arXiv subjects

Mingyu Xiao

Publications and source records attributed to Mingyu Xiao.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2024

Solving Co-Path/Cycle Packing and Co-Path Packing Faster Than $3^k$

The \textsc{Co-Path/Cycle Packing} problem (resp. The \textsc{Co-Path Packing} problem) asks whether we can delete at most $k$ vertices from the input graph such that the remaining graph is a collection of induced paths and cycles (resp. induced paths). These two problems are fundamental graph problems that have important applications in bioinformatics. Although these two problems have been extensively studied in parameterized algorithms, it seems hard to break the running time bound $3^k$. In 2015, Feng et al. provided an $O^*(3^k)$-time randomized algorithms for both of them. Recently, Tsur showed that they can be solved in $O^*(3^k)$ time deterministically. In this paper, by combining several techniques such as path decomposition, dynamic programming, cut \& count, and branch-and-search methods, we show that \textsc{Co-Path/Cycle Packing} can be solved in $O^*(2.8192^k)$ time deterministically and \textsc{Co-Path Packing} can be solved in $O^*(2.9241^{k})$ time with failure probability $\leq 1/3$. As a by-product, we also show that the \textsc{Co-Path Packing} problem can be solved in $O^*(5^p)$ time with probability at least 2/3 if a path decomposition of width $p$ is given.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

A Faster Branching Algorithm for the Maximum $k$-Defective Clique Problem

A $k$-defective clique of an undirected graph $G$ is a subset of its vertices that induces a nearly complete graph with a maximum of $k$ missing edges. The maximum $k$-defective clique problem, which asks for the largest $k$-defective clique from the given graph, is important in many applications, such as social and biological network analysis. In the paper, we propose a new branching algorithm that takes advantage of the structural properties of the $k$-defective clique and uses the efficient maximum clique algorithm as a subroutine. As a result, the algorithm has a better asymptotic running time than the existing ones. We also investigate upper-bounding techniques and propose a new upper bound utilizing the \textit{conflict relationship} between vertex pairs. Because conflict relationship is common in many graph problems, we believe that this technique can be potentially generalized. Finally, experiments show that our algorithm outperforms state-of-the-art solvers on a wide range of open benchmarks.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

Approximation Algorithms for Packing Cycles and Paths in Complete Graphs

Given an edge-weighted (metric/general) complete graph with $n$ vertices, the maximum weight (metric/general) $k$-cycle/path packing problem is to find a set of $\frac{n}{k}$ vertex-disjoint $k$-cycles/paths such that the total weight is maximized. In this paper, we consider approximation algorithms. For metric $k$-cycle packing, we improve the previous approximation ratio from $3/5$ to $7/10$ for $k=5$, and from $7/8\cdot(1-1/k)^2$ for $k>5$ to $(7/8-0.125/k)(1-1/k)$ for constant odd $k>5$ and to $7/8\cdot (1-1/k+\frac{1}{k(k-1)})$ for even $k>5$. For metric $k$-path packing, we improve the approximation ratio from $7/8\cdot (1-1/k)$ to $\frac{27k^2-48k+16}{32k^2-36k-24}$ for even $10\geq k\geq 6$. For the case of $k=4$, we improve the approximation ratio from $3/4$ to $5/6$ for metric 4-cycle packing, from $2/3$ to $3/4$ for general 4-cycle packing, and from $3/4$ to $14/17$ for metric 4-path packing.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

Deciding regular games: a playground for exponential time algorithms

Regular games form a well-established class of games for analysis and synthesis of reactive systems. They include coloured Muller games, McNaughton games, Muller games, Rabin games, and Streett games. These games are played on directed graphs $\mathcal G$ where Player 0 and Player 1 play by generating an infinite path $ρ$ through the graph. The winner is determined by specifications put on the set $X$ of vertices in $ρ$ that occur infinitely often. These games are determined, enabling the partitioning of $\mathcal G$ into two sets $W_0$ and $W_1$ of winning positions for Player 0 and Player 1, respectively. Numerous algorithms exist that decide specific instances of regular games, e.g., Muller games, by computing $W_0$ and $W_1$. In this paper we aim to find general principles for designing uniform algorithms that decide all regular games. For this we utilise various recursive and dynamic programming algorithms that leverage standard notions such as subgames and traps. Importantly, we show that our techniques improve or match the performances of existing algorithms for many instances of regular games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Multidepot Capacitated Vehicle Routing with Improved Approximation Guarantees

