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Naci Saldi

Publications and source records attributed to Naci Saldi.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Monotone Inclusion Approach to Weakly Monotone Discrete-Time Finite-Horizon Mean-Field Games

We revisit the problem of computing mean-field equilibria (MFEs) in discrete-time, monotone, finite-horizon mean-field games (MFGs). We show that, when the transition kernel is independent of the state-measure term and the reward function satisfies the usual weak monotonicity condition and is Lipschitz continuous, anchored proximal gradient descent methods can be used to compute a monotone MFE. We also establish last-iterate convergence results for these methods. Our approach relies on formulating the computation problem as an optimization problem over the space of occupation measures. Using this formulation, we show that the problem is equivalent to a class of constrained Lipschitz monotone inclusion problems. We then apply iterative methods for this monotone inclusion formulation to derive a tractable algorithm. The resulting algorithm achieves a convergence rate of \(O(1/\sqrt{T})\) after \(T\) iterations, without requiring any regularization. This rate holds even in the absence of a uniqueness assumption for the corresponding MFE.

math.OC

Generalization Bounds on Optimal Control for Transformer Training and Wasserstein Distributional Robustness

We derive finite-sample generalization bounds for Transformers trained with dynamic programming recursions. Building on the doubly lifted, measure-valued formulation of Transformer dynamics, we view data sets as probability laws on pairs of empirical input-output measures, allowing us to interpret the training problem as a finite-horizon Markovian control problem. We then analyze a quantized model, derived by quantizing the state, action, and measure-state spaces, and derive explicit finite-sample generalization bounds using concentration inequalities for empirical laws on finite metric spaces together with a Lipschitz stability estimate for the value function. These bounds are transferred to the base model at the cost of an explicit approximation error. Finally, we show that the same machinery yields a distributionally robust control formulation of the training problem, connecting Transformer generalization to Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization.

cs.LG

Mean-Field Systems with Heterogeneous Subteams: Optimality of Cluster-Symmetric Independent Policies and Equivalence with Decentralized McKean-Vlasov Control of Cluster-Representative Agents

Across science and engineering, mean-field methods have been a powerful and versatile approach for the analysis of systems of many interacting elements. However, common arguments used to characterize an infinite population limit can be quite restrictive from a modeling perspective by requiring that all agents be identical (i.e. symmetric, or homogeneous). In this paper, we consider large interactive particle systems under agent heterogeneity for a class of discrete time teams composed of finitely many species of agents, grouped into symmetric subteams, called clusters. In particular, for the class of discounted, partially exchangeable cost criteria considered, we establish the optimality of centralized joint policies which are exchangeable within each cluster and depend on the agent ensemble only up to the state empirical distribution over each cluster. Following this, a generalization of De Finetti's theorem is used to demonstrate the subsequential convergence of these optimal policies to one which is decentralized (depending on only the local state and distribution over each cluster) and symmetric within each subteam as the population size approaches infinity. This solution is shown to induce a sequence of asymptotically optimal policies for the finite population problems which retain their structure and decentralization. Furthermore, our analysis justifies the optimality of a decentralized McKean-Vlasov team representation involving coupled representative agents for each of the clusters, and establishes a verification theorem/value iterations for the mean-field limit. In this way, we provide an avenue for analyzing complex, cooperative systems with finite heterogeneity and set the stage for further research on learning algorithms.

math.OC

Decentralized Detection with Many Sensors: Optimality of Exchangeable and Identical Encoding Policies

We study a class of binary detection problems involving a single fusion center and a large or countably infinite number of sensors. Each sensor acts under a decentralized information structure, accessing only a local noisy observation related to the hypothesis. Based on this observation, sensors select policies to transmit a quantized signal through their actions to the fusion center, which makes the final decision using only these actions. This paper makes the following contributions: i) In the finitely many sensor setting, we provide a formal proof that an optimal encoding policy exists, and such an optimal policy is independent, deterministic, and of threshold type for the sensors and the maximum \emph{a posteriori} probability type for the fusion center; ii) For the finitely many sensor setting, we further show that an optimal encoding policy exhibits an exchangeability (permutation invariance) property; iii) We establish that an optimal encoding policy exists that is symmetric (identical) and independent across sensors in the infinitely many sensor setting under the error exponent cost; iv) Finally, we show that a symmetric optimal policy for the infinite population regime with the error exponent cost is approximately optimal for the large but finite sensor regime under the same cost criterion. We anticipate that the mathematical program used in the paper will find applications in several other massive communications applications.

