arXiv subjects

Mischa Huisman

Publications and source records attributed to Mischa Huisman.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Improving Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control Robustness to Parametric Uncertainty via Plant Equivalent Controller Realizations

Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) enables vehicle platooning through inter-vehicle communication, improving traffic efficiency and safety. Conventional CACC relies on feedback linearization, assuming exact knowledge of vehicle parameters. However, the nonlinear longitudinal vehicle dynamics are subject to parametric uncertainty. Applying such feedback linearization with a nominal model yields imperfect cancellation, leading to model mismatch and degraded performance with off-the-shelf CACC controllers. To improve robustness without redesigning the CACC law, we explicitly model the mismatch between the ideal closed-loop dynamics, assumed by the CACC design, and the actual dynamics under parametric uncertainties. Robustness is formulated as an $\mathcal{L}_2$ trajectory-matching problem, minimizing the energy of this mismatch to make the uncertain system behave as closely as possible to the ideal model. This objective is addressed by optimizing over plant equivalent controller (PEC) realizations that preserve the nominal closed-loop behavior while mitigating the effects of parametric uncertainty. Stability and performance are enforced via LMIs, yielding a convex optimization problem applicable to heterogeneous platoons. Experimental results demonstrate improved robustness and performance under parametric uncertainty while preserving nominal behavior.

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arXiv2025

Plant Equivalent Controller Realizations for Attack-Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems

As cyber-physical systems (CPSs) become more dependent on data and communication networks, their vulnerability to false data injection (FDI) attacks has raised significant concerns. Among these, stealthy attacks, those that evade conventional detection mechanisms, pose a critical threat to closed-loop performance. This paper introduces a controller-oriented method to enhance CPS resiliency against such attacks without compromising nominal closed-loop behavior. Specifically, we propose the concept of plant equivalent controller (PEC) realizations, representing a class of dynamic output-feedback controllers that preserve the input-output behavior of a given base controller while exhibiting distinct robustness properties in the presence of disturbances and sensor attacks. To quantify and improve robustness, we employ reachable set analysis to assess the impact of stealthy attacks on the closed-loop dynamics. Building on this analysis, we provide mathematical tools (in terms of linear matrix inequalities) to synthesize the optimal PEC realization that minimizes the reachable set under peak-bounded disturbances. The proposed framework thus provides systematic analysis and synthesis tools to enhance the attack resilience of CPSs while maintaining the desired nominal performance. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated on the quadruple-tank process subject to stealthy sensor attacks.

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arXiv2025

Self-Healing Hybrid Control as a Proxy for Detection and Mitigation of Sensor Attacks in Cooperative Driving

We propose a real-time hybrid controller scheme to detect and mitigate False-Data Injection (FDI) attacks on Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC). Our method uses sensor redundancy to create equivalent controller realizations, each driven by distinct sensor subsets but producing identical control inputs when no attack occurs. By comparing control signals and measurements via majority voting, the scheme identifies compromised sensors in real-time and switches to a healthy controller, even under unconstrained attacker switching. The hybrid controller utilizes attack-dependent flow and jump sets, and resets the states of compromised controllers, resulting in a self-healing architecture. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach.

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arXiv2024

Optimal Controller Realizations against False Data Injections in Cooperative Driving

To enhance the robustness of cooperative driving to cyberattacks, we study a controller-oriented approach to mitigate the effect of a class of False-Data Injection (FDI) attacks. By reformulating a given dynamic Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control scheme (the base controller), we show that a class of new but equivalent controllers (base controller realizations) can represent the base controller. This controller class exhibits the same platooning behavior in the absence of attacks, but in the presence of attacks, their robustness varies with the realization. We propose a prescriptive synthesis framework where the base controller and the system dynamics are written in new coordinates via an invertible coordinate transformation on the controller state. Because the input-output behavior is invariant under coordinate transformations, the input-output behavior is unaffected (so controller realizations do not change the system's closed-loop performance). However, each controller realization may require a different combination of sensors. Subsequently, we obtain the optimal combination of sensors that minimizes the effect of FDI attacks by solving a linear matrix inequality while quantifying the FDI's attack impact through reachability analysis. Through simulation studies, we demonstrate that this approach enhances the robustness of cooperative driving without relying on a detection scheme and maintaining all system properties.

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arXiv2023

Impact Sensitivity Analysis of Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control Against Resource-Limited Adversaries

Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is a technology that allows groups of vehicles to form in automated, tightly-coupled platoons. CACC schemes exploit Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communications to exchange information between vehicles. However, the use of communication networks brings security concerns as it exposes network access points that the adversary can exploit to disrupt the vehicles' operation and even cause crashes. In this manuscript, we present a sensitivity analysis of CACC schemes against a class of resource-limited attacks. We present a modelling framework that allows us to systematically compute outer ellipsoidal approximations of reachable sets induced by attacks. We use the size of these sets as a security metric to quantify the potential damage of attacks affecting different signals in a CACC-controlled vehicle and study how two key system parameters change this metric. We carry out a sensitivity analysis for two different controller implementations (as given the available sensors there is an infinite number of realizations of the same controller) and show how different controller realizations can significantly affect the impact of attacks. We present extensive simulation experiments to illustrate the results.

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