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Nail Kashaev

Publications and source records attributed to Nail Kashaev.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

GARP-EFM: Improving Foundation Models with Revealed Preference Structure

Modern pretrained time-series foundation models can forecast without task-specific training, but they do not fully incorporate economic behavior. We show that teaching them basic economic logic improves how they predict demand using an experimental panel. We fine-tune Amazon Chronos-2, a transformer-based probabilistic time-series model, on synthetic data generated from utility-maximizing agents. We exploit Afriat's theorem, which guarantees that demand satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if and only if it can be generated by maximizing some utility function subject to a budget constraint. GARP is a simple condition to check that allows us to generate time series from a large class of utilities efficiently. The fine-tuned model serves as a rationality-constrained forecasting prior: it learns price-quantity relations from GARP-consistent synthetic histories and then uses those relations to predict the choices of real consumers. We find that fine-tuning on GARP-consistent synthetic data substantially improves prediction relative to zero-shot Chronos-2 at all forecast horizons we study. Our results show that economic theory can be used to generate structured synthetic data that improves foundation-model predictions when the theory implies observable patterns in the data.

econ.EM

Discrete Choice with Endogenous Peer Selection

We develop a continuous time discrete choice model of peer effects. The distinctive feature of the model is that agents might not consider all peers at the moment of making a decision. Instead, they select some of them on the basis of a mechanism that depends on recent choices. We characterize the equilibrium behavior and study the empirical content of the limited attention peer effect model. We allow changes in the choices of peers to affect both the set of peers to which the agent pays attention and her preferences over the alternatives. We exploit variation in choices together with variation in the size of the set of potential peers (or reference groups) to recover the preferences of the agents and the peer selection mechanisms. We apply our results to model expansion and contraction decisions by fast-food restaurants and find evidence of limited attention to actions of competitors.

econ.EM

Entangled vs. Separable Choice

A judge observes the joint probabilistic choice rule of two decision makers: the frequency of action pairs across pairs of local covariates. The rule is separable if behavior can be generated as if the decision makers were in separate rooms, unable to communicate at the time of choice. Separability allows arbitrary correlation in tastes, beliefs, information, and randomization devices; it rules out only covariate-dependent coordination. It is therefore the revealed-preference null of social independence, not statistical independence. We construct an exact judge for separability: a complete nonparametric characterization requiring no rationality, utility maximization, equilibrium, or parametric structure. In the binary-covariate, binary-action case, separability is equivalent to no-signaling plus Bell-type CHSH inequalities. In general finite domains, it is equivalent to a no-signaling extension to finitely many virtual replicas of one decision maker, yielding a finite system of linear restrictions. The judge matters because entangled choice rules can pass no-signaling tests while violating separability. We illustrate this in match rigging, plea bargaining, classroom cheating, and an LLM-based agentic system.

econ.GN

Peer Effects in Consideration and Preferences

We develop a general model of discrete choice that incorporates peer effects in preferences and consideration sets. We characterize the equilibrium behavior and establish conditions under which all parts of the model can be recovered from a sequence of choices. We allow peers to affect preferences, consideration, or both. We show that these peer-effect mechanisms have different behavioral implications in the data. This allows us to recover the set and the type of connections between the agents in the network. We then use this information to recover each agent's preferences and consideration mechanisms. These nonparametric identification results allow for general forms of heterogeneity across agents and do not rely on the variation of either exogenous covariates or the set of available options (menus). We apply our results to model expansion decisions by tea chains and find evidence of limited consideration. We simulate counterfactual predictions and show how limited consideration slows market penetration and competition.

econ.GN

Dynamic and Stochastic Rational Behavior

The (static) utility maximization model of Afriat (1967), which is the standard in analysing choice behavior, is under scrutiny. We propose the Dynamic Random Utility Model (DRUM) that is more flexible than the framework of Afriat (1967) and more informative than the static Random Utility Model (RUM) framework of McFadden and Richter (1990). Under DRUM, each decision-maker randomly draws a utility function in each period and maximizes it subject to a menu. DRUM allows for unrestricted time correlation and cross-section heterogeneity in preferences. We characterize DRUM for situations when panel data on choices and menus are available. DRUM is linked to a finite mixture of deterministic behaviors that can be represented as a product of static rationalizable behaviors. This link allows us to convert the characterizations of the static RUM to its dynamic form. In an application, we find that although the static utility maximization model fails to explain population behavior, DRUM can explain it.

econ.TH

Random Utility and Limited Consideration

The random utility model (RUM, McFadden and Richter, 1990) has been the standard tool to describe the behavior of a population of decision makers. RUM assumes that decision makers behave as if they maximize a rational preference over a choice set. This assumption may fail when consideration of all alternatives is costly. We provide a theoretical and statistical framework that unifies well-known models of random (limited) consideration and generalizes them to allow for preference heterogeneity. We apply this methodology in a novel stochastic choice dataset that we collected in a large-scale online experiment. Our dataset is unique since it exhibits both choice set and (attention) frame variation. We run a statistical survival race between competing models of random consideration and RUM. We find that RUM cannot explain the population behavior. In contrast, we cannot reject the hypothesis that decision makers behave according to the logit attention model (Brade and Rehbeck, 2016).