The Multidepot Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem (MCVRP) is a well-known variant of the classic Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem (CVRP), where we need to route capacitated vehicles located in multiple depots to serve customers' demand such that each vehicle must return to the depot it starts, and the total traveling distance is minimized. There are three variants of MCVRP according to the property of the demand: unit-demand, splittable and unsplittable. We study approximation algorithms for $k$-MCVRP in metric graphs, where $k$ is the capacity of each vehicle. The best-known approximation ratios for the three versions are $4-Θ(1/k)$, $4-Θ(1/k)$, and $4$, respectively. We give a $(4-1/1500)$-approximation algorithm for unit-demand and splittable $k$-MCVRP, and a $(4-1/50000)$-approximation algorithm for unsplittable $k$-MCVRP. When $k$ is a fixed integer, we give a $(3+\ln2-\max\{Θ(1/\sqrt{k}),1/9000\})$-approximation algorithm for the splittable and unit-demand cases, and a $(3+\ln2-Θ(1/\sqrt{k}))$-approximation algorithm for the unsplittable case.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

The Traveling Tournament Problem: Improved Algorithms Based on Cycle Packing

The Traveling Tournament Problem (TTP) is a well-known benchmark problem in the field of tournament timetabling, which asks us to design a double round-robin schedule such that each pair of teams plays one game in each other's home venue, minimizing the total distance traveled by all $n$ teams ($n$ is even). TTP-$k$ is the problem with one more constraint that each team can have at most $k$-consecutive home games or away games. In this paper, we investigate schedules for TTP-$k$ and analyze the approximation ratio of the solutions. Most previous schedules were constructed based on a Hamiltonian cycle of the graph. We will propose a novel construction based on a $k$-cycle packing. Then, combining our $k$-cycle packing schedule with the Hamiltonian cycle schedule, we obtain improved approximation ratios for TTP-$k$ with deep analysis. The case where $k=3$, TTP-3, is one of the most investigated cases. We improve the approximation ratio of TTP-3 from $(1.667+\varepsilon)$ to $(1.598+\varepsilon)$, for any $\varepsilon>0$. For TTP-$4$, we improve the approximation ratio from $(1.750+\varepsilon)$ to $(1.700+\varepsilon)$. By a refined analysis of the Hamiltonian cycle construction, we also improve the approximation ratio of TTP-$k$ from $(\frac{5k-7}{2k}+\varepsilon)$ to $(\frac{5k^2-4k+3}{2k(k+1)}+\varepsilon)$ for any constant $k\geq 5$. Our methods can be extended to solve a variant called LDTTP-$k$ (TTP-$k$ where all teams are allocated on a straight line). We show that the $k$-cycle packing construction can achieve an approximation ratio of $(\frac{3k-3}{2k-1}+\varepsilon)$, which improves the approximation ratio of LDTTP-3 from $4/3$ to $(6/5+\varepsilon)$.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

Facility Location Games Beyond Single-Peakedness: the Entrance Fee Model

The facility location game has been studied extensively in mechanism design. In the classical model, each agent's cost is solely determined by her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we introduce a novel model where each facility charges an entrance fee. Thus, the cost of each agent is determined by both the distance to the facility and the entrance fee of the facility. In our model, the entrance fee function is allowed to be an arbitrary function, causing agents' preferences may no longer be single-peaked anymore: This departure from the classical model introduces additional challenges. We systematically delve into the intricacies of the model, designing strategyproof mechanisms with favorable approximation ratios. Additionally, we complement these ratios with nearly-tight impossibility results. Specifically, for one-facility and two-facility games, we provide upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratios given by deterministic and randomized mechanisms with respect to utilitarian and egalitarian objectives.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Facility Assignment with Fair Cost Sharing: Equilibrium and Mechanism Design

In the one-dimensional facility assignment problem, m facilities and n agents are positioned along the real line. Each agent will be assigned to a single facility to receive service. Each facility incurs a building cost, which is shared equally among the agents utilizing it. Additionally, each agent independently bears a connection cost to access a facility. Thus, an agent's cost is the sum of the connection cost and her portion of the building cost. The social cost is the total cost of all agents. Notably, the optimal assignment that minimizes the social cost can be found in polynomial time. In this paper, we study the problem from two game-theoretical settings regarding the strategy space of agents and the rule the assignment. In both settings, agents act strategically to minimize their individual costs. In our first setting, the strategy space of agents is the set of facilities, granting agents the freedom to select any facility. Consequently, the self-formed assignment can exhibit instability, as agents may deviate to other facilities. We focus on the computation of an equilibrium assignment, where no agent has an incentive to unilaterally change her choice. We show that we can compute a pure Nash equilibrium in polynomial time. In our second setting, agents report their positions to a mechanism for assignment to facilities. The strategy space of agents becomes the set of all positions. Our interest lies in strategyproof mechanisms. It is essential to note that the preference induced by the agents' cost function is more complex as it depends on how other agents are assigned. We establish a strong lower bound against all strategyproof and anonymous mechanisms: none can achieve a bounded social cost approximation ratio. Nonetheless, we identify a class of non-trivial strategyproof mechanisms for any n and m that is unanimous and anonymous.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

