arXiv subjects

Nanda Rani

Publications and source records attributed to Nanda Rani.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

How Do LLM Agents Actually Get the Flag? Trace-Level Provenance for Agentic Offensive Security Evaluation

Capture-the-Flag (CTF) benchmarks are widely used to assess the offensive security capabilities of autonomous language-model agents. Evaluations rely on shallow binary judgments or aggregate scores, overlooking the agent's trajectory to the flag. Consequently actual exploitation is conflated with direct flag exposure, memorized recall, external lookup, guessing, and unsupported claims, potentially overstating the agent's cybersecurity capability. We introduce CTF-ABACUS, a trace-based agent auditing framework that reconstructs each run as an evidence-grounded solve profile. By decomposing agent actions into penetration-testing phases and categorical techniques, it identifies where exploitation occurs, where the flag first appears, and whether the recovered flag is supported by demonstrated behavior. Aggregating solve profiles across agents yields challenge signatures that reveal whether success was achieved via the intended exploit or via shortcut pathways. We apply CTF-ABACUS to 1,435 CTF attempts by six frontier and open-source models on 240 challenges, yielding 2,870 solve profiles under two judge lenses. Trace-verified exploits account for only 62-87% of recovered flags across benchmarks, while shortcut recoveries follow substantially shallower trajectories. These findings shift CTF evaluation from counting recovered flags to verifying demonstrated exploitation and provide a basis for designing benchmarks that better isolate the offensive capabilities.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Beyond Reproducibility: Towards Security-Aware Evaluation of Research Artifacts

Research artifacts are widely shared to support reproducibility, and artifact evaluation (AE) has become common at many leading conferences. However, AE mainly checks whether artifacts work as claimed and can be reproduced. It does not aim at spotting or mitigitating potential security risks. Since these artifacts are publicly released and reused, they may unintentionally create opportunities for misuse and raise concerns about safe and responsible sharing. We study 1,388 research artifacts published between 2023 and 2025 at the top-4 security conferences, perform static analysis, and obtain 132,431 candidate security findings. We propose a taxonomy for context-aware security assessment and examine the findings to filter false positives and identify findings that represent plausible context-dependent security risks. We find that 44.80% of the reviewed findings are security-relevant. To support scalable analysis, we present SAFE (Security-Aware Framework for Artifact Evaluation), an autonomous framework that assesses tool-reported findings based on code semantics, execution context, and practical exploitability. SAFE achieves 94.40% accuracy and a 93.60% F1-score in distinguishing security-relevant from non-security findings, and 92.40% accuracy and an 81.10% F1-score in classifying security-risk types. Overall, our results show that context-aware security assessment is a practical complement to existing AE processes and can support safer and more responsible research artifact sharing. The source code for SAFE is available at: https://github.com/nanda-rani/SAFE

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

AI In Cybersecurity Education -- Scalable Agentic CTF Design Principles and Educational Outcomes

Large language models are rapidly changing how learners acquire and demonstrate cybersecurity skills. However, when human--AI collaboration is allowed, educators still lack validated competition designs and evaluation practices that remain fair and evidence-based. This paper presents a cross-regional study of LLM-centered Capture-the-Flag competitions built on the Cyber Security Awareness Week competition system. To understand how autonomy levels and participants' knowledge backgrounds influence problem-solving performance and learning-related behaviors, we formalize three autonomy levels: human-in-the-loop, autonomous agent frameworks, and hybrid. To enable verification, we require traceable submissions including conversation logs, agent trajectories, and agent code. We analyze multi-region competition data covering an in-class track, a standard track, and a year-long expert track, each targeting participants with different knowledge backgrounds. Using data from the 2025 competition, we compare solve performance across autonomy levels and challenge categories, and observe that autonomous agent frameworks and hybrid achieve higher completion rates on challenges requiring iterative testing and tool interactions. In the in-class track, we classify participants' agent designs and find a preference for lightweight, tool-augmented prompting and reflection-based retries over complex multi-agent architectures. Our results offer actionable guidance for designing LLM-assisted cybersecurity competitions as learning technologies, including autonomy-specific scoring criteria, evidence requirements that support solution verification, and track structures that improve accessibility while preserving reliable evaluation and engagement.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2026

