Moritz Graf | Searcharxiv

arXiv2026

Solving Qualitative Multi-Objective Stochastic Games

Many problems in compositional synthesis and verification of multi-agent systems -- such as rational verification and assume-guarantee verification in probabilistic systems -- reduce to reasoning about two-player multi-objective stochastic games. This motivates us to study the problem of characterizing the complexity and memory requirements for two-player stochastic games with Boolean combinations of qualitative reachability and safety objectives. Reachability objectives require that a given set of states is reached; safety requires that a given set is invariant. A qualitative winning condition asks that an objective is satisfied almost surely (AS) or (in negated form) with non-zero (NZ) probability. We study the determinacy and complexity landscape of the problem. We show that games with conjunctions of AS and NZ reachability and safety objectives are determined, and determining the winner is PSPACE-complete. The same holds for positive boolean combinations of AS reachability and safety, as well as for negations thereof. On the other hand, games with full Boolean combinations of qualitative objectives are not determined, and are NEXPTIME-hard. Our hardness results show a connection between stochastic games and logics with partially-ordered quantification. Our results shed light on the relationship between determinacy and complexity, and extend the complexity landscape for stochastic games in the multi-objective setting.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Symbolic Computation of Sequential Equilibria

The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a sequential equilibrium if it satisfies the properties of sequential rationality and consistency. Our main result is that both properties together can be written as a single finite system of polynomial equations and inequalities. The solutions to this system are exactly the sequential equilibria of the game. We construct this system explicitly and describe an implementation that solves it using cylindrical algebraic decomposition. To write consistency as a finite system of equations, we need to compute the extreme directions of a set of polyhedral cones. We propose a modified version of the double description method, optimized for this specific purpose. To the best of our knowledge, our implementation is the first to symbolically solve general finite imperfect information games for sequential equilibria.

cs.GT↗