An Improved Kernel and Parameterized Algorithm for Almost Induced Matching

An induced subgraph is called an induced matching if each vertex is a degree-1 vertex in the subgraph. The \textsc{Almost Induced Matching} problem asks whether we can delete at most $k$ vertices from the input graph such that the remaining graph is an induced matching. This paper studies parameterized algorithms for this problem by taking the size $k$ of the deletion set as the parameter. First, we prove a $6k$-vertex kernel for this problem, improving the previous result of $7k$. Second, we give an $O^*(1.6765^k)$-time and polynomial-space algorithm, improving the previous running-time bound of $O^*(1.7485^k)$.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

An Improved Approximation Algorithm for Metric Triangle Packing

Given an edge-weighted metric complete graph with $n$ vertices, the maximum weight metric triangle packing problem is to find a set of $n/3$ vertex-disjoint triangles with the total weight of all triangles in the packing maximized. Several simple methods can lead to a 2/3-approximation ratio. However, this barrier is not easy to break. Chen et al. proposed a randomized approximation algorithm with an expected ratio of $(0.66768-\varepsilon)$ for any constant $\varepsilon>0$. In this paper, we improve the approximation ratio to $(0.66835-\varepsilon)$. Furthermore, we can derandomize our algorithm.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

Fast Maximum $k$-Plex Algorithms Parameterized by Small Degeneracy Gaps

Given a graph, a $k$-plex is a set of vertices in which each vertex is not adjacent to at most $k-1$ other vertices in the set. The maximum $k$-plex problem, which asks for the largest $k$-plex from the given graph, is an important but computationally challenging problem in applications such as graph mining and community detection. So far, there are many practical algorithms, but without providing theoretical explanations on their efficiency. We define a novel parameter of the input instance, $g_k(G)$, the gap between the degeneracy bound and the size of the maximum $k$-plex in the given graph, and present an exact algorithm parameterized by this $g_k(G)$, which has a worst-case running time polynomial in the size of the input graph and exponential in $g_k(G)$. In real-world inputs, $g_k(G)$ is very small, usually bounded by $O(\log{(|V|)})$, indicating that the algorithm runs in polynomial time. We further extend our discussion to an even smaller parameter $cg_k(G)$, the gap between the community-degeneracy bound and the size of the maximum $k$-plex, and show that without much modification, our algorithm can also be parameterized by $cg_k(G)$. To verify the empirical performance of these algorithms, we carry out extensive experiments to show that these algorithms are competitive with the state-of-the-art algorithms. In particular, for large $k$ values such as $15$ and $20$, our algorithms dominate the existing algorithms. Finally, empirical analysis is performed to illustrate the effectiveness of the parameters and other key components in the implementation.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

Two new algorithms for solving Müller games and their applications

Müller games form a well-established class of games for model checking and verification. These games are played on directed graphs $\mathcal G$ where Player 0 and Player 1 play by generating an infinite path through the graph. The winner is determined by the set $X$ consisting of all vertices in the path that occur infinitely often. If $X$ belongs to $Ω$, a specified collection of subsets of $\mathcal G$, then Player 0 wins. Otherwise, Player 1 claims the win. These games are determined, enabling the partitioning of $\mathcal G$ into two sets $W_0$ and $W_1$ of winning positions for Player 0 and Player 1, respectively. Numerous algorithms exist that decide Müller games $\mathcal G$ by computing the sets $W_0$ and $W_1$. In this paper, we introduce two novel algorithms that outperform all previously known methods for deciding explicitly given Müller games, especially in the worst-case scenarios. The previously known algorithms either reduce Müller games to other known games (e.g. safety games) or recursively change the underlying graph $\mathcal G$ and the collection of sets in $Ω$. In contrast, our approach does not employ these techniques but instead leverages subgames, the sets within $Ω$, and their interactions. This distinct methodology sets our algorithms apart from prior approaches for deciding Müller games. Additionally, our algorithms offer enhanced clarity and ease of comprehension. Importantly, our techniques are applicable not only to Müller games but also to improving the performance of existing algorithms that handle other game classes, including coloured Müller games, McNaughton games, Rabin games, and Streett games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Multi-unit Auction over a Social Network

Diffusion auction is an emerging business model where a seller aims to incentivise buyers in a social network to diffuse the auction information thereby attracting potential buyers. We focus on designing mechanisms for multi-unit diffusion auctions. Despite numerous attempts at this problem, existing mechanisms either fail to be incentive compatible (IC) or achieve only an unsatisfactory level of social welfare (SW). Here, we propose a novel graph exploration technique to realise multi-item diffusion auction. This technique ensures that potential competition among buyers stay ``localised'' so as to facilitate truthful bidding. Using this technique, we design multi-unit diffusion auction mechanisms MUDAN and MUDAN-$m$. Both mechanisms satisfy, among other properties, IC and $1/m$-weak efficiency. We also show that they achieve optimal social welfare for the class of rewardless diffusion auctions. While MUDAN addresses the bottleneck case when each buyer demands only a single item, MUDAN-$m$ handles the more general, multi-demand setting. We further demonstrate that these mechanisms achieve near-optimal social welfare through experiments.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

