arXiv subjects

N. Nisan

Publications and source records attributed to N. Nisan.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2011

Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only by a linear factor.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2011

Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms

A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are, therefore, computationally infeasible. However, if the optimal outcome is replaced by the results of a sub-optimal algorithm, the resulting mechanism (termed VCG-based) is no longer necessarily truthful. The first part of this paper studies this phenomenon in depth and shows that it is near universal. Specifically, we prove that essentially all reasonable approximations or heuristics for combinatorial auctions as well as a wide class of cost minimization problems yield non-truthful VCG-based mechanisms. We generalize these results for affine maximizers. The second part of this paper proposes a general method for circumventing the above problem. We introduce a modification of VCG-based mechanisms in which the agents are given a chance to improve the output of the underlying algorithm. When the agents behave truthfully, the welfare obtained by the mechanism is at least as good as the one obtained by the algorithms output. We provide a strong rationale for truth-telling behavior. Our method satisfies individual rationality as well.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2011

Concurrent Auctions Across The Supply Chain

With the recent technological feasibility of electronic commerce over the Internet, much attention has been given to the design of electronic markets for various types of electronically-tradable goods. Such markets, however, will normally need to function in some relationship with markets for other related goods, usually those downstream or upstream in the supply chain. Thus, for example, an electronic market for rubber tires for trucks will likely need to be strongly influenced by the rubber market as well as by the truck market. In this paper we design protocols for exchange of information between a sequence of markets along a single supply chain. These protocols allow each of these markets to function separately, while the information exchanged ensures efficient global behavior across the supply chain. Each market that forms a link in the supply chain operates as a double auction, where the bids on one side of the double auction come from bidders in the corresponding segment of the industry, and the bids on the other side are synthetically generated by the protocol to express the combined information from all other links in the chain. The double auctions in each of the markets can be of several types, and we study several variants of incentive compatible double auctions, comparing them in terms of their efficiency and of the market revenue.

cs.GT↗

arXiv1996

Limitations of Noisy Reversible Computation

Noisy computation and reversible computation have been studied separately, and it is known that they are as powerful as unrestricted computation. We study the case where both noise and reversibility are combined and show that the combined model is weaker than unrestricted computation. In our noisy reversible circuits, each wire is flipped with probability p each time step, and all the inputs to the circuit are present in time 0. We prove that any noisy reversible circuit must have size exponential in its depth in order to compute a function with high probability. This is tight as we show that any circuit can be converted into a noise-resistant reversible one with a blow up in size which is exponential in the depth. This establishes that noisy reversible computation has the power of the complexity class NC^1. We extend this to quantum circuits(QC). We prove that any noisy QC which is not worthless, and for which all inputs are present at time 0, must have size exponential in its depth. (This high-lights the fact that fault tolerant QC must use a constant supply of inputs all the time.) For the lower bound, we show that quasi-polynomial noisy QC are at least powerful as logarithmic depth QC, (or QNC^1). Making these bounds tight is left open in the quantum case.

quant-ph↗