arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Naoki Masuda.
The smallest positive eigenvalue of the Laplacian of a network is called the spectral gap and characterizes various dynamics on networks. We propose mathematical programming methods to maximize the spectral gap of a given network by removing a fixed number of nodes. We formulate relaxed versions of the original problem using semidefinite programming and apply them to example networks.
From the viewpoint of networks, a ranking system for players or teams in sports is equivalent to a centrality measure for sports networks, whereby a directed link represents the result of a single game. Previously proposed network-based ranking systems are derived from static networks, i.e., aggregation of the results of games over time. However, the score of a player (or team) fluctuates over time. Defeating a renowned player in the peak performance is intuitively more rewarding than defeating the same player in other periods. To account for this factor, we propose a dynamic variant of such a network-based ranking system and apply it to professional men's tennis data. We derive a set of linear online update equations for the score of each player. The proposed ranking system predicts the outcome of the future games with a higher accuracy than the static counterparts.
Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly meet. The conditions under which cooperation based on indirect reciprocity occurs have been examined in great details. Most previous theoretical analysis assumed for mathematical tractability that an individual possesses a binary reputation value, i.e., good or bad, which depends on their past actions and other factors. However, in real situations, reputations of individuals may be multiple valued. Another puzzling discrepancy between the theory and experiments is the status of the so-called image scoring, in which cooperation and defection are judged to be good and bad, respectively, independent of other factors. Such an assessment rule is found in behavioral experiments, whereas it is known to be unstable in theory. In the present study, we fill both gaps by analyzing a trinary reputation model. By an exhaustive search, we identify all the cooperative and stable equilibria composed of a homogeneous population or a heterogeneous population containing two types of players. Some results derived for the trinary reputation model are direct extensions of those for the binary model. However, we find that the trinary model allows cooperation under image scoring under some mild conditions.
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations, in which an individual is motivated to help another to acquire a good reputation and receive help from others afterwards. Ingroup favoritism is another aspect of human cooperation, whereby individuals help members in their own group more often than those in other groups. Ingroup favoritism is a puzzle for the theory of cooperation because it is not easily evolutionarily stable. In the context of indirect reciprocity, ingroup favoritism has been shown to be a consequence of employing a double standard when assigning reputations to ingroup and outgroup members; e.g., helping an ingroup member is regarded as good, whereas the same action toward an outgroup member is regarded as bad. We analyze a model of indirect reciprocity in which information sharing is conducted groupwise. In our model, individuals play social dilemma games within and across groups, and the information about their reputations is shared within each group. We show that evolutionarily stable ingroup favoritism emerges even if all the players use the same reputation assignment rule regardless of group (i.e., a single standard). Two reputation assignment rules called simple standing and stern judging yield ingroup favoritism. Stern judging induces much stronger ingroup favoritism than does simple standing. Simple standing and stern judging are evolutionarily stable against each other when groups employing different assignment rules compete and the number of groups is sufficiently large. In addition, we analytically show as a limiting case that homogeneous populations of reciprocators that use reputations are unstable when individuals independently infer reputations of individuals, which is consistent with previously reported numerical results.
Records of time-stamped social interactions between pairs of individuals (e.g., face-to-face conversations, e-mail exchanges, and phone calls) constitute a so-called temporal network. A remarkable difference between temporal networks and conventional static networks is that time-stamped events rather than links are the unit elements generating the collective behavior of nodes. We propose an importance measure for single interaction events. By generalizing the concept of the advance of event proposed by [Kossinets G, Kleinberg J, and Watts D J (2008) Proceeding of the 14th ACM SIGKDD International conference on knowledge discovery and data mining, p 435], we propose that an event is central when it carries new information about others to the two nodes involved in the event. We find that the proposed measure properly quantifies the importance of events in connecting nodes along time-ordered paths. Because of strong heterogeneity in the importance of events present in real data, a small fraction of highly important events is necessary and sufficient to sustain the connectivity of temporal networks. Nevertheless, in contrast to the behavior of scale-free networks against link removal, this property mainly results from bursty activity patterns and not heterogeneous degree distributions.
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect) zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under standard evolutionary dynamics.
Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component that enables cooperation in such social dilemma situations is the reputation system. Under the reputation system, a buyer can avoid transacting with a seller with a bad reputation. A transaction in online marketplaces is better modeled by the trust game than other social dilemma games, including the donation game and the prisoner's dilemma. In addition, most individuals participate mostly as buyers or sellers; each individual does not play the two roles with equal probability. Although the reputation mechanism is known to be able to remove the moral hazard in games with asymmetric roles, competition between different strategies and population dynamics of such a game are not sufficiently understood. On the other hand, existing models of reputation-based cooperation, also known as indirect reciprocity, are based on the symmetric donation game. We analyze the trust game with two fixed roles, where trustees (i.e., sellers) but not investors (i.e., buyers) possess reputation scores. We study the equilibria and the replicator dynamics of the game. We show that the reputation mechanism enables cooperation between unacquainted buyers and sellers under fairly generous conditions, even when such a cooperative equilibrium coexists with an asocial equilibrium in which buyers do not buy and sellers cheat. In addition, we show that not many buyers may care about the seller's reputation under cooperative equilibrium. Buyers' trusting behavior and sellers' reputation-driven cooperative behavior coevolve to alleviate the social dilemma.
Indirect reciprocity in which players cooperate with unacquainted other players having good reputations is a mechanism for cooperation in relatively large populations subjected to social dilemma situations. When the population has group structure, as is often found in social networks, players in experiments are considered to show behavior that deviates from existing theoretical models of indirect reciprocity. First, players often show ingroup favoritism (i.e., cooperation only within the group) rather than full cooperation (i.e., cooperation within and across groups), even though the latter is Pareto efficient. Second, in general, humans approximate outgroup members' personal characteristics, presumably including the reputation used for indirect reciprocity, by a single value attached to the group. Humans use such a stereotypic approximation, a phenomenon known as outgroup homogeneity in social psychology. I propose a model of indirect reciprocity in populations with group structure to examine the possibility of ingroup favoritism and full cooperation. In accordance with outgroup homogeneity, I assume that players approximate outgroup members' personal reputations by a single reputation value attached to the group. I show that ingroup favoritism and full cooperation are stable under different social norms (i.e., rules for assigning reputations) such that they do not coexist in a single model. If players are forced to consistently use the same social norm for assessing different types of interactions (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup interactions), only full cooperation survives. The discovered mechanism is distinct from any form of group selection. The results also suggest potential methods for reducing ingroup bias to shift the equilibrium from ingroup favoritism to full cooperation.
Spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP) with asymmetric learning windows is commonly found in the brain and useful for a variety of spike-based computations such as input filtering and associative memory. A natural consequence of STDP is establishment of causality in the sense that a neuron learns to fire with a lag after specific presynaptic neurons have fired. The effect of STDP on synchrony is elusive because spike synchrony implies unitary spike events of different neurons rather than a causal delayed relationship between neurons. We explore how synchrony can be facilitated by STDP in oscillator networks with a pacemaker. We show that STDP with asymmetric learning windows leads to self-organization of feedforward networks starting from the pacemaker. As a result, STDP drastically facilitates frequency synchrony. Even though differences in spike times are lessened as a result of synaptic plasticity, the finite time lag remains so that perfect spike synchrony is not realized. In contrast to traditional mechanisms of large-scale synchrony based on mutual interaction of coupled neurons, the route to synchrony discovered here is enslavement of downstream neurons by upstream ones. Facilitation of such feedforward synchrony does not occur for STDP with symmetric learning windows.
Records of social interactions provide us with new sources of data for understanding how interaction patterns affect collective dynamics. Such human activity patterns are often bursty, i.e., they consist of short periods of intense activity followed by long periods of silence. This burstiness has been shown to affect spreading phenomena; it accelerates epidemic spreading in some cases and slows it down in other cases. We investigate a model of history-dependent contagion. In our model, repeated interactions between susceptible and infected individuals in a short period of time is needed for a susceptible individual to contract infection. We carry out numerical simulations on real temporal network data to find that bursty activity patterns facilitate epidemic spreading in our model.