math.OC

Approximation of Discrete-Time Infinite-Horizon Mean-Field Equilibria via Finite-Horizon Mean-Field Equilibria

We address in this paper a fundamental question that arises in mean-field games (MFGs), namely whether mean-field equilibria (MFE) for discrete-time finite-horizon MFGs can be used to obtain approximate stationary as well as non-stationary MFE for similarly structured infinite-horizon MFGs. We provide a rigorous analysis of this relationship, and show that any accumulation point of MFE of a discounted finite-horizon MFG constitutes, under weak convergence as the time horizon goes to infinity, a non-stationary MFE for the corresponding infinite-horizon MFG. Further, under certain conditions, these non-stationary MFE converge to a stationary MFE, establishing the appealing result that finite-horizon MFE can serve as approximations for stationary MFE. Additionally, we establish improved contraction rates for iterative methods used to compute regularized MFE in finite-horizon settings, extending existing results in the literature. As a byproduct, we obtain that when two MFGs have finite-horizon MFE that are close to each other, the corresponding stationary MFE are also close. As one application of the theoretical results, we show that finite-horizon MFGs can facilitate learning-based approaches to approximate infinite-horizon MFE when system components are unknown. Under further assumptions on the Lipschitz coefficients of the regularized system components (which are stronger than contractivity of finite-horizon MFGs), we obtain exponentially decaying finite-time error bounds -- in the time horizon -- between finite-horizon non-stationary, infinite-horizon non-stationary, and stationary MFE. As a byproduct of our error bounds, we present a new uniqueness criterion for infinite-horizon nonstationary MFE beyond the available contraction results in the literature.

math.OC

Kernel Based Maximum Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning for Mean-Field Games

We consider the maximum causal entropy inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) problem for infinite-horizon stationary mean-field games (MFG), in which we model the unknown reward function within a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS). This allows the inference of rich and potentially nonlinear reward structures directly from expert demonstrations, in contrast to most existing approaches for MFGs that typically restrict the reward to a linear combination of a fixed finite set of basis functions and rely on finite-horizon formulations. We introduce a Lagrangian relaxation that enables us to reformulate the problem as an unconstrained log-likelihood maximization and obtain a solution via a gradient ascent algorithm. To establish the theoretical consistency of the algorithm, we prove the smoothness of the log-likelihood objective through the Fr\'echet differentiability of the related soft Bellman operators with respect to the parameters in the RKHS. To illustrate the practical advantages of the RKHS formulation, we validate our framework on a mean-field traffic routing game exhibiting state-dependent preference reversal, where the kernel-based method reduces policy recovery error by over an order of magnitude compared to a linear reward baseline with a comparable parameter count. Furthermore, we extend the framework to the finite-horizon non-stationary setting. We demonstrate that the log-likelihood reformulation is structurally unavailable in this regime and instead develop an alternative gradient descent algorithm on the convex dual via Danskin's theorem, establishing smoothness and convergence guarantees.

cs.LG

Kernel Mean Embedding Topology: Weak and Strong Forms for Stochastic Kernels and Implications for Model Learning

