arXiv subjects

Mohak Goyal

Publications and source records attributed to Mohak Goyal.

14 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Quality-Sensitive Matrix Factorization for Community Notes: Towards Sample Efficiency and Manipulation Resistance

Community Notes is X's crowdsourced fact-checking program: contributors write short notes that add context to potentially misleading posts, and other contributors rate whether those notes are helpful. Its algorithm uses a matrix factorization model to separate ideology from note quality, so notes are surfaced only when they receive support across ideological lines. After ideology is accounted for, however, the model gives all raters equal influence on quality estimates. This slows consensus formation and leaves the quality estimate vulnerable to noisy or strategic raters. We propose Quality-Sensitive Matrix Factorization (QSMF), which uses a per-rater quality-sensitivity parameter $\hat\rho_i$ estimated jointly with all other parameters. This connects QSMF to peer prediction: without external ground truth, it gives more influence to raters whose ideology-adjusted ratings are more consistent with the note-quality estimates learned from all the ratings. We evaluate QSMF on 45M ratings over 365K notes from the six months before the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Split-half tests confirm that quality sensitivity is a stable, empirically recoverable rater trait. In evaluation on high-traffic notes, QSMF requires 26--40\% fewer ratings to match the baseline's accuracy. In semi-synthetic coordinated attacks on notes of opposing ideology, QSMF substantially reduces displacement on the estimated quality estimates of targeted notes relative to the baseline. In synthetic data with known ground truth, $\hat\rho_i$ separates good from bad raters with an AUC above 0.94, and achieves much lower error in recovering the true note quality estimates in the presence of bad raters. These gains come from a single additional scalar parameter per rater, with no external ground truth and no manual moderation.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2026

Utilitarian Distortion Under Probabilistic Voting

The utilitarian distortion framework evaluates voting rules by their worst-case efficiency loss when voters have cardinal utilities but express only ordinal rankings. Under the classical model, a longstanding tension exists: Plurality, which suffers from the spoiler effect, achieves optimal $\Theta(m^2)$ distortion among deterministic rules, while normatively superior rules like Copeland and Borda have unbounded distortion. We resolve this tension under probabilistic voting with the Plackett-Luce model, where rankings are noisy reflections of utilities governed by an inverse temperature parameter $\beta$. Copeland and Borda both achieve at most $\beta\frac{1+e^{-\beta}}{1-e^{-\beta}}$ distortion, independent of the number of candidates $m$, and within a factor of 2 of the lower bound for randomized rules satisfying the probabilistic Condorcet loser criterion known from prior work. This improves upon the prior $O(\beta^2)$ bound for Borda. These upper bounds are nearly tight: prior work establishes a $(1-o(1))\beta$ lower bound for Borda, and we prove a $(1-\epsilon)\beta$ lower bound for Copeland for any constant $\epsilon >0$. In contrast, rules that rely only on top-choice information fare worse: Plurality has distortion $\Omega(\min(e^\beta, m))$ and Random Dictator has distortion $\Theta(m)$. Additional `veto' information is also insufficient to remove the dependence on $m$; Plurality Veto and Pruned Plurality Veto have distortion $\Omega(\beta \ln m)$. We also prove a lower bound of $(\frac{5}{8}-\epsilon)\beta$ (for any constant $\epsilon >0$) for all deterministic finite-precision tournament-based rules, a class that includes Copeland and any rule based on pairwise comparison margins rounded to fixed precision. Our results show that the distortion framework aligns with normative intuitions once the probabilistic nature of real-world voting is taken into account.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Beyond Polarization: Opinion Mixing and Social Influence in Deliberation

Deliberative processes are often discussed as increasing or decreasing polarization. This approach misses a different, and arguably more diagnostic, dimension of opinion change: whether deliberation reshuffles who agrees with whom, or simply moves everyone in parallel while preserving the pre-deliberation rank ordering. We introduce \opinion mixing, measured by Kendall's rank correlation (\tau) between pre- and post-deliberation responses, as a complement to variance-based polarization metrics. Across two large online deliberative polls spanning 32 countries (MCF-2022: n=6,342; MCF-2023: n=1,529), deliberation increases opinion mixing relative to survey-only controls: treatment groups exhibit lower rank correlation on (97%) and (93%) of opinion questions, respectively. Polarization measures based on variance tell a more heterogeneous story: controls consistently converge, while treated groups sometimes converge and sometimes diverge depending on the issue. To probe mechanisms, we link transcripts and surveys in a third event (SOF: (n=617), 116 groups) and use LLM-assisted coding of 6,232 discussion statements. Expressed support in discussion statements strongly predicts subsequent group-level opinion shifts; this correlation is amplified by justification quality in the statements but not by argument novelty. To our knowledge, we are the first to observe how different notions of argument quality have different associations with the outcome of deliberation. This suggests that opinion change after deliberation is related to selective uptake of well-reasoned arguments, producing complex patterns of opinion reorganization that standard polarization metrics may miss.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2025

