arXiv subjects

Ming Wei

Publications and source records attributed to Ming Wei.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Stereotyping by strategy standing diversifies cooperation patterns in indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity explains how cooperation evolves through social reputations. People observe others, assign reputations, and condition their future actions on these assignments. This process is cognitively demanding, and stereotyping offers a simpler alternative by replacing individual-level reputation with group-level information. Theoretical models commonly implement stereotyping through exogenously given group labels. In real societies, however, group-level impressions may be associated with observable patterns of behavior. Here we propose a framework of stereotyping by strategy standing, in which mutants may condition their actions on the overall reputation level associated with a resident strategy rather than on the recipient's reputation. We show that this form of stereotyping can diversify stable cooperation in indirect reciprocity. As the strength of stereotyping increases, additional cooperative evolutionarily stable norm-strategy (ESS) pairs emerge in substantial numbers. In particular, we identify eight highly cooperative ESS pairs that become stable under very weak stereotyping. These pairs, which we call the counterparts of the leading eight, share the same social norms as the classical leading eight and differ only in how they prescribe behavior between bad individuals. They are unstable without stereotyping because they can be invaded by their corresponding leading strategies, but they become stable once stereotyping exceeds a critical threshold. Our results suggest that group-level impressions based on strategy standing can provide a coarse-grained informational route to stable cooperation and offer a more behaviorally grounded perspective on how stereotyping affects indirect reciprocity.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Indirect reciprocity beyond pairwise interactions

Cooperation in groups underpins collective responses to challenges from climate governance to public goods provision, yet how moral evaluation sustains it remains poorly understood. Indirect reciprocity -- cooperating to build a good reputation -- is well characterized for pairwise interactions, but real collective action requires individuals to be judged against the reputational profile of an entire group. Here we develop a general framework for multiplayer indirect reciprocity and show that stable group cooperation obeys a simple organizing principle: `all good, help; one bad, halt'. This rule is both necessary and sufficient for cooperation to emerge, and it recovers the classical leading eight norms in the pairwise limit. We further show that group structure fundamentally changes reputation dynamics: unlike pairwise models, which are monostable, multiplayer systems exhibit bistability and hysteresis, with a critical tipping point separating cooperative and defective regimes. Assessment of the latent norms of large language models reveals that they shift toward punitive defection when provided with richer social information, yet fail to follow the full logic of `all good, help; one bad, halt'. Our results establish a unifying principle for reputation-based cooperation in groups and provide a benchmark for evaluating cooperative alignment in artificial intelligence.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Attention Residuals

Residual connections with PreNorm are standard in modern LLMs, yet they accumulate all layer outputs with fixed unit weights. This uniform aggregation causes uncontrolled hidden-state growth with depth, progressively diluting each layer's contribution. We propose Attention Residuals (AttnRes), which replaces this fixed accumulation with softmax attention over preceding layer outputs, allowing each layer to selectively aggregate earlier representations with learned, input-dependent weights. To address the memory and communication overhead of attending over all preceding layer outputs for large-scale model training, we introduce Block AttnRes, which partitions layers into blocks and attends over block-level representations, reducing the memory footprint while preserving most of the gains of full AttnRes. Combined with cache-based pipeline communication and a two-phase computation strategy, Block AttnRes becomes a practical drop-in replacement for standard residual connections with minimal overhead. Scaling law experiments confirm that the improvement is consistent across model sizes, and ablations validate the benefit of content-dependent depth-wise selection. We further integrate AttnRes into the Kimi Linear architecture (48B total / 3B activated parameters) and pre-train on 1.4T tokens, where AttnRes mitigates PreNorm dilution, yielding more uniform output magnitudes and gradient distribution across depth, and improves downstream performance across all evaluated tasks.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Indirect Reciprocity with Environmental Feedback

Indirect reciprocity maintains cooperation in stranger societies by mapping individual behaviors onto reputation signals via social norms. Existing theoretical frameworks assume static environments with constant resources and fixed payoff structures. However, in real-world systems, individuals' strategic behaviors not only shape their reputation but also induce collective-level resource changes in ecological, economic, or other external environments, which in turn reshape the incentives governing future individual actions. To overcome this limitation, we establish a co-evolutionary framework that couples moral assessment, strategy updating, and environmental dynamics, allowing the payoff structure to dynamically adjust in response to the ecological consequences of collective actions. We find that this environmental feedback mechanism helps lower the threshold for the emergence of cooperation, enabling the system to spontaneously transition from a low-cooperation state to a stable high-cooperation regime, thereby reducing the dependence on specific initial conditions. Furthermore, while lenient norms demonstrate adaptability in static environments, norms with strict discrimination are shown to be crucial for curbing opportunism and maintaining evolutionary resilience in dynamic settings. Our results reveal the evolutionary dynamics of coupled systems involving reputation institutions and environmental constraints, offering a new theoretical perspective for understanding collective cooperation and social governance in complex environments.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

A unified framework for identifying influential nodes in hypergraphs

Identifying influential nodes plays a pivotal role in understanding, controlling, and optimizing the behavior of complex systems, ranging from social to biological and technological domains. Yet most centrality-based approaches rely on pairwise topology and are purely structural, neglecting the higher-order interactions and the coupling between structure and dynamics. Consequently, the practical effectiveness of existing approaches remains uncertain when applied to complex spreading processes. To bridge this gap, we propose a unified framework, Initial Propagation Score (IPS), to directly embed propagation dynamics into influence assessment on higher-order networks. We analytically derive mechanism-aware influence measures by relating the early-stage dynamics and local topological characteristics to long-term outbreak sizes, and such explicit physical context endows IPS with robustness, transferability, and interpretability. Extensive experiments across multiple dynamics and more than 20 real-world hypergraphs show that IPS consistently outperforms other leading baseline centralities. Furthermore, IPS estimates node influence with only local neighborhood information, yielding computational efficiency and scalability to large-scale networks. This work underscores the necessity of considering dynamics for reliable identification of influential nodes and provides a concise principled basis for optimizing interventions in epidemiology, information diffusion, and collective intelligence.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

