arXiv subjects

Minming Li

Publications and source records attributed to Minming Li.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

Online Nash Welfare Maximization Without Predictions

The maximization of Nash welfare, which equals the geometric mean of agents' utilities, is widely studied because it balances efficiency and fairness in resource allocation problems. Banerjee, Gkatzelis, Gorokh, and Jin (2022) recently introduced the model of online Nash welfare maximization for $T$ divisible items and $N$ agents with additive utilities with predictions of each agent's utility for receiving all items. They gave online algorithms whose competitive ratios are logarithmic. We initiate the study of online Nash welfare maximization \emph{without predictions}, assuming either that the agents' utilities for receiving all items differ by a bounded ratio, or that their utilities for the Nash welfare maximizing allocation differ by a bounded ratio. We design online algorithms whose competitive ratios only depend on the logarithms of the aforementioned ratios of agents' utilities and the number of agents.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2022

Fair Graphical Resource Allocation with Matching-Induced Utilities

Motivated by real-world applications, we study the fair allocation of graphical resources, where the resources are the vertices in a graph. Upon receiving a set of resources, an agent's utility equals the weight of a maximum matching in the induced subgraph. We care about maximin share (MMS) fairness and envy-freeness up to one item (EF1). Regarding MMS fairness, the problem does not admit a finite approximation ratio for heterogeneous agents. For homogeneous agents, we design constant-approximation polynomial-time algorithms, and also note that significant amount of social welfare is sacrificed inevitably in order to ensure (approximate) MMS fairness. We then consider EF1 allocations whose existence is guaranteed. However, the social welfare guarantee of EF1 allocations cannot be better than $1/n$ for the general case, where $n$ is the number of agents.Fortunately, for three special cases, binary-weight, two-agents and homogeneous-agents, we are able to design polynomial-time algorithms that also ensure a constant fractions of the maximum social welfare.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Composite Resource Scheduling for Networked Control Systems

Real-time end-to-end task scheduling in networked control systems (NCSs) requires the joint consideration of both network and computing resources to guarantee the desired quality of service (QoS). This paper introduces a new model for composite resource scheduling (CRS) in real-time networked control systems, which considers a strict execution order of sensing, computing, and actuating segments based on the control loop of the target NCS. We prove that the general CRS problem is NP-hard and study two special cases of the CRS problem. The first case restricts the computing and actuating segments to have unit-size execution time while the second case assumes that both sensing and actuating segments have unit-size execution time. We propose an optimal algorithm to solve the first case by checking the intervals with 100% network resource utilization and modify the deadlines of the tasks within those intervals to prune the search. For the second case, we propose another optimal algorithm based on a novel backtracking strategy to check the time intervals with the network resource utilization larger than 100% and modify the timing parameters of tasks based on these intervals. For the general case, we design a greedy strategy to modify the timing parameters of both network segments and computing segments within the time intervals that have network and computing resource utilization larger than 100%, respectively. The correctness and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms are verified through extensive experiments.

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arXiv2022

Mixed Strategies for Security Games with General Defending Requirements

The Stackelberg security game is played between a defender and an attacker, where the defender needs to allocate a limited amount of resources to multiple targets in order to minimize the loss due to adversarial attack by the attacker. While allowing targets to have different values, classic settings often assume uniform requirements to defend the targets. This enables existing results that study mixed strategies (randomized allocation algorithms) to adopt a compact representation of the mixed strategies. In this work, we initiate the study of mixed strategies for the security games in which the targets can have different defending requirements. In contrast to the case of uniform defending requirement, for which an optimal mixed strategy can be computed efficiently, we show that computing the optimal mixed strategy is NP-hard for the general defending requirements setting. However, we show that strong upper and lower bounds for the optimal mixed strategy defending result can be derived. We propose an efficient close-to-optimal Patching algorithm that computes mixed strategies that use only few pure strategies. We also study the setting when the game is played on a network and resource sharing is enabled between neighboring targets. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm in several large real-world datasets.