Metric Distortion of Small-group Deliberation

We consider models for social choice where voters rank a set of choices (or alternatives) by deliberating in small groups of size at most $k$, and these outcomes are aggregated by a social choice rule to find the winning alternative. We ground these models in the metric distortion framework, where the voters and alternatives are embedded in a latent metric space, with closer alternative being more desirable for a voter. We posit that the outcome of a small-group interaction optimally uses the voters' collective knowledge of the metric, either deterministically or probabilistically. We characterize the distortion of our deliberation models for small $k$, showing that groups of size $k=3$ suffice to drive the distortion bound below the deterministic metric distortion lower bound of $3$, and groups of size $4$ suffice to break the randomized lower bound of $2.11$. We also show nearly tight asymptotic distortion bounds in the group size, showing that for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, achieving a distortion of $1+\epsilon$ needs group size that only depends on $1/\epsilon$, and not the number of alternatives. We obtain these results via formulating a basic optimization problem in small deviations of the sum of $i.i.d.$ random variables, which we solve to global optimality via non-convex optimization. The resulting bounds may be of independent interest in probability theory.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Estimating Contribution Quality in Online Deliberations Using a Large Language Model

Deliberation involves participants exchanging knowledge, arguments, and perspectives and has been shown to be effective at addressing polarization. The Stanford Online Deliberation Platform facilitates large-scale deliberations. It enables video-based online discussions on a structured agenda for small groups without requiring human moderators. This paper's data comes from various deliberation events, including one conducted in collaboration with Meta in 32 countries, and another with 38 post-secondary institutions in the US. Estimating the quality of contributions in a conversation is crucial for assessing feature and intervention impacts. Traditionally, this is done by human annotators, which is time-consuming and costly. We use a large language model (LLM) alongside eight human annotators to rate contributions based on justification, novelty, expansion of the conversation, and potential for further expansion, with scores ranging from 1 to 5. Annotators also provide brief justifications for their ratings. Using the average rating from other human annotators as the ground truth, we find the model outperforms individual human annotators. While pairs of human annotators outperform the model in rating justification and groups of three outperform it on all four metrics, the model remains competitive. We illustrate the usefulness of the automated quality rating by assessing the effect of nudges on the quality of deliberation. We first observe that individual nudges after prolonged inactivity are highly effective, increasing the likelihood of the individual requesting to speak in the next 30 seconds by 65%. Using our automated quality estimation, we show that the quality ratings for statements prompted by nudging are similar to those made without nudging, signifying that nudging leads to more ideas being generated in the conversation without losing overall quality.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Augmenting Batch Exchanges with Constant Function Market Makers

Batch auctions are a classical market microstructure, acclaimed for their fairness properties, and have received renewed interest in the context of blockchain-based financial systems. Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are another market design innovation praised for their computational simplicity and applicability to liquidity provision via smart contracts. Liquidity provision in batch exchanges is an important problem, and CFMMs have recently shown promise in being useful within batch exchanges. Different real-world implementations have used fundamentally different approaches towards integrating CFMMs in batch exchanges, and there is a lack of formal understanding of different design tradeoffs. We first provide a minimal set of axioms that are well-accepted rules of batch exchanges and CFMMs. These are asset conservation, uniform valuations, a best response for limit orders, and non-decreasing CFMM trading function. In general, many market solutions may satisfy all our axioms. We then describe several economically useful properties of market solutions. These include Pareto optimality for limit orders, price coherence of CFMMs (as a defence against cyclic arbitrage), joint price discovery for CFMMs (as a defence against parallel running), path independence for simple instances, and a locally computable response of the CFMMs in equilibrium (to provide them predictability on trade size given a market price). We show fundamental conflicts between some pairs of these properties. We then provide two ways of integrating CFMMs in batch exchanges, which attain different subsets of these properties. We further provide a convex program for computing Arrow-Debreu exchange market equilibria when all agents have weak gross substitute (WGS) demand functions on two assets -- this program extends the literature on Arrow-Debreu exchange markets and may be of independent interest.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Metric distortion Under Probabilistic Voting

Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters submit rankings, and the rule aggregates these rankings to determine a winner. We extend this framework to incorporate probabilistic voting, recognizing that real-world voters exhibit randomness in how they vote. Our extension includes various probability functions, notably the widely studied Plackett-Luce (PL) model. We show that the distortion results under probabilistic voting better correspond with conventional intuitions regarding popular voting rules such as \textsc{Plurality}, \textsc{Copeland}, \textsc{Random Dictator} and \textsc{Borda} than those under deterministic voting. For example, in the PL model with candidate strength inversely proportional to the square of their metric distance from a voter, we show that \textsc{Copeland}'s distortion is at most 2, whereas that of \textsc{RandomDictator} is $\Omega(\sqrt{m})$ in large elections (i.e., number of voters $n \rightarrow \infty$), where $m$ is the number of candidates. This contrasts sharply with the classical model, where \textsc{RandomDictator} beats \textsc{Copeland} with a distortion of 3 versus 5. In the PL model where the candidate strength is inversely proportional to the distance raised to power $\theta$, the distortion under \textsc{Borda} is $\Theta(m^{1-2/\theta})$ when $\theta>2$ and $\Theta(1)$ otherwise. This generalizes the classical deterministic voting model where the distortion of \textsc{Borda} is $2m-1$. The proof uses a novel variant of asymptotic duality where we choose the Lagrange multiplier via asymptotically maximizing the derivative of the objective function. Overall, our work opens a new frontier for analyzing voting rules.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Pricing Personalized Preferences for Privacy Protection in Constant Function Market Makers

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are a popular decentralized exchange mechanism and have recently been the subject of much research, but major CFMMs give traders no privacy. Prior work proposes randomly splitting and shuffling trades to give some privacy to all users [Chitra et al. 2022], or adding noise to the market state after each trade and charging a fixed `privacy fee' to all traders [Frongillo and Waggoner 2018]. In contrast, we propose a noisy CFMM mechanism where users specify personal privacy requirements and pay personalized fees. We show that the noise added for privacy protection creates additional arbitrage opportunities. We call a mechanism priceable if there exists a privacy fee that always matches the additional arbitrage loss in expectation. We show that a mechanism is priceable if and only if the noise added is zero-mean in the asset amount. We also show that priceability and setting the right fee are necessary for a mechanism to be truthful, and that this fee is inversely proportional to the CFMM's liquidity.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

A Mechanism for Participatory Budgeting With Funding Constraints and Project Interactions

Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters. Also, the outcomes of PB in practice are subject to various minimum/maximum funding constraints on 'types' of projects. We propose a novel preference elicitation scheme for PB which allows voters to express how their utilities from projects within 'groups' interact. We consider preference aggregation done under minimum and maximum funding constraints on 'types' of projects, where a project can have multiple type labels as long as this classification can be defined by a 1-laminar structure (henceforth called 1-laminar funding constraints). Overall, we extend the Knapsack voting model of Goel et al. [26] in two ways - enriching the preference elicitation scheme to include project interactions and generalizing the preference aggregation scheme to include 1-laminar funding constraints. We show that the strategyproofness results of Goel et al. [26] for Knapsack voting continue to hold under 1-laminar funding constraints. Moreover, when the funding constraints cannot be described by a 1-laminar structure, strategyproofness does not hold. Although project interactions often break the strategyproofness, we study a special case of vote profiles where truthful voting is a Nash equilibrium under substitution project interactions. We then study the computational complexity of preference aggregation. Social welfare maximization under project interactions is NP-hard. As a workaround for practical instances, we give a fixed parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm for social welfare maximization with respect to the maximum number of projects in a group when the overall budget is specified in a fixed number of bits.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Low Sample Complexity Participatory Budgeting

We study low sample complexity mechanisms in participatory budgeting (PB), where each voter votes for a preferred allocation of funds to various projects, subject to project costs and total spending constraints. We analyze the distortion that PB mechanisms introduce relative to the minimum-social-cost outcome in expectation. The Random Dictator mechanism for this problem obtains a distortion of 2. In a special case where every voter votes for exactly one project, [Fain et al '17] obtain a distortion of 4/3 We show that when PB outcomes are determined as any convex combination of the votes of two voters, the distortion is 2. When three uniformly randomly sampled votes are used, we give a PB mechanism that obtains a distortion of at most 1.66, thus breaking the barrier of 2 with the smallest possible sample complexity. We give a randomized Nash bargaining scheme where two uniformly randomly chosen voters bargain with the disagreement point as the vote of a voter chosen uniformly at random. This mechanism has a distortion of at most 1.66. We provide a lower bound of 1.38 for the distortion of this scheme. Further, we show that PB mechanisms that output a median of the votes of three voters chosen uniformly at random have a distortion of at most 1.80.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market Makers

Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) are a tool for creating exchange markets, have been deployed effectively in prediction markets, and are now especially prominent in the Decentralized Finance ecosystem. We show that for any set of beliefs about future asset prices, an optimal CFMM trading function exists that maximizes the fraction of trades that a CFMM can settle. We formulate a convex program to compute this optimal trading function. This program, therefore, gives a tractable framework for market-makers to compile their belief function on the future prices of the underlying assets into the trading function of a maximally capital-efficient CFMM. Our convex optimization framework further extends to capture the tradeoffs between fee revenue, arbitrage loss, and opportunity costs of liquidity providers. Analyzing the program shows how the consideration of profit and loss leads to a qualitatively different optimal trading function. Our model additionally explains the diversity of CFMM designs that appear in practice. We show that careful analysis of our convex program enables inference of a market-maker's beliefs about future asset prices, and show that these beliefs mirror the folklore intuition for several widely used CFMMs. Developing the program requires a new notion of the liquidity of a CFMM, and the core technical challenge is in the analysis of the KKT conditions of an optimization over an infinite-dimensional Banach space.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Signal Reconstruction from Quantized Noisy Samples of the Discrete Fourier Transform

In this paper, we present two variations of an algorithm for signal reconstruction from one-bit or two-bit noisy observations of the discrete Fourier transform (DFT). The one-bit observations of the DFT correspond to the sign of its real part, whereas, the two-bit observations of the DFT correspond to the signs of both the real and imaginary parts of the DFT. We focus on images for analysis and simulations, thus using the sign of the 2D-DFT. This choice of the class of signals is inspired by previous works on this problem. For our algorithm, we show that the expected mean squared error (MSE) in signal reconstruction is asymptotically proportional to the inverse of the sampling rate. The samples are affected by additive zero-mean noise of known distribution. We solve this signal estimation problem by designing an algorithm that uses contraction mapping, based on the Banach fixed point theorem. Numerical tests with four benchmark images are provided to show the effectiveness of our algorithm. Various metrics for image reconstruction quality assessment such as PSNR, SSIM, ESSIM, and MS-SSIM are employed. On all four benchmark images, our algorithm outperforms the state-of-the-art in all of these metrics by a significant margin.

eess.SP↗

arXiv2021

Secretary Matching With Vertex Arrivals and No Rejections

Most prior work on online matching problems has been with the flexibility of keeping some vertices unmatched. We study three related online matching problems with the constraint of matching every vertex, i.e., with no rejections. We adopt a model in which vertices arrive in uniformly random order and the non-negative edge-weights are arbitrary. For the capacitated online bipartite matching problem, in which the vertices of one side of the graph are offline and those of the other side arrive online, we give a 4.62-competitive algorithm when the capacity of each offline vertex is 2. For the online general (non-bipartite) matching problem, where all vertices arrive online, we give a 3.34-competitive algorithm. We also study the online roommate matching problem (Huzhang et al. 2017), in which each room (offline vertex) holds 2 persons (online vertices). Persons derive non-negative additive utilities from their room as well as roommate. In this model, with the goal of maximizing the social welfare, we give a 7.96-competitive algorithm. This is an improvement over the 24.72 approximation factor in (Huzhang et al. 2017).

cs.DS↗

arXiv2021

Maintaining Ferment: On Opinion Control Over Social Networks

We consider the design of external inputs to achieve a control objective on the opinions, represented by scalars, in a social network. The opinion dynamics follow a variant of the discrete-time Friedkin-Johnsen model. We first consider two minimum cost optimal control problems over a finite interval $(T_0,T),$ $T_0 >0$ -- (1) TF where opinions at all nodes should exceed a given $τ,$ and (2) GF where a scalar function of the opinion vector should exceed a given $τ.$ For both problems we first provide a Pontryagin maximum principle (PMP) based control function when the controllable nodes are specified. We then show that both these problems exhibit the turnpike property where both the control function and the state vectors stay near their equilibrium for a large fraction of the time. This property is then used to choose the optimum set of controllable nodes. We then consider a third system, MF, which is a cost-constrained optimal control problem where we maximize the minimum value of a scalar function of the opinion vector over $(T_0,T).$ We provide a numerical algorithm to derive the control function for this problem using non-smooth PMP based techniques. Extensive numerical studies illustrate the three models, control techniques and corresponding outcomes.

cs.SI↗