A $5$-approximation Algorithm for the Traveling Tournament Problem

The Traveling Tournament Problem (TTP-$k$) is a well-known benchmark problem in tournament timetabling, which asks us to design a double round-robin schedule such that the total traveling distance of all $n$ teams is minimized under the constraints that each pair of teams plays one game in each other's home venue, and each team plays at most $k$-consecutive home games or away games. Westphal and Noparlik (Ann. Oper. Res. 218(1):347-360, 2014) claimed a $5.875$-approximation algorithm for all $k\geq 4$ and $n\geq 6$. However, there were both flaws in the construction of the schedule and in the analysis. In this paper, we show that there is a $5$-approximation algorithm for all $k$ and $n$. Furthermore, if $k \geq n/2$, the approximation ratio can be improved to $4$.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

A Discharging Method: Improved Kernels for Edge Triangle Packing and Covering

\textsc{Edge Triangle Packing} and \textsc{Edge Triangle Covering} are dual problems extensively studied in the field of parameterized complexity. Given a graph $G$ and an integer $k$, \textsc{Edge Triangle Packing} seeks to determine whether there exists a set of at least $k$ edge-disjoint triangles in $G$, while \textsc{Edge Triangle Covering} aims to find out whether there exists a set of at most $k$ edges that intersects all triangles in $G$. Previous research has shown that \textsc{Edge Triangle Packing} has a kernel of $(3+ε)k$ vertices, while \textsc{Edge Triangle Covering} has a kernel of $6k$ vertices. In this paper, we show that the two problems allow kernels of $3k$ vertices, improving all previous results. A significant contribution of our work is the utilization of a novel discharging method for analyzing kernel size, which exhibits potential for analyzing other kernel algorithms.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2023

Characterizations of Network Auctions and Generalizations of VCG

With the growth of networks, promoting products through social networks has become an important problem. For auctions in social networks, items are needed to be sold to agents in a network, where each agent can bid and also diffuse the sale information to her neighbors. Thus, the agents' social relations are intervened with their bids in the auctions. In network auctions, the classical VCG mechanism fails to retain key properties. In order to better understand network auctions, in this paper, we characterize network auctions for the single-unit setting with respect to weak budget balance, individual rationality, incentive compatibility, efficiency, and other properties. For example, we present sufficient conditions for mechanisms to be efficient and (weakly) incentive compatible. With the help of these properties and new concepts such as rewards, participation rewards, and so on, we show how to design efficient mechanisms to satisfy incentive compatibility as much as possible, and incentive compatibility mechanisms to maximize the revenue. Our results provide insights into understanding auctions in social networks.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Connectivity in the presence of an opponent

The paper introduces two player connectivity games played on finite bipartite graphs. Algorithms that solve these connectivity games can be used as subroutines for solving Müller games. Müller games constitute a well established class of games in model checking and verification. In connectivity games, the objective of one of the players is to visit every node of the game graph infinitely often. The first contribution of this paper is our proof that solving connectivity games can be reduced to the incremental strongly connected component maintenance (ISCCM) problem, an important problem in graph algorithms and data structures. The second contribution is that we non-trivially adapt two known algorithms for the ISCCM problem to provide two efficient algorithms that solve the connectivity games problem. Finally, based on the techniques developed, we recast Horn's polynomial time algorithm that solves explicitly given Müller games and provide an alternative proof of its correctness. Our algorithms are more efficient than that of Horn's algorithm. Our solution for connectivity games is used as a subroutine in the algorithm.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

MMS Allocations of Chores with Connectivity Constraints: New Methods and New Results

We study the problem of allocating indivisible chores to agents under the Maximin share (MMS) fairness notion. The chores are embedded on a graph and each bundle of chores assigned to an agent should be connected. Although there is a simple algorithm for MMS allocations of goods on trees, it remains open whether MMS allocations of chores on trees always exist or not, which is a simple but annoying problem in chores allocation. In this paper, we introduce a new method for chores allocation with connectivity constraints, called the group-satisfied method, that can show the existence of MMS allocations of chores on several subclasses of trees. Even these subcases are non-trivial and our results can be considered as a significant step to the open problem. We also consider MMS allocations of chores on cycles where we get the tight approximation ratio for three agents. Our result was obtained via the linear programming (LP) method, which enables us not only to compute approximate MMS allocations but also to construct tight examples of the nonexistence of MMS allocations without complicated combinatorial analysis. These two proposed methods, the group-satisfied method and the LP method, have the potential to solve more related problems.

cs.DS↗