-solvable but machine-resistant CAPTCHAs.

cs.CR

EIP-7702 Phishing Attack

EIP-7702 introduces a delegation-based authorization mechanism that allows an externally owned account (EOA) to authenticate a single authorization tuple, after which all subsequent calls are routed to arbitrary delegate code. We show that this design enables a qualitatively new class of phishing attacks: instead of deceiving users into signing individual transactions, an attacker can induce a victim to sign a single authorization tuple that grants unconditional and persistent execution control over the account. Through controlled experiments, we identify three reliable trigger pathways: user-driven, attacker-driven, and protocol-triggered. Each can lead to full account takeover and complete asset drainage. We further propose two extended attack surfaces. First, ERC-4337's EntryPoint pipeline enables remote and repeated activation of the delegated code without further victim involvement. Second, the chain-agnostic authorization mode permits replay-like compromises across independent networks. We also present the first empirical measurement of EIP-7702 usage across major EVM chains. Analyzing over 150k authorization and execution events involving 26k addresses and hundreds of delegator contracts, we assess the protocol's real-world footprint. Our findings show that EIP-7702 authorizations are highly centralized, dominated by a small number of contract families linked to criminal activity and repeatedly reused across incidents. Corresponding loss data reveals substantial theft of ETH, ERC-20 tokens, and NFTs. These results provide practical evidence that the attack surface we identify is not merely theoretical, but is already being exploited at scale. We conclude by proposing protocol-level defenses to mitigate the delegation-based phishing vector introduced by EIP-7702.

cs.CR

The Trust Paradox in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems: When Collaboration Becomes a Security Vulnerability

Multi-agent systems powered by large language models are advancing rapidly, yet the tension between mutual trust and security remains underexplored. We introduce and empirically validate the Trust-Vulnerability Paradox (TVP): increasing inter-agent trust to enhance coordination simultaneously expands risks of over-exposure and over-authorization. To investigate this paradox, we construct a scenario-game dataset spanning 3 macro scenes and 19 sub-scenes, and run extensive closed-loop interactions with trust explicitly parameterized. Using Minimum Necessary Information (MNI) as the safety baseline, we propose two unified metrics: Over-Exposure Rate (OER) to detect boundary violations, and Authorization Drift (AD) to capture sensitivity to trust levels. Results across multiple model backends and orchestration frameworks reveal consistent trends: higher trust improves task success but also heightens exposure risks, with heterogeneous trust-to-risk mappings across systems. We further examine defenses such as Sensitive Information Repartitioning and Guardian-Agent enablement, both of which reduce OER and attenuate AD. Overall, this study formalizes TVP, establishes reproducible baselines with unified metrics, and demonstrates that trust must be modeled and scheduled as a first-class security variable in multi-agent system design.

cs.CR

Does GenAI Rewrite How We Write? An Empirical Study on Two-Million Preprints

Preprint repositories become central infrastructures for scholarly communication. Their expansion transforms how research is circulated and evaluated before journal publication. Generative large language models (LLMs) introduce a further potential disruption by altering how manuscripts are written. While speculation abounds, systematic evidence of whether and how LLMs reshape scientific publishing remains limited. This paper addresses the gap through a large-scale analysis of more than 2.1 million preprints spanning 2016--2025 (115 months) across four major repositories (i.e., arXiv, bioRxiv, medRxiv, SocArXiv). We introduce a multi-level analytical framework that integrates interrupted time-series models, collaboration and productivity metrics, linguistic profiling, and topic modeling to assess changes in volume, authorship, style, and disciplinary orientation. Our findings reveal that LLMs have accelerated submission and revision cycles, modestly increased linguistic complexity, and disproportionately expanded AI-related topics, while computationally intensive fields benefit more than others. These results show that LLMs act less as universal disruptors than as selective catalysts, amplifying existing strengths and widening disciplinary divides. By documenting these dynamics, the paper provides the first empirical foundation for evaluating the influence of generative AI on academic publishing and highlights the need for governance frameworks that preserve trust, fairness, and accountability in an AI-enabled research ecosystem.

cs.CY

Collaborative Text-to-Image Generation via Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning and Semantic Fusion

Multimodal text-to-image generation remains constrained by the difficulty of maintaining semantic alignment and professional-level detail across diverse visual domains. We propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that coordinates domain-specialized agents (e.g., focused on architecture, portraiture, and landscape imagery) within two coupled subsystems: a text enhancement module and an image generation module, each augmented with multimodal integration components. Agents are trained using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) under a composite reward function that balances semantic similarity, linguistic visual quality, and content diversity. Cross-modal alignment is enforced through contrastive learning, bidirectional attention, and iterative feedback between text and image. Across six experimental settings, our system significantly enriches generated content (word count increased by 1614%) while reducing ROUGE-1 scores by 69.7%. Among fusion methods, Transformer-based strategies achieve the highest composite score (0.521), despite occasional stability issues. Multimodal ensembles yield moderate consistency (ranging from 0.444 to 0.481), reflecting the persistent challenges of cross-modal semantic grounding. These findings underscore the promise of collaborative, specialization-driven architectures for advancing reliable multimodal generative systems.

cs.AI

Towards Transparent and Incentive-Compatible Collaboration in Decentralized LLM Multi-Agent Systems: A Blockchain-Driven Approach

