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Minh-Khanh Vu

Publications and source records attributed to Minh-Khanh Vu.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Taint-Based Code Slicing for LLMs-based Malicious NPM Package Detection

Software supply chain attacks on the npm ecosystem have grown increasingly sophisticated, exploiting obfuscation and complex logic to evade detection. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer strong semantic understanding of code but face practical constraints: limited context windows and high inference costs make full-package analysis infeasible, while naive token-based splitting fragments semantic context and degrades accuracy. This paper introduces an LLM-based framework for malicious npm package detection built on code-slicing techniques. We propose an adaptation of taint-based slicing for the npm ecosystem, guided by a curated inventory of JavaScript-specific sensitive APIs, to isolate security-relevant data flows from benign boilerplate. The approach reduces the mean input token count by 99.75% and the median by 93.7% while preserving critical malicious behaviors. Packages relying on dynamic code generation or obfuscation yield empty slices under static analysis and require deobfuscation preprocessing, a limitation we explicitly discuss. The framework is evaluated on a dataset of more than 7000 malicious and benign npm packages using DeepSeek-Coder6.7B. On the 2537 packages amenable to static taint analysis, taint-based slicing achieves 87.04% detection accuracy, outperforming both a naive token-splitting baseline at 75.41% and a CFG-only static slicing approach at 75.65%. These results demonstrate that semantically targeted input representations improve LLM-based detection performance beyond what is achievable through simple input-size reduction, providing an effective and computationally practical defense against evolving open-source supply-chain threats.

cs.CR↗

Pack-A-Mal: A Malware Analysis Framework for Open-Source Packages

The increasingly sophisticated environment in which attackers operate makes software security an even greater challenge in open-source projects, where malicious packages are prevalent. Static analysis tools, such as Malcontent, are highly useful but are often incapable of dealing with obfuscated malware. Such situations lead to an unreasonably high rate of false positives. This paper highlights that dynamic analysis, rather than static analysis, provides greater insight but is also more resource-intensive for understanding software behaviour during execution. In this study, we enhance a dynamic analysis tool, package-analysis, to capture key runtime behaviours, including commands executed, files accessed, and network communications. This modification enables the use of container sandboxing technologies, such as gVisor, to analyse potentially malicious packages without significantly compromising the host system.

cs.CR↗