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Mohammad Zakaria Haider

Publications and source records attributed to Mohammad Zakaria Haider.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Attack-Resiliency Analytics for Wide-Area Control Systems in Smart Grids

Wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) systems damp inter-area oscillations in large interconnected grids, but their reliance on synchronized PMU measurements carried over wide-area networks exposes them to false data injection (FDI) attacks. This paper presents an attack-resiliency analytics framework that formally models the coupled dynamics of the wide-area damping loop, automatic generation control, and the governor and excitation systems, and formulates the optimal stealthy FDI attack as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP). The anomaly detection model (ADM) enters as a replaceable constraint set: either a static bad-data detection (BDD) rule or a boundary learned from benign operation calibrated to a common false-positive rate. On the IEEE 39 and 118 bus systems, with reference dynamics validated on an OPAL-RT hardware-in-the-loop testbed, the optimal attack with wide-area access attains 3.3 and 8.1 times the benign objective and reaches a 0.5Hz frequency excursion more than twice as fast as an attack confined to automatic generation control. Learned boundaries reduce the attack objective by 15.5 55.0% and prevent over-frequency relay trips in all configurations, with feasible stealthy attacks remaining in every case, and residual risk tracks the width of the learned boundary rather than the detector family.

eess.SY↗

Physics-Aware Machine Unlearning for Cyber-Physical Systems

This paper proposes a physics-guided gradient-ascent-based machine unlearning method that couples the forgetting signal with the physical residual of the target cyber-physical systems, ensuring that weight updates during unlearning are steered toward physically feasible regions of the weight space. The physics residual acts as a safety fence during gradient ascent: the model is steered away from the poisoned behavioral basin and simultaneously toward physics-compliant territory, rather than toward an arbitrary alternative that may still violate domain constraints. We evaluate the proposed method against four baselines: naive gradient ascent, exact unlearning, SISA, and full retraining on an IEEE 34-bus distribution system, driven by two physics-informed neural network-based distribution energy resource controllers and validated through high-fidelity OpenDSS power-flow co-simulation. From the evaluation, we found that our proposed physics-guided model simultaneously removes poison and restores physical compliance, which are essential for the safe deployment of safety-critical cyber-physical systems

cs.LG↗

PHANTOM: Physics-Aware Adversarial Attacks against Federated Learning-Coordinated EV Charging Management System

The rapid deployment of electric vehicle charging stations (EVCS) within distribution networks necessitates intelligent and adaptive control to maintain the grid's resilience and reliability. In this work, we propose PHANTOM, a physics-aware adversarial network that is trained and optimized through a multi-agent reinforcement learning model. PHANTOM integrates a physics-informed neural network (PINN) enabled by federated learning (FL) that functions as a digital twin of EVCS-integrated systems, ensuring physically consistent modeling of operational dynamics and constraints. Building on this digital twin, we construct a multi-agent RL environment that utilizes deep Q-networks (DQN) and soft actor-critic (SAC) methods to derive adversarial false data injection (FDI) strategies capable of bypassing conventional detection mechanisms. To examine the broader grid-level consequences, a transmission and distribution (T and D) dual simulation platform is developed, allowing us to capture cascading interactions between EVCS disturbances at the distribution level and the operations of the bulk transmission system. Results demonstrate how learned attack policies disrupt load balancing and induce voltage instabilities that propagate across T and D boundaries. These findings highlight the critical need for physics-aware cybersecurity to ensure the resilience of large-scale vehicle-grid integration.

cs.ET↗

MISGUIDE: Security-Aware Attack Analytics for Smart Grid Load Frequency Control

Incorporating advanced information and communication technologies into smart grids (SGs) offers substantial operational benefits while increasing vulnerability to cyber threats like false data injection (FDI) attacks. Current SG attack analysis tools predominantly employ formal methods or adversarial machine learning (ML) techniques with rule-based bad data detectors to analyze the attack space. However, these attack analytics either generate simplistic attack vectors detectable by the ML-based anomaly detection models (ADMs) or fail to identify critical attack vectors from complex controller dynamics in a feasible time. This paper introduces MISGUIDE, a novel defense-aware attack analytics designed to extract verifiable multi-time slot-based FDI attack vectors from complex SG load frequency control dynamics and ADMs, utilizing the Gurobi optimizer. MISGUIDE can identify optimal (maliciously triggering under/over frequency relays in minimal time) and stealthy attack vectors. Using real-world load data, we validate the MISGUIDE-identified attack vectors through real-time hardware-in-the-loop (OPALRT) simulations of the IEEE 39-bus system.

cs.CE↗