Mrudula Balachander | Searcharxiv

arXiv2023

LTL Reactive Synthesis with a Few Hints

We study a variant of the problem of synthesizing Mealy machines that enforce LTL specifications against all possible behaviours of the environment including hostile ones. In the variant studied here, the user provides the high level LTL specification ϕ of the system to design, and a set E of examples of executions that the solution must produce. Our synthesis algorithm works in two phases. First, it generalizes the decisions taken along the examples E using tailored extensions of automata learning algorithms. This phase generalizes the user-provided examples in E while preserving realizability of ϕ. Second, the algorithm turns the (usually) incomplete Mealy machine obtained by the learning phase into a complete Mealy machine that realizes ϕ. The examples are used to guide the synthesis procedure. We provide a completeness result that shows that our procedure can learn any Mealy machine M that realizes ϕ with a small (polynomial) set of examples. We also show that our problem, that generalizes the classical LTL synthesis problem (i.e. when E = {\emptyset}), matches its worst-case complexity. The additional cost of learning from E is even polynomial in the size of E and in the size of a symbolic representation of solutions that realize ϕ. This symbolic representation is computed by the synthesis algorithm implemented in Acacia-Bonzai when solving the plain LTL synthesis problem. We illustrate the practical interest of our approach on a set of examples.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Fragility and Robustness in Mean-Payoff Adversarial Stackelberg Games

Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weighted graph by Leader (Player 0) and Follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, Leader announces her strategy, second, Follower chooses his best-response. If we cannot impose which best-response is chosen by Follower, we say that Follower, though strategic, is adversarial towards Leader. The maximal value that Leader can get in this nonzero-sum game is called the adversarial Stackelberg value (ASV) of the game. We study the robustness of strategies for Leader in these games against two types of deviations: (i) Modeling imprecision - the weights on the edges of the game arena may not be exactly correct, they may be delta-away from the right one. (ii) Sub-optimal response - Follower may play epsilon-optimal best-responses instead of perfect best-responses. First, we show that if the game is zero-sum then robustness is guaranteed while in the nonzero-sum case, optimal strategies for ASV are fragile. Second, we provide a solution concept to obtain strategies for Leader that are robust to both modeling imprecision, and as well as to the epsilon-optimal responses of Follower, and study several properties and algorithmic problems related to this solution concept.

math.OC↗