arXiv subjects

Moin Hussain Moti

Publications and source records attributed to Moin Hussain Moti.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Fast and Adaptive Bulk Loading of Multidimensional Points

Existing methods for bulk loading disk-based multidimensional points involve multiple applications of external sorting. In this paper, we propose techniques that apply linear scan, and are therefore significantly faster. The resulting FMBI Index possesses several desirable properties, including almost full and square nodes with zero overlap, and has excellent query performance. As a second contribution, we develop an adaptive version AMBI, which utilizes the query workload to build a partial index only for parts of the data space that contain query results. Finally, we extend FMBI and AMBI to parallel bulk loading and query processing in distributed systems. An extensive experimental evaluation with real datasets confirms that FMBI and AMBI clearly outperform competitors in terms of combined index construction and query processing cost, sometimes by orders of magnitude.

cs.DB↗

arXiv2021

Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding

Civic crowdfunding (CC) is a popular medium for raising funds for civic projects from interested agents. With Blockchains gaining traction, we can implement CC in a reliable, transparent, and secure manner with smart contracts (SCs). The fundamental challenge in CC is free-riding. PPR, the proposal by Zubrickas [23] of giving refund bonus to the contributors, in the case of the project not getting provisioned, has attractive properties. However, as observed by Chandra et al. [7], PPR faces a challenge wherein the agents defer their contribution until the deadline. We define this delaying of contributions as a race condition. To address this, their proposal, PPS, considers the temporal aspects of a contribution. However, PPS is computationally complex, expensive to implement as an SC, and it being sophisticated, it is difficult to explain to a layperson. In this work, our goal is to identify all essential properties a refund bonus scheme must satisfy in order to curb free-riding while avoiding the race condition. We prove Contribution Monotonicity and Time Monotonicity are sufficient conditions for this. We propose three elegant refund bonus schemes satisfying these two conditions leading to three novel mechanisms for CC - PPRG, PPRE, and PPRP. We show that PPRG is the most cost-effective mechanism when deployed as an SC. We show that under certain modest assumptions on valuations of the agents, in PPRG, the project is funded at equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

FASTEN: Fair and Secure Distributed Voting Using Smart Contracts

Electing democratic representatives via voting has been a common mechanism since the 17th century. However, these mechanisms raise concerns about fairness, privacy, vote concealment, fair calculations of tally, and proxies voting on their behalf for the voters. Ballot voting, and in recent times, electronic voting via electronic voting machines (EVMs) improves fairness by relying on centralized trust. Homomorphic encryption-based voting protocols also assure fairness but cannot scale to large scale elections such as presidential elections. In this paper, we leverage the blockchain technology of distributing trust to propose a smart contract-based protocol, namely, \proto. There are many existing protocols for voting using smart contracts. We observe that these either are not scalable or leak the vote tally during the voting stage, i.e., do not provide vote concealment. In contrast, we show that FASTEN preserves voter's privacy ensures vote concealment, immutability, and avoids double voting. We prove that the probability of privacy breaches is negligibly small. Further, our cost analysis of executing FASTEN over Ethereum is comparable to most of the existing cost of elections.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

SplitEasy: A Practical Approach for Training ML models on Mobile Devices

Modern mobile devices, although resourceful, cannot train state-of-the-art machine learning models without the assistance of servers, which require access to, potentially, privacy-sensitive user data. Split learning has recently emerged as a promising technique for training complex deep learning (DL) models on low-powered mobile devices. The core idea behind this technique is to train the sensitive layers of a DL model on mobile devices while offloading the computationally intensive layers to a server. Although a lot of works have already explored the effectiveness of split learning in simulated settings, a usable toolkit for this purpose does not exist. In this work, we highlight the theoretical and technical challenges that need to be resolved to develop a functional framework that trains ML models in mobile devices without transferring raw data to a server. Focusing on these challenges, we propose SplitEasy, a framework for training ML models on mobile devices using split learning. Using the abstraction provided by SplitEasy, developers can run various DL models under split learning setting by making minimal modifications. We provide a detailed explanation of SplitEasy and perform experiments with six state-of-the-art neural networks. We demonstrate how SplitEasy can train models that cannot be trained solely by a mobile device while incurring nearly constant time per data sample.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

FaRM: Fair Reward Mechanism for Information Aggregation in Spontaneous Localized Settings (Extended Version)

Although peer prediction markets are widely used in crowdsourcing to aggregate information from agents, they often fail to reward the participating agents equitably. Honest agents can be wrongly penalized if randomly paired with dishonest ones. In this work, we introduce \emph{selective} and \emph{cumulative} fairness. We characterize a mechanism as fair if it satisfies both notions and present FaRM, a representative mechanism we designed. FaRM is a Nash incentive mechanism that focuses on information aggregation for spontaneous local activities which are accessible to a limited number of agents without assuming any prior knowledge of the event. All the agents in the vicinity observe the same information. FaRM uses \textit{(i)} a \emph{report strength score} to remove the risk of random pairing with dishonest reporters, \textit{(ii)} a \emph{consistency score} to measure an agent's history of accurate reports and distinguish valuable reports, \textit{(iii)} a \emph{reliability score} to estimate the probability of an agent to collude with nearby agents and prevents agents from getting swayed, and \textit{(iv)} a \emph{location robustness score} to filter agents who try to participate without being present in the considered setting. Together, report strength, consistency, and reliability represent a fair reward given to agents based on their reports.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Negative Valuations and Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs

In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved to be effective in generating funds for the provision of public projects. However, the existing literature deals only with citizen's with positive valuation and symmetric belief towards the project's provision. In this work, we present novel mechanisms which break these two barriers, i.e., mechanisms which incorporate negative valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negative valuation, we present a methodology for converting existing mechanisms to mechanisms that incorporate agents with negative valuations. Particularly, we adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel PPRN and PPSN mechanisms which incentivize strategic agents to contribute to the project based on their true preference. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose a reward scheme Belief Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism. With BBR, we propose a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding which incorporates asymmetric agents. We leverage PPR and PPS, to present PPRx and PPSx. We prove that in PPRx and PPSx, agents with greater belief towards the project's provision contribute more than agents with lesser belief. Further, we also show that contributions are such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.

cs.GT↗