We introduce a novel topology, called Kernel Mean Embedding Topology, for stochastic kernels, in a weak and strong form. This topology, defined on the spaces of Bochner integrable functions from a signal space to a space of probability measures endowed with a Hilbert space structure, allows for a versatile formulation. This construction allows one to obtain both a strong and weak formulation. (i) For its weak formulation, we highlight the utility on relaxed policy spaces, and investigate connections with the Young narrow topology and Borkar (or \( w^* \))-topology, and establish equivalence properties. We report that, while both the \( w^* \)-topology and kernel mean embedding topology are relatively compact, they are not closed. Conversely, while the Young narrow topology is closed, it lacks relative compactness. (ii) We show that the strong form provides an appropriate formulation for placing topologies on spaces of models characterized by stochastic kernels with explicit robustness and learning theoretic implications on optimal stochastic control under discounted or average cost criteria. (iii) We thus show that this topology possesses several properties making it ideal to study optimality and approximations (under the weak formulation) and robustness (under the strong formulation) for many applications.

eess.SY

Existence of $\epsilon$-Nash Equilibria in Nonzero-Sum and Zero-Sum Markov Games with Standard Borel Spaces via Finite Model Approximations

Establishing the existence of exact or near Markov or stationary perfect Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum Markov games over Borel spaces is a challenging problem with limited positive results. Motivated by problems in multi-agent and Bayesian learning, this paper demonstrates the existence of approximate Markov and stationary Nash equilibria for such games under mild regularity conditions. Our approach is constructive: For both compact and non-compact state spaces, we approximate the Borel model with finite state-action models and show that their equilibria correspond to \(\epsilon\)-equilibria for the original game. Compared with previous results in the literature, which we comprehensively review, we provide more general and complementary conditions, along with explicit approximation models whose equilibria are $\epsilon$-equilibria for the original model. For completeness, we also study the approximation of zero-sum Markov games and Markov teams to highlight the key differences between zero-sum and nonzero-sum settings. In particular, while for zero-sum and team games, joint weak (Feller) continuity of the transition kernel is sufficient (as the value function is continuous), this is not the case for general nonzero-sum games.

eess.SY

Best Ergodic Averages via Optimal Graph Filters in Reversible Markov Chains

In this paper, we address the problem of finding the best ergodic or Birkhoff averages in the mean ergodic theorem to ensure rapid convergence to a desired value, using graph filters. Our approach begins by representing a function on the state space as a graph signal, where the (directed) graph is formed by the transition probabilities of a reversible Markov chain. We introduce a concept of graph variation, enabling the definition of the graph Fourier transform for graph signals on this directed graph. Viewing the iteration in the mean ergodic theorem as a graph filter, we recognize its non-optimality and propose three optimization problems aimed at determining optimal graph filters. These optimization problems yield the Bernstein, Chebyshev, and Legendre filters. Numerical testing reveals that while the Bernstein filter performs slightly better than the traditional ergodic average, the Chebyshev and Legendre filters significantly outperform the ergodic average, demonstrating rapid convergence to the desired value.

eess.SY

Decentralized Exchangeable Stochastic Dynamic Teams in Continuous-time, their Mean-Field Limits and Optimality of Symmetric Policies

We study a class of stochastic exchangeable teams comprising a finite number of decision makers (DMs) as well as their mean-field limits involving infinite numbers of DMs. In the finite population regime, we study exchangeable teams under the centralized information structure. For the infinite population setting, we study exchangeable teams under the decentralized mean-field information sharing. The paper makes the following main contributions: i) For finite population exchangeable teams, we establish the existence of a randomized optimal policy that is exchangeable (permutation invariant) and Markovian; ii) As our main result in the paper, we show that a sequence of exchangeable optimal policies for finite population settings converges to a conditionally symmetric (identical), independent, and decentralized randomized policy for the infinite population problem, which is globally optimal for the infinite population problem. This result establishes the existence of a symmetric, independent, decentralized optimal randomized policy for the infinite population problem. Additionally, this proves the optimality of the limiting measure-valued MDP for the representative DM; iii) Finally, we show that symmetric, independent, decentralized optimal randomized policies are approximately optimal for the corresponding finite-population team with a large number of DMs under the centralized information structure. Our paper thus establishes the relation between the controlled McKean-Vlasov dynamics and the optimal infinite population decentralized stochastic control problem (without an apriori restriction of symmetry in policies of individual agents), for the first time, to our knowledge.