Nonlinear Public Goods Game in Dynamical Environments

The evolutionary mechanisms of cooperative behavior represent a fundamental topic in complex systems and evolutionary dynamics. Real-world collective interactions, particularly in multi-agent systems, are often characterized by behavior-dependent mechanism switching where the environmental state is endogenously shaped by group strategies. However, existing models typically treat such environmental variations as static stochasticity and neglect the closed-loop feedback between environmental states and cooperative behaviors. Here, we introduce a dynamic environmental feedback mechanism into a nonlinear public goods game framework to establish a coevolutionary model that couples environmental states and individual cooperative strategies. Our results demonstrate that the interplay among environmental feedback, nonlinear effects, and environmental randomness can drive the system toward a wide variety of steady-state structures, including full defection, full cooperation, stable coexistence, and periodic limit cycles. Further analysis reveals that asymmetric nonlinear parameters and environmental feedback rates exert significant regulatory effects on cooperation levels and system dynamics. This study not only enriches the theoretical framework of evolutionary game theory but also provides a foundation for modeling environmental feedback loops in scenarios ranging from ecological management to the design of cooperative mechanisms in autonomous systems.

nlin.AO↗

arXiv2024

On Game based Distributed Approach for General Multi-agent Optimal Coverage with Application to UAV Networks

This paper focuses on the optimal coverage problem (OCP) for multi-agent systems with a decentralized optimization mechanism. A game based distributed decision-making method for the multi-agent OCP is proposed to address the high computational costs arising from the large scale of the multi-agent system and to ensure that the game's equilibrium achieves the global performance objective's maximum value. In particular, a distributed algorithm that needs only local information is developed and proved to converge to near-optimal global coverage. Finally, the proposed method is applied to maximize the coverage area of the UAV network for a target region. The simulation results show that our method can require much less computational time than other typical distributed algorithms in related work, while achieving a faster convergence rate. Comparison with centralized optimization also demonstrates that the proposed method has approximate optimization results and high computation efficiency.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2023

Indirect reciprocity in the public goods game with collective reputations

Indirect reciprocity unveils how social cooperation is founded upon moral systems. Within the frame of dyadic games based on individual reputations, the "leading-eight" strategies distinguish themselves in promoting and sustaining cooperation. However, in the real-world societies, there are widespread interactions at the group level, where individuals need to make a singular action choice when facing multiple individuals with different reputations. Here, through introducing the assessment of collective reputations, we develop a framework that embeds group-level reputation structure into public goods game to study the evolution of group-level indirect reciprocity. We show that changing the criteria of group assessment destabilize the reputation dynamics of leading-eight strategies. In a particular range of social assessment criteria, all leading-eight strategies can break the social dilemma in public goods games and sustain cooperation. Specifically, there exists an optimal, moderately set assessment criterion that is most conducive to promoting cooperation. Moreover, in the evolution of assessment criteria, the preference of the leading-eight strategies for social strictness is inversely correlated with the payoff level. Our work reveals the impact of social strictness on prosocial behavior, highlighting the importance of group-level interactions in the analysis of evolutionary games and complex social dynamics.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2022

Nonlinear eco-evolutionary games with global environmental fluctuations and local environmental feedbacks

Environmental changes play a critical role in determining the evolution of social dilemmas in many natural or social systems. Generally, the environmental changes include two prominent aspects: the global time-dependent fluctuations and the local strategy-dependent feedbacks. However, the impacts of these two types of environmental changes have only been studied separately, a complete picture of the environmental effects exerted by the combination of these two aspects remains unclear. Here we develop a theoretical framework that integrates group strategic behaviors with their general dynamic environments, where the global environmental fluctuations are associated with a nonlinear factor in public goods game and the local environmental feedbacks are described by the `eco-evolutionary game'. We show how the coupled dynamics of local game-environment evolution differs in static and dynamic global environments. In particular, we find the emergence of cyclic evolutions of group cooperation and local environment, which forms an interior irregular loop in the phase plane, depending on the relative changing speed of both global and local environments compared to the strategic change. Our results provide important insights toward how diverse evolutionary outcomes could emerge from the nonlinear interactions between strategies and the changing environments.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2020

StreamNet: A DAG System with Streaming Graph Computing

To achieve high throughput in the POW based blockchain systems, researchers proposed a series of methods, and DAG is one of the most active and promising fields. We designed and implemented the StreamNet, aiming to engineer a scalable and endurable DAG system. When attaching a new block in the DAG, only two tips are selected. One is the parent tip whose definition is the same as in Conflux[1]; another is using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique by which the definition is the same as IOTA [2]. We infer a pivotal chain along the path of each epoch in the graph, and a total order of the graph could be calculated without a centralized authority. To scale up, we leveraged the graph streaming property; high transaction validation speed will be achieved even if the DAG is growing. To scale out, we designed the direct signal gossip protocol to help disseminate block updates in the network, such that messages can be passed in the network more efficiently. We implemented our system based on IOTA's reference code (IRI) and ran comprehensive experiments over the different sizes of clusters of multiple network topologies.

cs.DC↗