arXiv subjects

Mohamadali Berahman

Publications and source records attributed to Mohamadali Berahman.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Changing the Game: Status-Quo Inertia, Institutional Design, and Equilibrium Transition

Many economic interventions are designed as marginal changes in incentives. Yet in environments shaped by coordination, institutional persistence, and path dependence, such reforms often leave behavior largely unchanged. This paper studies interventions in games when equilibrium selection displays status-quo inertia: if the pre-intervention equilibrium remains a Nash equilibrium after policy, it continues to be selected. In that environment, price-based interventions and simple option expansion may fail even when they improve welfare in a partial-equilibrium sense. By contrast, interventions that modify the feasible action space, especially deletion and replacement interventions, can be substantially more effective because they remove the strategic basis for persistence. We develop a simple framework, derive general results, provide complete proofs, and illustrate the economics with examples from climate transition, platform regulation, financial reform, and industrial modernization. The analysis highlights a basic policy lesson: when inefficient equilibria are institutionally entrenched, the central problem is often not how to price the existing game more finely, but how to change the game itself.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Meta-Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Existence via Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem

We extend the concept of meta-Nash equilibrium, introduced by Eshaghi Gordji and Bagha [2026] for complete-information games, to environments with incomplete information. We define a meta-Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a profile of type-dependent mixed meta-strategies together with an environmental move such that no player type can profitably deviate and the environment cannot improve its expected payoff. For each transformed game, meta-payoffs are determined by the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game. Using Kakutani's fixed point theorem, we establish existence under finiteness assumptions on type spaces, meta-actions, and transformations, together with the assumption that each transformed game admits a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Several illustrative examples, including adaptive subsidy competition, cybersecurity protocol selection, and platform rule formation, demonstrate that private information at the meta-level plays an essential role in endogenous game transformation. The framework contains both classical Bayesian games and complete-information meta-games as special cases.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

The Dynamics of Trust: A Stochastic Levy Model Capturing Sudden Behavioral Jumps

Trust is the invisible glue that holds together the fabric of societies, economic systems, and political institutions. Yet, its dynamics-especially in real-world settings remain unpredictable and difficult to control. While classical trust game models largely rely on discrete frameworks with limited noise, they fall short in capturing sudden behavioral shifts, extreme volatility, or abrupt breakdowns in cooperation.Here, we propose-for the first time a comprehensive stochastic model of trust based on Lévy processes that integrates three fundamental components: Brownian motion (representing everyday fluctuations), Poissonian jump intensity (capturing the frequency of shocks), and random distributions for jump magnitudes. This framework surpasses conventional models by enabling simulations of phenomena such as "sudden trust collapse," "chaotic volatility," and "nonlinear recoveries" dynamics often neglected in both theoretical and empirical studies.By implementing four key simulation scenarios and conducting a detailed parameter sensitivity analysis via 3D and contour plots, we demonstrate that the proposed model is not only mathematically more advanced, but also offers a more realistic representation of human dynamics compared to previous approaches. Beyond its technical contributions, this study outlines a conceptual framework for understanding fragile, jump-driven behaviors in social, economic, and geopolitical systems-where trust is not merely a psychological construct, but an inherently unstable and stochastic variable best captured through Lévy based modeling.

stat.AP↗

arXiv2025

The Trust-Building Game: A Model for Sustainable Cooperation

Trust serves as a fundamental pillar of human interactions, playing a crucial role in economic, social, and political relationships. While traditional models of trust primarily focus on the decision making of the first player, this paper introduces an innovative approach that shifts the emphasis to the decision making processes of the second player. The proposed model employs a repetitive structure through which the first player effectively cultivates the second player's trust through consistent and strategic actions. This framework is applicable across various fields, including public policy, marketing, and international relations. It significantly deepens our understanding of the trust-building process and aids in fostering sustainable cooperation in real world scenarios.

econ.GN↗