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Mohammad I. Husain

Publications and source records attributed to Mohammad I. Husain.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Agent Trust Infrastructure (ATI): A Federated Identity, Trust, Attestation, and Accountability Architecture for Cross-Organization Autonomous AI Agents

AI agents increasingly collaborate across organizational boundaries, invoking tools and interacting with agents operated by independent entities. Although existing agent frameworks support planning and coordination, they lack a common mechanism for verifying cross-organizational agent identity, execution integrity, and authorization. We propose the Agent Trust Infrastructure (ATI), a framework-independent security architecture built on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), and remote attestation. ATI establishes federated trust through peer organizational certificate authorities (AgentCAs), eliminating the need for a shared root authority. Before executing requests, ATI validates agent certificates, verifies approved model, tool, and system-prompt configurations, and enforces authorization through three policy checks. We implement ATI as an external security enforcement layer that integrates with existing agent frameworks without modifying their underlying models. We evaluate ATI in a simulated federation of eight organizations using six agent frameworks, each deploying a five-agent team. Security experiments involve two organizations and assess 14 attack scenarios and six benign tasks across five agent models, using five attack variations and three repetitions per variation. A panel of judge models evaluates the experimental outcomes. With all enforcement mechanisms enabled, attack containment increases from 43% to 84% (40% to 80% for the 11 attack scenarios evaluated consistently across all configurations), while enforcement introduces approximately 174 microseconds of overhead per request. ATI is released as an open-source, framework-independent package that uses IETF WIMSE workload token formats for identity and request verification and Entity Attestation Tokens for model, tool, and system-prompt integrity verification.

cs.AI↗

The Provenance-Privacy Paradox: Can Private Cloud Compute (PCC) Prove That Apple Reference Images Are Not Used for Learning?

Apple Reference Image (ARI) combines camera-sensor signatures, Secure Enclave attestation (SEP), cryptographic timestamp bounds, Private Cloud Compute (PCC), and a final post-quantum signature to establish photographic provenance. PCC is central to this process because it validates the secure digital negative and develops authenticated raw sensor measurements into a reference JPEG. Although the secure digital negative is encrypted during transmission, the authorized PCC workload must process the raw pixels in plaintext. This requirement creates a provenance-privacy paradox: cloud processing strengthens the provenance guarantee while giving an Apple-authorized, machine-learning-capable workload access to valuable, hardware-authenticated raw imagery. We argue that workload attestation and transparency-log inclusion verify software identity and authorization but do not, by themselves, prove that an authorized workload cannot learn from or retain information derived from the photograph. We implement this counterexample in a Python- and Docker-based experimental testbed that models relevant ARI and PCC functions. Across 27 public-domain photographs, a baseline workload and a learning-enabled workload both passed the same verification checks and returned byte-for-byte identical JPEGs. However, the learning-enabled workload retained a first-layer gradient of approximately 48 KB from which its 64 x 64 input was reconstructed with a maximum absolute per-pixel error of 6 x 10^-8. The additional processing overhead was small relative to image decoding and processing. These results do not demonstrate that Apple currently trains on ARI photographs or reproduce production PCC, but identify non-learning and non-retention as independently verifiable assurance requirements.

cs.CR↗

An Experimental Evaluation of Multimodal Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic AI Frameworks

Agentic AI frameworks let a language model plan, keep memory, and call tools that reach real files, mail, and services. Most of these agents also read images, which gives an attacker a way to put text into the agent's context without going through the user. We present MMPIBench, a reproducible benchmark that measures what happens next. It delivers a fixed set of attacks through six visual carriers (OCR text, overlays, EXIF metadata, QR codes, fake interfaces, and hybrids) and records how far each injected instruction travels through the agent, from perception through planning to the tool call. Across 720 runs covering six frameworks, five foundation models, six carriers, and four attacker objectives, attacks complete in approximately 1% of runs but are attempted in 12.8%, and the gap is closed almost entirely at the planning step, where the model reads the injected instruction and declines to act on it. The model matters far more than the framework for whether an instruction is acted on. One model never attempts an attack and recognizes the injection in 59.7% of runs, while two others attempt in 23.6%. We then extend the benchmark to audio, the only other raw perceptual channel current frontier models accept. Only two of the five models ingest audio and only three of the six frameworks deliver it, but where the signal arrives the attack completes in 49% of cells, and in 75% for one model. Reporting completion alone therefore understates exposure, and perceptual channels beyond vision are narrower but much less defended.

cs.CR↗

Penetration Testing of Agentic AI: A Comparative Security Analysis Across Models and Frameworks

Agentic AI introduces security vulnerabilities that traditional LLM safeguards fail to address. Although recent work by Unit 42 at Palo Alto Networks demonstrated that ChatGPT-4o successfully executes attacks as an agent that it refuses in chat mode, there is no comparative analysis in multiple models and frameworks. We conducted the first systematic penetration testing and comparative evaluation of agentic AI systems, testing five prominent models (Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-4o, Grok 2, and Nova Pro) across two agentic AI frameworks (AutoGen and CrewAI) using a seven-agent architecture that mimics the functionality of a university information management system and 13 distinct attack scenarios that span prompt injection, Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), SQL injection, and tool misuse. Our 130 total test cases reveal significant security disparities: AutoGen demonstrates a 52.3% refusal rate versus CrewAI's 30.8%, while model performance ranges from Nova Pro's 46.2% to Claude and Grok 2's 38.5%. Most critically, Grok 2 on CrewAI rejected only 2 of 13 attacks (15.4% refusal rate), and the overall refusal rate of 41.5% across all configurations indicates that more than half of malicious prompts succeeded despite enterprise-grade safety mechanisms. We identify six distinct defensive behavior patterns including a novel "hallucinated compliance" strategy where models fabricate outputs rather than executing or refusing attacks, and provide actionable recommendations for secure agent deployment. Complete attack prompts are also included in the Appendix to enable reproducibility.

cs.CR↗