SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Mose Mizrahi

Publications and source records attributed to Mose Mizrahi.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Multivalued Consensus: General Adversaries Require More Communication

We study $n$-party fault-tolerant consensus against general (non-threshold) adversaries. We describe an infinite family $Z_\mathsf{proj}^{n,d}$ of $Q^d$-satisfying $n$-party adversary structures based on finite projective geometry which cause error-free $R$-round protocols for interactive consistency on $L$-bit inputs to require $Ω(Ln^{2+1/d})$ bits of expected communication. Likewise, $Z_\mathsf{proj}^{n,d}$ causes error-free byzantine agreement and broadcast to cost $Ω(Ln^{1+1/d})$ bits. In every case, the lower bound is $Ω(L_{\mathsf{out}} \cdot n^{1+1/d})$ bits, where $L_{\mathsf{out}}$ is the output length. The family $Z_\mathsf{proj}^{n,d}$ also causes reliable broadcast and byzantine agreement to cost $Ω(Ln^{1+1/d})$ bits of expected communication in asynchronous networks. Moreover, there exists a related family $Z_\mathsf{2\textsf-proj}^{n,d}$ of $Q^d$-satisfying adversary structures that make core set agreement cost $Ω(Ln^{2+1/d})$ bits. These asynchronous lower bounds hold against send-omission adversaries, even if the protocol uses cryptography. Their basis is that if a quorum of non-faulty parties agree on an output and terminate, then the messages they sent before terminating must suffice for the parties outside the quorum to also terminate with the same output. Surprisingly, if we do not require the parties to terminate (stop sending messages) after they output, then these bounds no longer hold. We show this by designing a non-terminating omission-tolerant reliable broadcast protocol that can for any parameter $δ> 1$ be tuned to cost $(1 + \frac{1}{δ- 1})Ln + O(δn^2\log(δn))$ bits, which is of independent interest. Lastly, we show how to get termination with $O(Ln^{1+1/d} + n^2\log n)$ bits (assuming the $Q^d$ condition), and thus prove our asynchronous lower bounds tight.

cs.DC

Subcubic Coin Tossing in Asynchrony without PKI

We consider an asynchronous network of $n$ parties connected to each other via secure channels, up to $t$ of which are byzantine. We study common coin tossing, a task where the parties try to agree on an unpredictable random value, with some chance of failure due to the byzantine parties' influence. Coin tossing is a well-known and often-studied task due to its use in byzantine agreement. In this work, we present a committee-based method to transform strong (rarely failing) binary common coins into weaker ones that asymptotically require less communication. For any $k > 2$ and $\varepsilon > 0$, we can transform a strong binary coin that costs $\widetilde{O}(n^k)$ bits of communication into a weak binary coin that costs $\widetilde{O}(\varepsilon^{-2k}n^{3 - 2/k})$ bits. This latter coin tolerates $\varepsilon n$ fewer byzantine parties than the strong coin it is based on, and it fails with an arbitrarily small constant probability. With our method, we obtain a secure-channel-based perfectly secure coin for $t \leq (\frac{1}{4} - \varepsilon)n$ faults that costs $\widetilde{O}(n^{2.5})$ bits, as well as a coin based on cryptographic hashing for $t \leq (\frac{1}{3} - \varepsilon)n$ faults that costs $\widetilde{O}(n^{7/3}κ)$ bits. These are to our knowledge the first PKI-free asynchronous common coins that cost $o(n^3)$ bits of communication but still succeed with at least constant probability against $t = Θ(n)$ adaptive byzantine faults.

cs.DC

Firefighting on the Hexagonal Grid and on Infinite Trees

The firefighter problem with $k$ firefighters on an infinite graph $G$ is an iterative graph process, defined as follows: Suppose a fire breaks out at a given vertex $v\in V(G)$ on Turn 1. On each subsequent even turn, $k$ firefighters protect $k$ vertices that are not on fire, and on each subsequent odd turn, any vertex that is on fire spreads the fire to all adjacent unprotected vertices. The firefighters' goal is to eventually stop the spread of the fire. If there exists a strategy for $k$ firefighters to eventually stop the spread of the fire, then we say $G$ is $k$-containable. We consider the firefighter problem on the hexagonal grid, which is the graph whose vertices and edges are exactly the vertices and edges of a regular hexagonal tiling of the plane. It is not known if the hexagonal grid is $1$-containable. In arXiv:1305.7076 [math.CO], it was shown that if the firefighters have one firefighter per turn and one extra firefighter on two turns, the firefighters can contain the fire. We improve on this result by showing that even with only one extra firefighter on one turn, the firefighters can still contain the fire. In addition, we explore $k$-containability for birth sequence trees, which are infinite rooted trees that have the property that every vertex at the same level has the same degree. A birth sequence forest is an infinite forest, each component of which is a birth sequence tree. For birth sequence trees and forests, the fire always starts at the root of each tree. We provide a pseudopolynomial time algorithm to decide if all the vertices at a fixed level can be protected or not.

math.CO