CTFExplorer: Evaluating LLM Offensive Agents Through Multi-Target Web CTF Benchmarking

Existing benchmarks for LLM-based offensive security agents use isolated, single-target setups with a known vulnerable service and fixed objective. They measure exploitation effectively, but miss how real Capture-the-Flag (CTF) participants triage unknown surfaces, prioritize targets, and allocate effort under uncertainty. Current evaluations therefore fail to assess strategic reasoning beyond exploitation alone. To address this, we introduce \textit{CTFExplorer}, a benchmark suite that shifts offensive security evaluation toward a multi-target setting, which tests how agents explore, prioritize, and chain attacks. CTFExplorer deploys 40 web-based vulnerable services within a single environment, where agents must autonomously discover, distinguish, and exploit targets without predefined guidance. We also present a reactive multi-agent setup as a reference agent framework and develop an agent-agnostic evaluation framework that records structured reasoning traces for fine-grained assessment. This enables behavioral evaluation beyond binary flag capture, such as how agents manage target selection, handle failed hypotheses, coordinate across multiple stages, and extract security intelligence.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Towards Effective Offensive Security LLM Agents: Hyperparameter Tuning, LLM as a Judge, and a Lightweight CTF Benchmark

Recent advances in LLM agentic systems have improved the automation of offensive security tasks, particularly for Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges. We systematically investigate the key factors that drive agent success and provide a detailed recipe for building effective LLM-based offensive security agents. First, we present CTFJudge, a framework leveraging LLM as a judge to analyze agent trajectories and provide granular evaluation across CTF solving steps. Second, we propose a novel metric, CTF Competency Index (CCI) for partial correctness, revealing how closely agent solutions align with human-crafted gold standards. Third, we examine how LLM hyperparameters, namely temperature, top-p, and maximum token length, influence agent performance and automated cybersecurity task planning. For rapid evaluation, we present CTFTiny, a curated benchmark of 50 representative CTF challenges across binary exploitation, web, reverse engineering, forensics, and cryptography. Our findings identify optimal multi-agent coordination settings and lay the groundwork for future LLM agent research in cybersecurity. We make CTFTiny open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/CTFTiny along with CTFJudge on https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/CTFJudge.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

AURA: A Multi-Agent Intelligence Framework for Knowledge-Enhanced Cyber Threat Attribution

Effective attribution of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) increasingly hinges on the ability to correlate behavioral patterns and reason over complex, varied threat intelligence artifacts. We present AURA (Attribution Using Retrieval-Augmented Agents), a multi-agent, knowledge-enhanced framework for automated and interpretable APT attribution. AURA ingests diverse threat data including Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), malware details, adversarial tools, and temporal information, which are processed through a network of collaborative agents. These agents are designed for intelligent query rewriting, context-enriched retrieval from structured threat knowledge bases, and natural language justification of attribution decisions. By combining Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with Large Language Models (LLMs), AURA enables contextual linking of threat behaviors to known APT groups and supports traceable reasoning across multiple attack phases. Experiments on recent APT campaigns demonstrate AURA's high attribution consistency, expert-aligned justifications, and scalability. This work establishes AURA as a promising direction for advancing transparent, data-driven, and scalable threat attribution using multi-agent intelligence.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