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arXiv2021

Fair Allocation with Interval Scheduling Constraints

We study a fair resource scheduling problem, where a set of interval jobs are to be allocated to heterogeneous machines controlled by agents. Each job is associated with release time, deadline, and processing time such that it can be processed if its complete processing period is between its release time and deadline. The machines gain possibly different utilities by processing different jobs, and all jobs assigned to the same machine should be processed without overlap. We consider two widely studied solution concepts, namely, maximin share fairness and envy-freeness. For both criteria, we discuss the extent to which fair allocations exist and present constant approximation algorithms for various settings.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Online Ride-Hitching in UAV Travelling

The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has emerged as a promising solution to provide delivery and other mobile services to customers rapidly, yet it drains its stored energy quickly when travelling on the way and (even if solar-powered) it takes time for charging power on the way before reaching the destination. To address this issue, existing works focus more on UAV's path planning with designated system vehicles providing charging service. However, in some emergency cases and rural areas where system vehicles are not available, public trucks can provide more feasible and cost-saving services and hence a silver lining. In this paper, we explore how a single UAV can save flying distance by exploiting public trucks, to minimize the travel time of the UAV. We give the first theoretical work studying online algorithms for the problem, which guarantees a worst-case performance. We first consider the offline problem knowing future truck trip information far ahead of time. By delicately transforming the problem into a graph satisfying both time and power constraints, we present a shortest-path algorithm that outputs the optimal solution of the problem. Then, we proceed to the online setting where trucks appear in real-time and only inform the UAV of their trip information some certain time $Δt$ beforehand. As a benchmark, we propose a well-constructed lower bound that an online algorithm could achieve. We propose an online algorithm MyopicHitching that greedily takes truck trips and an improved algorithm $Δt$-Adaptive that further tolerates a waiting time in taking a ride. Our theoretical analysis shows that $Δt$-Adaptive is asymptotically optimal in the sense that its ratio approaches the proposed lower bounds as $Δt$ increases.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2021

Facility Location Games with Ordinal Preferences

We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over the facilities. Our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit truthful information (preferences and/or locations) from the agents and locate the facilities to minimize both maximum and total cost objectives as well as to maximize both minimum and total utility objectives. For the four possible objectives, we consider the 2-facility settings in which only preferences are private, or locations are private. For each possible combination of the objectives and settings, we provide lower and upper bounds on the approximation ratios of strategyproof mechanisms, which are asymptotically tight up to a constant. Finally, we discuss the generalization of our results beyond two facilities and when the agents can misreport both locations and preferences.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective and ensure desirable properties based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information such as their locations. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Maximizing approximately k-submodular functions

We introduce the problem of maximizing approximately $k$-submodular functions subject to size constraints. In this problem, one seeks to select $k$-disjoint subsets of a ground set with bounded total size or individual sizes, and maximum utility, given by a function that is "close" to being $k$-submodular. The problem finds applications in tasks such as sensor placement, where one wishes to install $k$ types of sensors whose measurements are noisy, and influence maximization, where one seeks to advertise $k$ topics to users of a social network whose level of influence is uncertain. To deal with the problem, we first provide two natural definitions for approximately $k$-submodular functions and establish a hierarchical relationship between them. Next, we show that simple greedy algorithms offer approximation guarantees for different types of size constraints. Last, we demonstrate experimentally that the greedy algorithms are effective in sensor placement and influence maximization problems.

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arXiv2020

Defending against Contagious Attacks on a Network with Resource Reallocation

In classic network security games, the defender distributes defending resources to the nodes of the network, and the attacker attacks a node, with the objective to maximize the damage caused. Existing models assume that the attack at node u causes damage only at u. However, in many real-world security scenarios, the attack at a node u spreads to the neighbors of u and can cause damage at multiple nodes, e.g., for the outbreak of a virus. In this paper, we consider the network defending problem against contagious attacks. Existing works that study shared resources assume that the resource allocated to a node can be shared or duplicated between neighboring nodes. However, in real world, sharing resource naturally leads to a decrease in defending power of the source node, especially when defending against contagious attacks. To this end, we study the model in which resources allocated to a node can only be transferred to its neighboring nodes, which we refer to as a reallocation process. We show that this more general model is difficult in two aspects: (1) even for a fixed allocation of resources, we show that computing the optimal reallocation is NP-hard; (2) for the case when reallocation is not allowed, we show that computing the optimal allocation (against contagious attack) is also NP-hard. For positive results, we give a mixed integer linear program formulation for the problem and a bi-criteria approximation algorithm. Our experimental results demonstrate that the allocation and reallocation strategies our algorithm computes perform well in terms of minimizing the damage due to contagious attacks.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Online Maximum $k$-Interval Coverage Problem

