arXiv subjects

Moran Feldman

Publications and source records attributed to Moran Feldman.

58 records · Page 4Linked to original sources

arXiv2015

Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators

We consider the problem of designing mechanisms that interact with strategic agents through strategic intermediaries (or mediators), and investigate the cost to society due to the mediators' strategic behavior. Selfish agents with private information are each associated with exactly one strategic mediator, and can interact with the mechanism exclusively through that mediator. Each mediator aims to optimize the combined utility of his agents, while the mechanism aims to optimize the combined utility of all agents. We focus on the problem of facility location on a metric induced by a publicly known tree. With non-strategic mediators, there is a dominant strategy mechanism that is optimal. We show that when both agents and mediators act strategically, there is no dominant strategy mechanism that achieves any approximation. We, thus, slightly relax the incentive constraints, and define the notion of a two-sided incentive compatible mechanism. We show that the $3$-competitive deterministic mechanism suggested by Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) and Dekel et al. (2010) for lines extends naturally to trees, and is still $3$-competitive as well as two-sided incentive compatible. This is essentially the best possible. We then show that by allowing randomization one can construct a $2$-competitive randomized mechanism that is two-sided incentive compatible, and this is also essentially tight. This result also closes a gap left in the work of Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) and Lu et al. (2009) for the simpler problem of designing strategy-proof mechanisms for weighted agents with no mediators on a line, while extending to the more general model of trees. We also investigate a further generalization of the above setting where there are multiple levels of mediators.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Comparing Apples and Oranges: Query Tradeoff in Submodular Maximization

Fast algorithms for submodular maximization problems have a vast potential use in applicative settings, such as machine learning, social networks, and economics. Though fast algorithms were known for some special cases, only recently Badanidiyuru and Vondrák (2014) were the first to explicitly look for such algorithms in the general case of maximizing a monotone submodular function subject to a matroid independence constraint. The algorithm of Badanidiyuru and Vondrák matches the best possible approximation guarantee, while trying to reduce the number of value oracle queries the algorithm performs. Our main result is a new algorithm for this general case which establishes a surprising tradeoff between two seemingly unrelated quantities: the number of value oracle queries and the number of matroid independence queries performed by the algorithm. Specifically, one can decrease the former by increasing the latter and vice versa, while maintaining the best possible approximation guarantee. Such a tradeoff is very useful since various applications might incur significantly different costs in querying the value and matroid independence oracles. Furthermore, in case the rank of the matroid is $O(n^c)$, where $n$ is the size of the ground set and $c$ is an absolute constant smaller than $1$, the total number of oracle queries our algorithm uses can be made to have a smaller magnitude compared to that needed by Badanidiyuru and Vondrák. We also provide even faster algorithms for the well studied special cases of a cardinality constraint and a partition matroid independence constraint, both of which capture many real-world applications and have been widely studied both theorically and in practice.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2014

Constrained Monotone Function Maximization and the Supermodular Degree

The problem of maximizing a constrained monotone set function has many practical applications and generalizes many combinatorial problems. Unfortunately, it is generally not possible to maximize a monotone set function up to an acceptable approximation ratio, even subject to simple constraints. One highly studied approach to cope with this hardness is to restrict the set function. An outstanding disadvantage of imposing such a restriction on the set function is that no result is implied for set functions deviating from the restriction, even slightly. A more flexible approach, studied by Feige and Izsak, is to design an approximation algorithm whose approximation ratio depends on the complexity of the instance, as measured by some complexity measure. Specifically, they introduced a complexity measure called supermodular degree, measuring deviation from submodularity, and designed an algorithm for the welfare maximization problem with an approximation ratio that depends on this measure. In this work, we give the first (to the best of our knowledge) algorithm for maximizing an arbitrary monotone set function, subject to a k-extendible system. This class of constraints captures, for example, the intersection of k-matroids (note that a single matroid constraint is sufficient to capture the welfare maximization problem). Our approximation ratio deteriorates gracefully with the complexity of the set function and k. Our work can be seen as generalizing both the classic result of Fisher, Nemhauser and Wolsey, for maximizing a submodular set function subject to a k-extendible system, and the result of Feige and Izsak for the welfare maximization problem. Moreover, when our algorithm is applied to each one of these simpler cases, it obtains the same approximation ratio as of the respective original work.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2014

A Simple $O(\log\log(\mathrm{rank}))$-Competitive Algorithm for the Matroid Secretary Problem

Only recently progress has been made in obtaining $o(\log(\mathrm{rank}))$-competitive algorithms for the matroid secretary problem. More precisely, Chakraborty and Lachish (2012) presented a $O(\sqrt{\log(\mathrm{rank})})$-competitive procedure, and Lachish (2014) later presented a $O(\log\log(\mathrm{rank}))$-competitive algorithm. Both these algorithms and their analyses are very involved, which is also reflected in the extremely high constants in their competitive ratios. Using different tools, we present a considerably simpler $O(\log\log(\mathrm{rank}))$-competitive algorithm for the matroid secretary problem. Our algorithm can be interpreted as a distribution over a simple type of matroid secretary algorithms which are easy to analyze. Due to the simplicity of our procedure, we are also able to vastly improve on the hidden constant in the competitive ratio.

cs.DS↗