CRAKEN: Cybersecurity LLM Agent with Knowledge-Based Execution

Large Language Model (LLM) agents can automate cybersecurity tasks and can adapt to the evolving cybersecurity landscape without re-engineering. While LLM agents have demonstrated cybersecurity capabilities on Capture-The-Flag (CTF) competitions, they have two key limitations: accessing latest cybersecurity expertise beyond training data, and integrating new knowledge into complex task planning. Knowledge-based approaches that incorporate technical understanding into the task-solving automation can tackle these limitations. We present CRAKEN, a knowledge-based LLM agent framework that improves cybersecurity capability through three core mechanisms: contextual decomposition of task-critical information, iterative self-reflected knowledge retrieval, and knowledge-hint injection that transforms insights into adaptive attack strategies. Comprehensive evaluations with different configurations show CRAKEN's effectiveness in multi-stage vulnerability detection and exploitation compared to previous approaches. Our extensible architecture establishes new methodologies for embedding new security knowledge into LLM-driven cybersecurity agentic systems. With a knowledge database of CTF writeups, CRAKEN obtained an accuracy of 22% on NYU CTF Bench, outperforming prior works by 3% and achieving state-of-the-art results. On evaluation of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, CRAKEN solves 25-30% more techniques than prior work, demonstrating improved cybersecurity capabilities via knowledge-based execution. We make our framework open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/nyuctf_agents_craken.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Generative AI in Financial Institution: A Global Survey of Opportunities, Threats, and Regulation

Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) is rapidly reshaping the global financial landscape, offering unprecedented opportunities to enhance customer engagement, automate complex workflows, and extract actionable insights from vast financial data. This survey provides an overview of GenAI adoption across the financial ecosystem, examining how banks, insurers, asset managers, and fintech startups worldwide are integrating large language models and other generative tools into their operations. From AI-powered virtual assistants and personalized financial advisory to fraud detection and compliance automation, GenAI is driving innovation across functions. However, this transformation comes with significant cybersecurity and ethical risks. We discuss emerging threats such as AI-generated phishing, deepfake-enabled fraud, and adversarial attacks on AI systems, as well as concerns around bias, opacity, and data misuse. The evolving global regulatory landscape is explored in depth, including initiatives by major financial regulators and international efforts to develop risk-based AI governance. Finally, we propose best practices for secure and responsible adoption - including explainability techniques, adversarial testing, auditability, and human oversight. Drawing from academic literature, industry case studies, and policy frameworks, this chapter offers a perspective on how the financial sector can harness GenAI's transformative potential while navigating the complex risks it introduces.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

MaLAware: Automating the Comprehension of Malicious Software Behaviours using Large Language Models (LLMs)

Current malware (malicious software) analysis tools focus on detection and family classification but fail to provide clear and actionable narrative insights into the malignant activity of the malware. Therefore, there is a need for a tool that translates raw malware data into human-readable descriptions. Developing such a tool accelerates incident response, reduces malware analysts' cognitive load, and enables individuals having limited technical expertise to understand malicious software behaviour. With this objective, we present MaLAware, which automatically summarizes the full spectrum of malicious activity of malware executables. MaLAware processes Cuckoo Sandbox-generated reports using large language models (LLMs) to correlate malignant activities and generate concise summaries explaining malware behaviour. We evaluate the tool's performance on five open-source LLMs. The evaluation uses the human-written malware behaviour description dataset as ground truth. The model's performance is measured using 11 extensive performance metrics, which boosts the confidence of MaLAware's effectiveness. The current version of the tool, i.e., MaLAware, supports Qwen2.5-7B, Llama2-7B, Llama3.1-8B, Mistral-7B, and Falcon-7B, along with the quantization feature for resource-constrained environments. MaLAware lays a foundation for future research in malware behavior explanation, and its extensive evaluation demonstrates LLMs' ability to narrate malware behavior in an actionable and comprehensive manner.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

D-CIPHER: Dynamic Collaborative Intelligent Multi-Agent System with Planner and Heterogeneous Executors for Offensive Security