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the emergence of autonomous agents capable of complex reasoning, planning, and interaction. However, coordinating such agents at scale remains a fundamental challenge, particularly in decentralized environments where communication lacks transparency and agent behavior cannot be shaped through centralized incentives. We propose a blockchain-based framework that enables transparent agent registration, verifiable task allocation, and dynamic reputation tracking through smart contracts. The core of our design lies in two mechanisms: a matching score-based task allocation protocol that evaluates agents by reputation, capability match, and workload; and a behavior-shaping incentive mechanism that adjusts agent behavior via feedback on performance and reward. Our implementation integrates GPT-4 agents with Solidity contracts and demonstrates, through 50-round simulations, strong task success rates, stable utility distribution, and emergent agent specialization. The results underscore the potential for trustworthy, incentive-compatible multi-agent coordination in open environments.

cs.MA

Understanding NFTs from EIP Standards

We argue that the technical foundations of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) remain inadequately understood. Prior research has focused on market dynamics, user behavior, and isolated security incidents, yet systematic analysis of the standards underpinning NFT functionality is largely absent. We present the first study of NFTs through the lens of Ethereum Improvement Proposals (EIPs). We conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of 191 NFT-related EIPs and 10K+ Ethereum Magicians discussions (as of July, 2025). We integrate multi-dimensional analyses including the automated parsing of Solidity interfaces, graph-based modeling of inheritance structures, contributor profiling, and mining of community discussion data. We distinguish foundational from emerging standards, expose poor cross-version interoperability, and show that growing functional complexity heightens security risks.

cs.CR

BRC20 Snipping Attack

In this paper, we introduce and implement BRC20 sniping attack. Our attack manipulates the BRC20 token transfers in open markets and disrupts the fairness among bidding participants. The long-standing principle of ``highest bidder wins'' is rendered ineffective. Typically, open BRC20 token markets rely on Partially Signed Bitcoin Transactions (PSBT) to broadcast selling intents and wait for buying auctions. Our attack targets the BRC20 buying process (i.e., transfer) by injecting a front-running transaction to complete the full signature of the PSBT. At its core, the attack exploits the mempool's fee-based transaction selection mechanism to snipe the victim transaction, replicate metadata, and front-run the legesmate transaction. This attack applies to platforms using PSBT for BRC20 token transfers, including popular Bitcoin exchanges and marketplaces (e.g., Magic Eden, Unisat, Gate.io, OKX). We implemented and tested the attack on a Bitcoin testnet (regtest), validating its effectiveness through multiple experimental rounds. Results show that the attacker consistently replaces legitimate transactions by submitting higher-fee PSBTs. We have also made responsible disclosures to the mentioned exchanges.

cs.CR

BRC20 Pinning Attack

BRC20 tokens are a type of non-fungible asset on the Bitcoin network. They allow users to embed customised content within Bitcoin's satoshis. The token frenzy reached a market size of US\$2.811\,b (2023Q3--2025Q1). However, this intuitive design has not undergone serious security scrutiny. We present the first analysis of BRC20's \emph{transfer} mechanism and identify a new attack vector. A typical BRC20 transfer involves two "bundled" on-chain transactions with different fee levels: the first (i.e., \textbf{Tx1}) with a lower fee inscribes the \textsf{transfer} request, while the second (i.e., \textbf{Tx2}) with a higher fee finalizes the actual transfer. An adversary can send a manipulated fee transaction (falling between the two fee levels), which causes \textbf{Tx1} to be processed while \textbf{Tx2} is pinned in the mempool. This locks BRC20 liquidity and disrupts normal withdrawal requests from users. We term this the \emph{BRC20 pinning attack}. We validated the attack in real-world settings in collaboration with Binance researchers. With their knowledge and permission, we conducted a controlled test against Binance's ORDI hot wallet, resulting in a temporary suspension of ORDI withdrawals for 3.5 hours. Recovery was performed shortly after. Further analysis confirms that the attack can be applied to over \textbf{90\%} of inscription-based tokens within the Bitcoin ecosystem.

cs.CR

SoK: Bitcoin Layer Two (L2)

We present the first Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on constructing Layer Two (L2) solutions for Bitcoin. We carefully examine a representative subset of ongoing Bitcoin L2 solutions (40 out of 335 extensively investigated cases) and provide a concise yet impactful identification of six classic design patterns through two approaches (i.e., modifying transactions \& creating proofs). Notably, we are the first to incorporate the inscription technology (emerged in mid-2023), along with a series of related innovations. We further establish a reference framework that serves as a baseline criterion ideally suited for evaluating the security aspects of Bitcoin L2 solutions, and which can also be extended to broader L2 applications. We apply this framework to evaluate each of the projects we investigated. We find that the inscription-based approaches introduce new functionality (i.e., programability) to Bitcoin systems, whereas existing proof-based solutions primarily address scalability challenges. Our security analysis reveals new attack vectors targeting data/state (availability, verification), assets (withdrawal, recovery), and users (disputes, censorship).

cs.CR

Bitcoin Inscriptions: Foundations and Beyond

Bitcoin inscription marks a pivotal moment in blockchain technology. This report presents a primary exploration of Bitcoin inscriptions. We dive into the technological underpinnings and offer a detailed comparative analysis between Bitcoin inscriptions and NFTs on other blockchains. Further, we explore a wide range of use cases and significant opportunities for future innovation, including inscription derivative protocols, Bitcoin Layer2 solutions, and interoperability techniques.

cs.CR