math.OC

Optimality of Symmetric Independent Policies under Decentralized Mean-Field Information Sharing for Stochastic Teams and Equivalence with McKean-Vlasov Control of a Representative Agent

We study a class of stochastic exchangeable teams with a finite number of decision makers (DMs) as well as their mean-field limits with infinitely many DMs. In the finite population regime, we study exchangeable teams under the centralized information structure. The paper makes the following main contributions: i) For finite population exchangeable teams, we establish the existence of an optimal policy that is exchangeable (permutation invariant) and Markovian; ii) As our main result in the paper, we show that a sequence of exchangeable optimal policies for finite population settings (which satisfies a measure valued MDP formulation due to B{\"a}uerle) converges to a decentralized symmetric (identical) and conditionally independent (given the mean-field) policy for the infinite population problem, which is then globally optimal under both the centralized information structure as well as the mean-field sharing information structure. (iii) This result establishes existence of a symmetric, independent, decentralized optimal randomized policy for the infinite population problem and proves the optimality of the limiting measure-valued MDP for the representative DM. Our paper thus establishes the relation between the controlled McKean-Vlasov dynamics and the optimal infinite population decentralized stochastic control problem (without an apriori restriction of symmetry in policies of individual agents), for the first time, to our knowledge (beyond several special cases). We also establish near optimality of a numerical method for solving this problem. iv) Finally, we show that symmetric, independent, decentralized optimal randomized policies are approximately optimal for the corresponding finite-population team with a large number of DMs under the centralized information structure.

math.OC

Quantum Markov Decision Processes: General Theory, Approximations, and Classes of Policies

In this paper, the aim is to develop a quantum counterpart to classical Markov decision processes (MDPs). Firstly, we provide a very general formulation of quantum MDPs with state and action spaces in the quantum domain, quantum transitions, and cost functions. Once we formulate the quantum MDP (q-MDP), our focus shifts to establishing the verification theorem that proves the sufficiency of Markovian quantum control policies and provides a dynamic programming principle. Subsequently, a comparison is drawn between our q-MDP model and previously established quantum MDP models (referred to as QOMDPs) found in the literature. Furthermore, approximations of q-MDPs are obtained via finite-action models, which can be formulated as QOMDPs. Finally, classes of open-loop and classical-state-preserving closed-loop policies for q-MDPs are introduced, along with structural results for these policies. In summary, we present a novel quantum MDP model aiming to introduce a new framework, algorithms, and future research avenues. We hope that our approach will pave the way for a new research direction in discrete-time quantum control.

quant-ph

Quantum Markov Decision Processes: Dynamic and Semi-Definite Programs for Optimal Solutions

In this paper, building on the formulation of quantum Markov decision processes (q-MDPs) presented in our previous work [{\sc N.~Saldi, S.~Sanjari, and S.~Y\"{u}ksel}, {\em Quantum Markov Decision Processes: General Theory, Approximations, and Classes of Policies}, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 2024], our focus shifts to the development of semi-definite programming approaches for optimal policies and value functions of both open-loop and classical-state-preserving closed-loop policies. First, by using the duality between the dynamic programming and the semi-definite programming formulations of any q-MDP with open-loop policies, we establish that the optimal value function is linear and there exists a stationary optimal policy among open-loop policies. Then, using these results, we establish a method for computing an approximately optimal value function and formulate computation of optimal stationary open-loop policy as a bi-linear program. Next, we turn our attention to classical-state-preserving closed-loop policies. Dynamic programming and semi-definite programming formulations for classical-state-preserving closed-loop policies are established, where duality of these two formulations similarly enables us to prove that the optimal policy is linear and there exists an optimal stationary classical-state-preserving closed-loop policy. Then, similar to the open-loop case, we establish a method for computing the optimal value function and pose computation of optimal stationary classical-state-preserving closed-loop policies as a bi-linear program.