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used in cybersecurity such as autonomous security analysis or penetration testing. Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges serve as benchmarks to assess automated task-planning abilities of LLM agents for cybersecurity. Early attempts to apply LLMs for solving CTF challenges used single-agent systems, where feedback was restricted to a single reasoning-action loop. This approach was inadequate for complex CTF tasks. Inspired by real-world CTF competitions, where teams of experts collaborate, we introduce the D-CIPHER LLM multi-agent framework for collaborative CTF solving. D-CIPHER integrates agents with distinct roles with dynamic feedback loops to enhance reasoning on complex tasks. It introduces the Planner-Executor agent system, consisting of a Planner agent for overall problem-solving along with multiple heterogeneous Executor agents for individual tasks, facilitating efficient allocation of responsibilities among the agents. Additionally, D-CIPHER incorporates an Auto-prompter agent to improve problem-solving by auto-generating a highly relevant initial prompt. We evaluate D-CIPHER on multiple CTF benchmarks and LLM models via comprehensive studies to highlight the impact of our enhancements. Additionally, we manually map the CTFs in NYU CTF Bench to MITRE ATT&CK techniques that apply for a comprehensive evaluation of D-CIPHER's offensive security capability. D-CIPHER achieves state-of-the-art performance on three benchmarks: 22.0% on NYU CTF Bench, 22.5% on Cybench, and 44.0% on HackTheBox, which is 2.5% to 8.5% better than previous work. D-CIPHER solves 65% more ATT&CK techniques compared to previous work, demonstrating stronger offensive capability.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Automated Classification of Cybercrime Complaints using Transformer-based Language Models for Hinglish Texts

The rise in cybercrime and the complexity of multilingual and code-mixed complaints present significant challenges for law enforcement and cybersecurity agencies. These organizations need automated, scalable methods to identify crime types, enabling efficient processing and prioritization of large complaint volumes. Manual triaging is inefficient, and traditional machine learning methods fail to capture the semantic and contextual nuances of textual cybercrime complaints. Moreover, the lack of publicly available datasets and privacy concerns hinder the research to present robust solutions. To address these challenges, we propose a framework for automated cybercrime complaint classification. The framework leverages Hinglish-adapted transformers, such as HingBERT and HingRoBERTa, to handle code-mixed inputs effectively. We employ the real-world dataset provided by Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C) during CyberGuard AI Hackathon 2024. We employ GenAI open source model-based data augmentation method to address class imbalance. We also employ privacy-aware preprocessing to ensure compliance with ethical standards while maintaining data integrity. Our solution achieves significant performance improvements, with HingRoBERTa attaining an accuracy of 74.41% and an F1-score of 71.49%. We also develop ready-to-use tool by integrating Django REST backend with a modern frontend. The developed tool is scalable and ready for real-world deployment in platforms like the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal. This work bridges critical gaps in cybercrime complaint management, offering a scalable, privacy-conscious, and adaptable solution for modern cybersecurity challenges.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Chasing the Shadows: TTPs in Action to Attribute Advanced Persistent Threats

The current state of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) attribution primarily relies on time-consuming manual processes. These include mapping incident artifacts onto threat attribution frameworks and employing expert reasoning to uncover the most likely responsible APT groups. This research aims to assist the threat analyst in the attribution process by presenting an attribution method named CAPTAIN (Comprehensive Advanced Persistent Threat AttrIbutioN). This novel APT attribution approach leverages the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) employed by various APT groups in past attacks. CAPTAIN follows two significant development steps: baseline establishment and similarity measure for attack pattern matching. This method starts by maintaining a TTP database of APTs seen in past attacks as baseline behaviour of threat groups. The attribution process leverages the contextual information added by TTP sequences, which reflects the sequence of behaviours threat actors demonstrated during the attack on different kill-chain stages. Then, it compares the provided TTPs with established baseline to identify the most closely matching threat group. CAPTAIN introduces a novel similarity measure for APT group attack-pattern matching that calculates the similarity between TTP sequences. The proposed approach outperforms traditional similarity measures like Cosine, Euclidean, and Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) in performing attribution. Overall, CAPTAIN performs attribution with the precision of 61.36% (top-1) and 69.98% (top-2), surpassing the existing state-of-the-art attribution methods.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

