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Mojtaba Fayaz-Bakhsh

Publications and source records attributed to Mojtaba Fayaz-Bakhsh.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Who Observes Whom: Network Rationalizability and Its Complexity

Nash equilibrium and rationalizability sit at opposite informational extremes: the former presumes that each player knows all opponents' strategies, the latter that players reason from common knowledge of rationality alone. When visibility is partial and asymmetric, we study the solution concepts induced by a directed \emph{observation network} $G$ in which an edge $i\to j$ means that $i$ observes $j$'s strategy. A set of profiles is \emph{self-sustaining} if every profile in it can be justified, for every player, by conjectures from the same set that agree with everything the player observes. We consider \emph{point} conjectures (single profiles) and \emph{belief} conjectures (distributions over profiles). Both range from Nash equilibrium on the complete network to point- and correlated rationalizability on the empty network, and shrink monotonically as links are added. Network topology governs both behavior and complexity. A predicted profile can be found in polynomial time on the empty network, whereas a single link makes search $\mathsf{PPAD}$-hard: under one-sided two-player monitoring, the observed player's strategies are exactly her Nash equilibrium strategies. On hierarchical networks (transitive tournaments), membership reduces recursively to smaller games and admits polynomial-size certificates, placing verification in $\exists\mathbb{R}$, and in $\mathsf{P}$ for two players. On the directed three-cycle, however, iterated elimination may never terminate under either variant, and under point conjectures interior predictions may admit only infinite witness sets, a pathology that belief conjectures avoid in the same game. Finally, when only realized pure actions are observed, the solution set is guaranteed to be non-empty exactly when the network has no edges, and is computable in time $O(n|A|^2)$.

cs.GT↗

Cold-Start Active Preference Learning in Socio-Economic Domains

Active preference learning offers an efficient approach to modeling preferences, but it is hindered by the cold-start problem, which leads to a marked decline in performance when no initial labeled data are available. While cold-start solutions have been proposed for domains such as vision and text, the cold-start problem in active preference learning remains largely unexplored, underscoring the need for practical, effective methods. Drawing inspiration from established practices in social and economic research, the proposed method initiates learning with a self-supervised phase that employs Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to generate initial pseudo-labels. This process produces a \say{warmed-up} model based solely on the data's intrinsic structure, without requiring expert input. The model is then refined through an active learning loop that strategically queries a simulated noisy oracle for labels. Experiments conducted on various socio-economic datasets, including those related to financial credibility, career success rate, and socio-economic status, consistently show that the PCA-driven approach outperforms standard active learning strategies that start without prior information. This work thus provides a computationally efficient and straightforward solution that effectively addresses the cold-start problem.

cs.LG↗