arXiv subjects

Mohammad Rahmani Fadiheh

Publications and source records attributed to Mohammad Rahmani Fadiheh.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

VeriCHERI: Exhaustive Formal Security Verification of CHERI at the RTL

Protecting data in memory from attackers continues to be a concern in computing systems. CHERI is a promising approach to achieve such protection, by providing and enforcing fine-grained memory protection directly in the hardware. Creating trust for the entire system stack, however, requires a gap-free verification of CHERI's hardware-based protection mechanisms. Existing verification methods for CHERI target the abstract ISA model rather than the underlying hardware implementation. Fully ensuring the CHERI security guarantees for a concrete RTL implementation is a challenge in previous flows and demands high manual efforts. This paper presents VeriCHERI, a novel approach to security verification. It is conceptionally different from previous works in that it does not require any ISA specification. Instead of checking compliance with a golden ISA model, we check against well-established global security objectives of confidentiality and integrity. Fully covering these objectives, VeriCHERI uses as few as four unbounded properties to exhaustively prove or disprove any vulnerability. We demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of VeriCHERI on a RISC-V based processor implementing a CHERI variant.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

MCU-Wide Timing Side Channels and Their Detection

Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting common intuitions, recent activities demonstrate that this threat is real even in microcontroller SoCs without such features. In this paper, we describe SoC-wide timing side channels previously neglected by security analysis and present a new formal method to close this gap. In a case study on the RISC-V Pulpissimo SoC, our method detected a vulnerability to a previously unknown attack variant that allows an attacker to obtain information about a victim's memory access behavior. After implementing a conservative fix, we were able to verify that the SoC is now secure w.r.t. the considered class of timing side channels.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

A Scalable Formal Verification Methodology for Data-Oblivious Hardware

The importance of preventing microarchitectural timing side channels in security-critical applications has surged in recent years. Constant-time programming has emerged as a best-practice technique for preventing the leakage of secret information through timing. It is based on the assumption that the timing of certain basic machine instructions is independent of their respective input data. However, whether or not an instruction satisfies this data-independent timing criterion varies between individual processor microarchitectures. In this paper, we propose a novel methodology to formally verify data-oblivious behavior in hardware using standard property checking techniques. The proposed methodology is based on an inductive property that enables scalability even to complex out-of-order cores. We show that proving this inductive property is sufficient to exhaustively verify data-obliviousness at the microarchitectural level. In addition, the paper discusses several techniques that can be used to make the verification process easier and faster. We demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed methodology through case studies on several open-source designs. One case study uncovered a data-dependent timing violation in the extensively verified and highly secure IBEX RISC-V core. In addition to several hardware accelerators and in-order processors, our experiments also include RISC-V BOOM, a complex out-of-order processor, highlighting the scalability of the approach.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

A Golden-Free Formal Method for Trojan Detection in Non-Interfering Accelerators

The threat of hardware Trojans (HTs) in security-critical IPs like cryptographic accelerators poses severe security risks. The HT detection methods available today mostly rely on golden models and detailed circuit specifications. Often they are specific to certain HT payload types, making pre-silicon verification difficult and leading to security gaps. We propose a novel formal verification method for HT detection in non-interfering accelerators at the Register Transfer Level (RTL), employing standard formal property checking. Our method guarantees the exhaustive detection of any sequential HT independently of its payload behavior, including physical side channels. It does not require a golden model or a functional specification of the design. The experimental results demonstrate efficient and effective detection of all sequential HTs in accelerators available on Trust-Hub, including those with complex triggers and payloads.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

An Exhaustive Approach to Detecting Transient Execution Side Channels in RTL Designs of Processors

Hardware (HW) security issues have been emerging at an alarming rate in recent years. Transient execution attacks, in particular, pose a genuine threat to the security of modern computing systems. Despite recent advances, understanding the intricate implications of microarchitectural design decisions on processor security remains a great challenge and has caused a number of update cycles in the past. number of update cycles in the past. This papers addresses the need for a new approach to HW sign-off verification which guarantees the security of processors at the Register Transfer Level (RTL). To this end, we introduce a formal definition of security with respect to transient execution attacks, formulated as a HW property. We present a formal proof methodology based on Unique Program Execution Checking (UPEC) which can be used to systematically detect all vulnerabilities to transient execution attacks in RTL designs. UPEC does not exploit any a priori knowledge on known attacks and can therefore detect also vulnerabilities based on new, so far unknown, types of channels. This is demonstrated by two new attack scenarios discovered in our experiments with UPEC. UPEC scales to a wide range of HW designs, including in-order processors (RocketChip), pipelines with out-of-order writeback (Ariane), and processors with deep out-of-order speculative execution (BOOM). To the best of our knowledge, UPEC is the first RTL verification technique that exhaustively covers transient execution side channels in processors of realistic complexity.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Effective Pre-Silicon Verification of Processor Cores by Breaking the Bounds of Symbolic Quick Error Detection

We present a novel approach to pre-silicon verification of processor designs. The purpose of pre-silicon verification is to find logic bugs in a design at an early stage and thus avoid time- and cost-intensive post-silicon debugging. Our approach relies on symbolic quick error detection (Symbolic QED, or SQED). SQED is targeted at finding logic bugs in a symbolic representation of a design by combining bounded model checking (BMC) with QED tests. QED tests are powerful in generating short sequences of instructions (traces) that trigger bugs. We extend an existing SQED approach with symbolic starting states. This way, we enable the BMC tool to select starting states arbitrarily when generating a trace. To avoid false positives, (e.g., traces starting in unreachable states that may not be-have in accordance with the processor instruction-set architecture), we define constraints to restrict the set of possible starting states. We demonstrate that these constraints, togeth-er with reasonable assumptions about the system behavior, allow us to avoid false positives. Using our approach, we discovered previously unknown bugs in open-source RISC-V processor cores that existing methods cannot detect. Moreover, our novel approach out-performs existing ones in the detection of bugs having long traces and in the detection of hardware Trojans, i.e., unauthorized modifications of a design.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2018

Processor Hardware Security Vulnerabilities and their Detection by Unique Program Execution Checking

Recent discovery of security attacks in advanced processors, known as Spectre and Meltdown, has resulted in high public alertness about security of hardware. The root cause of these attacks is information leakage across "covert channels" that reveal secret data without any explicit information flow between the secret and the attacker. Many sources believe that such covert channels are intrinsic to highly advanced processor architectures based on speculation and out-of-order execution, suggesting that such security risks can be avoided by staying away from high-end processors. This paper, however, shows that the problem is of wider scope: we present new classes of covert channel attacks which are possible in average-complexity processors with in-order pipelining, as they are mainstream in applications ranging from Internet-of-Things to Autonomous Systems. We present a new approach as a foundation for remedy against covert channels: while all previous attacks were found by clever thinking of human attackers, this paper presents an automated and exhaustive method called "Unique Program Execution Checking" which detects and locates vulnerabilities to covert channels systematically, including those to covert channels unknown so far.

cs.CR↗