econ.GN

Prices, Profits, Proxies, and Production

This paper studies nonparametric identification and counterfactual bounds for heterogeneous firms that can be ranked in terms of productivity. Our approach works when quantities and prices are latent, rendering standard approaches inapplicable. Instead, we require observation of profits or other optimizing-values such as costs or revenues, and either prices or price proxies of flexibly chosen variables. We extend classical duality results for price-taking firms to a setup with discrete heterogeneity, endogeneity, and limited variation in possibly latent prices. Finally, we show that convergence results for nonparametric estimators may be directly converted to convergence results for production sets.

econ.EM

A Random Attention and Utility Model

We generalize the stochastic revealed preference methodology of McFadden and Richter (1990) for finite choice sets to settings with limited consideration. Our approach is nonparametric and requires partial choice set variation. We impose a monotonicity condition on attention first proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2020) and a stability condition on the marginal distribution of preferences. Our framework is amenable to statistical testing. These new restrictions extend widely known parametric models of consideration with heterogeneous preferences.

econ.TH

Nonparametric Analysis of Dynamic Random Utility Models

We study a dynamic generalization of stochastic rationality in consumer behavior, the Dynamic Random Utility Model (DRUM). Under DRUM, a consumer draws a utility function from a stochastic utility process and maximizes this utility subject to her budget constraint in each time period. Utility is random, with unrestricted correlation across time periods and unrestricted heterogeneity in a cross-section. We provide a revealed preference characterization of DRUM when we observe a panel of choices from budgets. This characterization is amenable to statistical testing. Our result unifies Afriat's (1967) theorem that works with time-series data and the static random utility framework of McFadden-Richter (1990) that works with cross-sections of choice.

econ.TH

Identification and estimation of multinomial choice models with latent special covariates

Identification of multinomial choice models is often established by using special covariates that have full support. This paper shows how these identification results can be extended to a large class of multinomial choice models when all covariates are bounded. I also provide a new $\sqrt{n}$-consistent asymptotically normal estimator of the finite-dimensional parameters of the model.

econ.EM

Random Rank-Dependent Expected Utility

We present a novel characterization of random rank-dependent expected utility for finite datasets and finite prizes. The test lends itself to statistical testing using the tools in Kitamura and Stoye (2018).

econ.TH

Identification and Estimation of Discrete Choice Models with Unobserved Choice Sets

We propose a framework for nonparametric identification and estimation of discrete choice models with unobserved choice sets. We recover the joint distribution of choice sets and preferences from a panel dataset on choices. We assume that either the latent choice sets are sparse or that the panel is sufficiently long. Sparsity requires the number of possible choice sets to be relatively small. It is satisfied, for instance, when the choice sets are nested, or when they form a partition. Our estimation procedure is computationally fast and uses mixed-integer optimization to recover the sparse support of choice sets. Analyzing the ready-to-eat cereal industry using a household scanner dataset, we find that ignoring the unobservability of choice sets can lead to biased estimates of preferences due to significant latent heterogeneity in choice sets.

econ.EM

Peer Effects in Random Consideration Sets

We develop a dynamic model of discrete choice that incorporates peer effects into random consideration sets. We characterize the equilibrium behavior and study the empirical content of the model. In our setup, changes in the choices of friends affect the distribution of the consideration sets. We exploit this variation to recover the ranking of preferences, attention mechanisms, and network connections. These nonparametric identification results allow unrestricted heterogeneity across people and do not rely on the variation of either covariates or the set of available options. Our methodology leads to a maximum-likelihood estimator that performs well in simulations. We apply our results to an experimental dataset that has been designed to study the visual focus of attention.

econ.EM

Stochastic Revealed Preferences with Measurement Error

A long-standing question about consumer behavior is whether individuals' observed purchase decisions satisfy the revealed preference (RP) axioms of the utility maximization theory (UMT). Researchers using survey or experimental panel data sets on prices and consumption to answer this question face the well-known problem of measurement error. We show that ignoring measurement error in the RP approach may lead to overrejection of the UMT. To solve this problem, we propose a new statistical RP framework for consumption panel data sets that allows for testing the UMT in the presence of measurement error. Our test is applicable to all consumer models that can be characterized by their first-order conditions. Our approach is nonparametric, allows for unrestricted heterogeneity in preferences, and requires only a centering condition on measurement error. We develop two applications that provide new evidence about the UMT. First, we find support in a survey data set for the dynamic and time-consistent UMT in single-individual households, in the presence of \emph{nonclassical} measurement error in consumption. In the second application, we cannot reject the static UMT in a widely used experimental data set in which measurement error in prices is assumed to be the result of price misperception due to the experimental design. The first finding stands in contrast to the conclusions drawn from the deterministic RP test of Browning (1989). The second finding reverses the conclusions drawn from the deterministic RP test of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982).

econ.EM

Discerning Solution Concepts

The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for identification of payoff parameters, but also for the validity and informativeness of counterfactual exercises and policy implications. We say that a solution concept is discernible if it is possible to determine whether it generated the observed data on the players' behavior and covariates. We propose a set of conditions that make it possible to discern solution concepts. In particular, our conditions are sufficient to tell whether the players' choices emerged from Nash equilibria. We can also discern between rationalizable behavior, maxmin behavior, and collusive behavior. Finally, we identify the correlation structure of unobserved shocks in our model using a novel approach.

econ.EM