arXiv subjects

Mojtaba Eslami

Publications and source records attributed to Mojtaba Eslami.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Adversarial Causal Intervention Falsification

Generative models can reproduce an observational distribution while encoding an incorrect causal structure. We study a sequential game in which a structural causal generator proposes observational and interventional distributions, while an adversarial experimentalist selects interventions intended to maximally falsify the generator. The discriminator is therefore not merely a real-versus-synthetic classifier: it is indexed by an intervention and tests whether the generator reproduces the corresponding post-intervention law. We introduce Adversarial Causal Intervention Falsification (ACIF), formulate oracle and implementable versions of the game, and distinguish three objects that are often conflated: observational fit, interventional equivalence over an admissible query class, and point identification of a structural causal model. For finite model and intervention classes, we prove: (i) an exact reduction of the adversarial objective to a worst-intervention integral probability metric; (ii) identification up to interventional equivalence, with point identification under a separating intervention family; (iii) existence of mixed-strategy equilibria; (iv) finite-sample uniform convergence and margin-based model-selection guarantees; and (v) a logarithmic elimination guarantee for a disagreement-driven sequential design under a balanced-separation condition. We also give a complete linear-Gaussian example in which two observationally indistinguishable causal directions are separated by a single well-chosen intervention. The framework clarifies what an adversarial causal discriminator can and cannot certify, and provides a principled bridge between causal generative modeling, active causal discovery, and experimental design.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Spectral Truncation in Synthetic Control

Synthetic control (SC) matches a treated unit's pre-treatment trajectory to a weighted combination of donor units. We study Spectral SC, which instead matches the treated unit in coordinates defined by the leading temporal singular vectors of the donor panel, and a hybrid estimator that places separately tunable weight on retained and discarded directions, nesting raw-path SC and truncated Spectral SC as endpoints. We prove that the family reduces exactly to raw-path SC at full rank, that exact balance on $K$ retained dimensions with $N_0$ donors is underdetermined whenever $N_0>K+1$, with an affine solution set of dimension $N_0-K-1$, and that spectral imbalance maps to treatment-effect bias through a finite-sample best-linear-predictor decomposition. We evaluate the estimators across eleven data-generating regimes, using $400$ replications per regime and donor-only placebo validation to select regularization and the mixing weight. Truncated Spectral SC has significantly higher RMSE than tuned raw-path SC in every regime, with paired differences equal to $4$ to $11$ Monte Carlo standard errors. The hybrid estimator selects raw-path matching in most replications and is statistically indistinguishable from tuned SC in most regimes. The result is highly sensitive to preprocessing. With raw inputs, the performance gap is large; after removing unit and time fixed effects before spectral decomposition, as suggested by the assumptions behind our bound, the gap nearly disappears and placebo validation begins to favor truncation. We interpret these findings diagnostically rather than as evidence that Spectral SC should replace raw-path SC. Basis-estimation noise, balancing underdetermination, and fixed-effects contamination determine when spectral matching can help.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2026

Interventional Score Geometry for Causal Inference

Let $p(x)$ be the joint density of variables $X$, and let $\psi(x)=\nabla_x\log p(x)$ be its score field. Geometry constructed from $p$ and $\psi$ alone cannot identify causal direction: structural models with the same observational distribution have the same score geometry. I develop an interventional analogue. A hard intervention $\operatorname{do}(X_k=\xi)$ does not merely reweight the joint law; it restricts the distribution to the submanifold ${x_k=\xi}$. Its score should therefore be defined on the remaining $d-1$ free coordinates. I define causal influence $X_k\rightsquigarrow X_j$ as variation of the interventional marginal distribution of $X_j$ with $\xi$, and show that the corresponding derivative of the marginal interventional score gives a local sufficient condition for influence. Projecting the observational score onto admissible intervention directions does not generally recover causal response: two models may share the same observational score and admissible set yet respond differently. I therefore introduce an interventional response field supplied by structural information. A causal metric is defined as the Fisher information metric on a family of interventions with a common target, avoiding ill-posed comparisons across targets. The framework yields a geometric dictionary for randomized trials, instrumental variables, and conditional-independence designs, clarifying what each does and does not identify. A bivariate Gaussian example gives two models with the same observational score but different interventional score derivatives. The framework organizes relations among designs, interventions, and score fields, but adds no identification beyond the underlying assumptions. In Pearl's Ladder of Causation, observational score geometry belongs to association, intervention-indexed score fields to intervention, and unit-level counterfactual geometry is left for future work.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2026

Dynamic Coalition Formation and Communication Pricing in Skill-Based Agentic AI Systems

Modern agentic AI systems combine multiple large language model agents with heterogeneous skills, yet most architectures either fix communication in advance or allow full broadcast. Both can be inefficient because token cost, latency, redundancy, and error propagation increase with the number of active agents and communication links. We model agent selection and communication as a cooperative game with task-conditioned net utility $U(C\mid x)=V(C\mid x)-\sum_{i\in C}c_i$, separating coalition-level costs from agent activation costs. We propose a marginal-value activation rule and greedy router, extend the model to optimize communication edges with per-edge costs, and use estimated Shapley values to predict which agents are worth contacting before and during execution. We connect the problem to submodular maximization and prove two limited guarantees: a curvature-refined bound for a monotone, cardinality-constrained special case, and a tight $1/2$-approximation, with a correction for signed objectives, for an unconstrained non-monotone case via double greedy. Neither guarantee applies directly to the main router, which remains a heuristic. We also prove a Shapley-submodularity sandwich bound linking the error of marginal-value routing to a per-agent diminishing-returns quantity. In synthetic experiments, greedy routing achieves $99.5%$ of brute-force-optimal utility while activating $1.96$ of $8$ agents on average, compared with $38.8%$ for full broadcast. Performance is robust to activation cost and redundancy weight but falls to $66%$ under strong violations of submodularity or noisy value estimates. We distinguish the framework from Shapley pricing, hedonic coalition formation, and communication-graph pruning, and propose evaluation on real multi-agent LLM benchmarks.

cs.AI↗