We study the online maximum coverage problem on a line, in which, given an online sequence of sub-intervals (which may intersect among each other) of a target large interval and an integer $k$, we aim to select at most $k$ of the sub-intervals such that the total covered length of the target interval is maximized. The decision to accept or reject each sub-interval is made immediately and irrevocably (no preemption) right at the release timestamp of the sub-interval. We comprehensively study different settings of this problem regarding both the length of a released sub-interval and the total number of released sub-intervals. We first present lower bounds on the competitive ratio for the settings concerned in this paper, respectively. For the offline problem where the sequence of all the released sub-intervals is known in advance to the decision-maker, we propose a dynamic-programming-based optimal approach as the benchmark. For the online problem, we first propose a single-threshold-based deterministic algorithm SOA by adding a sub-interval if the added length exceeds a certain threshold, achieving competitive ratios close to the lower bounds, respectively. Then, we extend to a double-thresholds-based algorithm DOA, by using the first threshold for exploration and the second threshold (larger than the first one) for exploitation. With the two thresholds solved by our proposed program, we show that DOA improves SOA in the worst-case performance. Moreover, we prove that a deterministic algorithm that accepts sub-intervals by multi non-increasing thresholds cannot outperform even SOA.

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arXiv2019

Favorite-Candidate Voting for Eliminating the Least Popular Candidate in Metric Spaces

We study single-candidate voting embedded in a metric space, where both voters and candidates are points in the space, and the distances between voters and candidates specify the voters' preferences over candidates. In the voting, each voter is asked to submit her favorite candidate. Given the collection of favorite candidates, a mechanism for eliminating the least popular candidate finds a committee containing all candidates but the one to be eliminated. Each committee is associated with a social value that is the sum of the costs (utilities) it imposes (provides) to the voters. We design mechanisms for finding a committee to optimize the social value. We measure the quality of a mechanism by its distortion, defined as the worst-case ratio between the social value of the committee found by the mechanism and the optimal one. We establish new upper and lower bounds on the distortion of mechanisms in this single-candidate voting, for both general metrics and well-motivated special cases.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Defending with Shared Resources on a Network

In this paper we consider a defending problem on a network. In the model, the defender holds a total defending resource of R, which can be distributed to the nodes of the network. The defending resource allocated to a node can be shared by its neighbors. There is a weight associated with every edge that represents the efficiency defending resources are shared between neighboring nodes. We consider the setting when each attack can affect not only the target node, but its neighbors as well. Assuming that nodes in the network have different treasures to defend and different defending requirements, the defender aims at allocating the defending resource to the nodes to minimize the loss due to attack. We give polynomial time exact algorithms for two important special cases of the network defending problem. For the case when an attack can only affect the target node, we present an LP-based exact algorithm. For the case when defending resources cannot be shared, we present a max-flow-based exact algorithm. We show that the general problem is NP-hard, and we give a 2-approximation algorithm based on LP-rounding. Moreover, by giving a matching lower bound of 2 on the integrality gap on the LP relaxation, we show that our rounding is tight.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Strategic Learning Approach for Deploying UAV-provided Wireless Services