A Comprehensive Survey of Advanced Persistent Threat Attribution: Taxonomy, Methods, Challenges and Open Research Problems

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attribution is a critical challenge in cybersecurity and implies the process of accurately identifying the perpetrators behind sophisticated cyber attacks. It can significantly enhance defense mechanisms and inform strategic responses. With the growing prominence of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques, researchers are increasingly focused on developing automated solutions to link cyber threats to responsible actors, moving away from traditional manual methods. Previous literature on automated threat attribution lacks a systematic review of automated methods and relevant artifacts that can aid in the attribution process. To address these gaps and provide context on the current state of threat attribution, we present a comprehensive survey of automated APT attribution. The presented survey starts with understanding the dispersed artifacts and provides a comprehensive taxonomy of the artifacts that aid in attribution. We comprehensively review and present the classification of the available attribution datasets and current automated APT attribution methods. Further, we raise critical comments on current literature methods, discuss challenges in automated attribution, and direct toward open research problems. This survey reveals significant opportunities for future research in APT attribution to address current gaps and challenges. By identifying strengths and limitations in current practices, this survey provides a foundation for future research and development in automated, reliable, and actionable APT attribution methods.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

TTPXHunter: Actionable Threat Intelligence Extraction as TTPs from Finished Cyber Threat Reports

Understanding the modus operandi of adversaries aids organizations in employing efficient defensive strategies and sharing intelligence in the community. This knowledge is often present in unstructured natural language text within threat analysis reports. A translation tool is needed to interpret the modus operandi explained in the sentences of the threat report and translate it into a structured format. This research introduces a methodology named TTPXHunter for the automated extraction of threat intelligence in terms of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) from finished cyber threat reports. It leverages cyber domain-specific state-of-the-art natural language processing (NLP) to augment sentences for minority class TTPs and refine pinpointing the TTPs in threat analysis reports significantly. The knowledge of threat intelligence in terms of TTPs is essential for comprehensively understanding cyber threats and enhancing detection and mitigation strategies. We create two datasets: an augmented sentence-TTP dataset of 39,296 samples and a 149 real-world cyber threat intelligence report-to-TTP dataset. Further, we evaluate TTPXHunter on the augmented sentence dataset and the cyber threat reports. The TTPXHunter achieves the highest performance of 92.42% f1-score on the augmented dataset, and it also outperforms existing state-of-the-art solutions in TTP extraction by achieving an f1-score of 97.09% when evaluated over the report dataset. TTPXHunter significantly improves cybersecurity threat intelligence by offering quick, actionable insights into attacker behaviors. This advancement automates threat intelligence analysis, providing a crucial tool for cybersecurity professionals fighting cyber threats.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Leveraging Machine Learning for Ransomware Detection

The current pandemic situation has increased cyber-attacks drastically worldwide. The attackers are using malware like trojans, spyware, rootkits, worms, ransomware heavily. Ransomware is the most notorious malware, yet we did not have any defensive mechanism to prevent or detect a zero-day attack. Most defensive products in the industry rely on either signature-based mechanisms or traffic-based anomalies detection. Therefore, researchers are adopting machine learning and deep learning to develop a behaviour-based mechanism for detecting malware. Though we have some hybrid mechanisms that perform static and dynamic analysis of executable for detection, we have not any full proof detection proof of concept, which can be used to develop a full proof product specific to ransomware. In this work, we have developed a proof of concept for ransomware detection using machine learning models. We have done detailed analysis and compared efficiency between several machine learning models like decision tree, random forest, KNN, SVM, XGBoost and Logistic Regression. We obtained 98.21% accuracy and evaluated various metrics like precision, recall, TP, TN, FP, and FN.

cs.CR↗