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Monica Patriche

Publications and source records attributed to Monica Patriche.

24 records · Page 2Linked to original sources
arXiv2013

The core of the games with fractional linear utility functions

We consider fractional linear programming production games for the single-objective and multiobjective cases. We use the method of Chakraborty and Gupta (2002) in order to transform the fractional linear programming problems into linear programming problems. A cooperative game is attached and we prove the non-emptiness of the core by using the duality theory from the linear programming. In the multiobjective case, we give a characterization of the Stable outcome of the associate cooperative game, which is balanced. We also consider the cooperative game associated to an exchange economy with a finite number of agents.

math.OC↗
arXiv2013

The reduction of qualitative games

We extend the study of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) from Nash strategic games to a class of qualitative games. Also in this case, the IESDS process leads us to a kind of 'rationalizable' result. We define several types of dominance relation and game reduction and establish conditions under which a unique and nonempty maximal reduction exists. We generalize, in this way, some results due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) and Apt (2007).

cs.GT↗
arXiv2013

Equilibrium existence results for a class of discontinuous games

We introduce the notions of w-lower semicontinuous and almost w-lower semicontinuous correspondence with respect to a given set and prove a new fixed-point theorem. We also introduce the notion of correspondence with e-LSCS-property. As applications we obtain some new equilibrium theorems for abstract economies and for generalized multiobjective games.

math.OC↗
arXiv2013

Fixed Point Theorems and applications in Theory of Games

We introduce the notions of weakly *-concave and weakly naturally quasi-concave correspondence and prove fixed point theorems and continuous selection theorems for these kind of correspondences. As applications in the game theory, by using a tehnique based on a continuous selection, we establish new existence results for the equilibrium of the abstract economies. The constraint correspondences are weakly naturally quasi-concave. We show that the equilibrium exists without continuity assumptions.

math.OC↗
arXiv2013

On the maximal reduction of games

We study the conditions under which the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is order independent and we identify a class of discontinuous games for which order does not matter. In this way, we answer the open problem raised by M. Dufwenberg and M. Stegeman (2002) and generalize their main results. We also establish new theorems concerning the existence and uniqueness of the maximal game reduction when the pure strategies are dominated by mixed strategies.

math.OC↗