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) have emerged as a promising technique to rapidly provide wireless services to a group of mobile users simultaneously. The paper aims to address a challenging issue that each user is selfish and may misreport his location or preference for changing the optimal UAV location to be close to himself. Using algorithmic game theory, we study how to determine the final location of a UAV in the 3D space, by ensuring all selfish users' truthfulness in reporting their locations for learning purpose. To minimize the social service cost in this UAV placement game, we design strategyproof mechanisms with the approximation ratios, when comparing to the social optimum. We also study the obnoxious UAV placement game to maximally keep their social utility, where each incumbent user may misreport his location to keep the UAV away from him. Moreover, we present the dual-preference UAV placement game by considering the coexistence of the two groups of users above, where users can misreport both their locations and preference types (favorable or obnoxious) towards the UAV. Finally, we extend the three games above to include multiple UAVs and design strategyproof mechanisms with provable approximation ratios.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Well-behaved Online Load Balancing Against Strategic Jobs

In the online load balancing problem on related machines, we have a set of jobs (with different sizes) arriving online, and we need to assign each job to a machine immediately upon its arrival, so as to minimize the makespan, i.e., the maximum completion time. In classic mechanism design problems, we assume that the jobs are controlled by selfish agents, with the sizes being their private information. Each job (agent) aims at minimizing its own cost, which is its completion time plus the payment charged by the mechanism. Truthful mechanisms guaranteeing that every job minimizes its cost by reporting its true size have been well-studied [Aspnes et al. JACM 1997, Feldman et al. EC 2017]. In this paper, we study truthful online load balancing mechanisms that are well-behaved [Epstein et al., MOR 2016]. Well-behavior is important as it guarantees fairness between machines, and implies truthfulness in some cases when machines are controlled by selfish agents. Unfortunately, existing truthful online load balancing mechanisms are not well-behaved. We first show that to guarantee producing a well-behaved schedule, any online algorithm (even non-truthful) has a competitive ratio at least $Ω(\sqrt{m})$, where m is the number of machines. Then we propose a mechanism that guarantees truthfulness of the online jobs, and produces a schedule that is almost well-behaved. We show that our algorithm has a competitive ratio of $O(\log m)$. Moreover, for the case when the sizes of online jobs are bounded, the competitive ratio of our algorithm improves to $O(1)$. Interestingly, we show several cases for which our mechanism is actually truthful against selfish machines.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Facilities with Constant Approximation Ratio

In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. We design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 2.75, improving upon the earlier best ratio of n/2+1.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2018

Mechanism Design for Two-Opposite-Facility Location Games with Penalties on Distance

This paper is devoted to the two-opposite-facility location games with a penalty whose amount depends on the distance between the two facilities to be opened by an authority. The two facilities are "opposite" in that one is popular and the other is obnoxious. Every selfish agent in the game wishes to stay close to the popular facility and stay away from the obnoxious one; its utility is measured by the difference between its distances to the obnoxious facility and the popular one. The authority determines the locations of the two facilities on a line segment where all agents are located. Each agent has its location information as private, and is required to report its location to the authority. Using the reported agent locations as input, an algorithmic mechanism run by the authority outputs the locations of the two facilities with an aim to maximize certain social welfare. The sum-type social welfare concerns with the penalized total utility of all agents, for which we design both randomized and deterministic group strategy-proof mechanisms with provable approximation ratios, and establish a lower bound on the approximation ratio of any deterministic strategy-proof mechanism. The bottleneck-type social welfare concerns with the penalized minimum utility among all agents, for which we propose a deterministic group strategy-proof mechanism that ensures optimality.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Facility location with double-peaked preference

We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on opposite sides of their locations. We observe that double-peaked preferences capture real-life scenarios and thus complement the well-studied notion of single-peaked preferences. We mainly focus on the case where peaks are equidistant from the agents' locations and discuss how our results extend to more general settings. We show that most of the results for single-peaked preferences do not directly apply to this setting; this makes the problem essentially more challenging. As our main contribution, we present a simple truthful-in-expectation mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of 1+b/c for both the social and the maximum cost, where b is the distance of the agent from the peak and c is the minimum cost of an agent. For the latter case, we provide a 3/2 lower bound on the approximation ratio of any truthful-in-expectation mechanism. We also study deterministic mechanisms under some natural conditions, proving lower bounds and approximation guarantees. We prove that among a large class of reasonable mechanisms, there is no deterministic mechanism that outperforms our truthful-in-expectation mechanism.

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