quant-ph

Maximum Causal Entropy IRL in Mean-Field Games and GNEP Framework for Forward RL

This paper explores the use of Maximum Causal Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) within the context of discrete-time stationary Mean-Field Games (MFGs) characterized by finite state spaces and an infinite-horizon, discounted-reward setting. Although the resulting optimization problem is non-convex with respect to policies, we reformulate it as a convex optimization problem in terms of state-action occupation measures by leveraging the linear programming framework of Markov Decision Processes. Based on this convex reformulation, we introduce a gradient descent algorithm with a guaranteed convergence rate to efficiently compute the optimal solution. Moreover, we develop a new method that conceptualizes the MFG problem as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP), enabling effective computation of the mean-field equilibrium for forward reinforcement learning (RL) problems and marking an advancement in MFG solution techniques. We further illustrate the practical applicability of our GNEP approach by employing this algorithm to generate data for numerical MFG examples.

eess.SY

Robustness and Approximation of Discrete-time Mean-field Games under Discounted Cost Criterion

In this paper, we investigate the robustness of stationary mean-field equilibria in the presence of model uncertainties, specifically focusing on infinite-horizon discounted cost functions. To achieve this, we initially establish convergence conditions for value iteration-based algorithms in mean-field games. Subsequently, utilizing these results, we demonstrate that the mean-field equilibrium obtained through this value iteration algorithm remains robust even in the face of system dynamics misspecifications. We then apply these robustness findings to the finite model approximation problem in mean-field games, showing that if the state space quantization is fine enough, the mean-field equilibrium for the finite model closely approximates the nominal one.

eess.SY

Common Information Approach for Static Team Problems with Polish Spaces and Existence of Optimal Policies

In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of team-optimal strategies for static teams under observation-sharing information structures. Assuming that agents can access shared observations, we begin by converting the team problem into an equivalent centralized stochastic control problem through the introduction of a topology on policies. We subsequently apply conventional methods from stochastic control to prove the existence of team-optimal strategies. This study expands upon the widely recognized common information approach for team problems, originally designed for discrete scenarios, and adapts it to a more abstract continuous framework. The primary difficulty in this context is to establish the appropriate topology on policies.

eess.SY

Linear Mean-Field Games with Discounted Cost

In this paper, we introduce discrete-time linear mean-field games subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of a generic agent is a compact Borel space. At every time, each agent is randomly coupled with another agent via their dynamics and one-stage cost function, where this randomization is generated via the empirical distribution of their states (i.e., the mean-field term). Therefore, the transition probability and the one-stage cost function of each agent depend linearly on the mean-field term, which is the key distinction between classical mean-field games and linear mean-field games. Under mild assumptions, we show that the policy obtained from infinite population equilibrium is $\varepsilon(N)$-Nash when the number of agents $N$ is sufficiently large, where $\varepsilon(N)$ is an explicit function of $N$. Then, using the linear programming formulation of MDPs and the linearity of the transition probability in mean-field term, we formulate the game in the infinite population limit as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) and establish an algorithm for computing equilibrium with a convergence guarantee.

eess.SY

Nash Equilibria for Exchangeable Team against Team Games, their Mean Field Limit, and Role of Common Randomness

We study stochastic mean-field games among finite number of teams with large finite as well as infinite number of decision makers. For this class of games within static and dynamic settings, we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium, and show that a Nash equilibrium exhibits exchangeability in the finite decision maker regime and symmetry in the infinite one. To arrive at these existence and structural theorems, we endow the set of randomized policies with a suitable topology under various decentralized information structures, which leads to the desired convexity and compactness of the set of randomized policies. Then, we establish the existence of a randomized Nash equilibrium that is exchangeable (not necessarily symmetric) among decision makers within each team for a general class of exchangeable stochastic games. As the number of decision makers within each team goes to infinity (that is for the mean-field game among teams), using a de Finetti representation theorem, we show existence of a randomized Nash equilibrium that is symmetric (i.e., identical) among decision makers within each team and also independently randomized. Finally, we establish that a Nash equilibrium for a class of mean-field games among teams (which is symmetric) constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding pre-limit (exchangeable) game among teams with large but finite number of decision makers. We thus show that common randomness is not necessary for large team-against-team games, unlike the case with small sized teams.

math.OC