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known as strong competitors in iterated social dilemma games. On the other hand, real repeated interaction generally allows plasticity (i.e., learning) of individuals based on the experience of the past. Although plasticity is relevant to various biological phenomena, its role in repeated social dilemma games is relatively unexplored. In particular, if experience-based learning plays a key role in promotion and maintenance of cooperation, learners should evolve in the contest with nonlearners under selection pressure. By modeling players using a simple reinforcement learning model, we numerically show that learning enables the evolution of cooperation. We also show that numerically estimated adaptive dynamics appositely predict the outcome of evolutionary simulations. The analysis of the adaptive dynamics enables us to capture the obtained results as an affirmative example of the Baldwin effect, where learning accelerates the evolution to optimality.
Upstream reciprocity (also called generalized reciprocity) is a putative mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations with which players help others when they are helped by somebody else. It is a type of indirect reciprocity. Although upstream reciprocity is often observed in experiments, most theories suggest that it is operative only when players form short cycles such as triangles, implying a small population size, or when it is combined with other mechanisms that promote cooperation on their own. An expectation is that real social networks, which are known to be full of triangles and other short cycles, may accommodate upstream reciprocity. In this study, I extend the upstream reciprocity game proposed for a directed cycle by Boyd and Richerson to the case of general networks. The model is not evolutionary and concerns the conditions under which the unanimity of cooperative players is a Nash equilibrium. I show that an abundance of triangles or other short cycles in a network does little to promote upstream reciprocity. Cooperation is less likely for a larger population size even if triangles are abundant in the network. In addition, in contrast to the results for evolutionary social dilemma games on networks, scale-free networks lead to less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous degree distribution.
Recent developments in sensing technologies have enabled us to examine the nature of human social behavior in greater detail. By applying an information theoretic method to the spatiotemporal data of cell-phone locations, [C. Song et al. Science 327, 1018 (2010)] found that human mobility patterns are remarkably predictable. Inspired by their work, we address a similar predictability question in a different kind of human social activity: conversation events. The predictability in the sequence of one's conversation partners is defined as the degree to which one's next conversation partner can be predicted given the current partner. We quantify this predictability by using the mutual information. We examine the predictability of conversation events for each individual using the longitudinal data of face-to-face interactions collected from two company offices in Japan. Each subject wears a name tag equipped with an infrared sensor node, and conversation events are marked when signals are exchanged between sensor nodes in close proximity. We find that the conversation events are predictable to some extent; knowing the current partner decreases the uncertainty about the next partner by 28.4% on average. Much of the predictability is explained by long-tailed distributions of interevent intervals. However, a predictability also exists in the data, apart from the contribution of their long-tailed nature. In addition, an individual's predictability is correlated with the position in the static social network derived from the data. Individuals confined in a community - in the sense of an abundance of surrounding triangles - tend to have low predictability, and those bridging different communities tend to have high predictability.
Recent analysis of social communications among humans has revealed that the interval between interactions for a pair of individuals and for an individual often follows a long-tail distribution. We investigate the effect of such a non-Poissonian nature of human behavior on dynamics of opinion formation. We use a variant of the voter model and numerically compare the time to consensus of all the voters with different distributions of interevent intervals and different networks. Compared with the exponential distribution of interevent intervals (i.e., the standard voter model), the power-law distribution of interevent intervals slows down consensus on the ring. This is because of the memory effect; in the power-law case, the expected time until the next update event on a link is large if the link has not had an update event for a long time. On the complete graph, the consensus time in the power-law case is close to that in the exponential case. Regular graphs bridge these two results such that the slowing down of the consensus in the power-law case as compared to the exponential case is less pronounced as the degree increases.
We study the effect of vaccination on robustness of networks against propagating attacks that obey the susceptible-infected-removed model.By extending the generating function formalism developed by Newman (2005), we analytically determine the robustness of networks that depends on the vaccination parameters. We consider the random defense where nodes are vaccinated randomly and the degree-based defense where hubs are preferentially vaccinated. We show that when vaccines are inefficient, the random graph is more robust against propagating attacks than the scale-free network. When vaccines are relatively efficient, the scale-free network with the degree-based defense is more robust than the random graph with the random defense and the scale-free network with the random defense.
Biological rhythms are generated by pacemaker organs, such as the heart pacemaker organ (the sinoatrial node) and the master clock of the circadian rhythms (the suprachiasmatic nucleus), which are composed of a network of autonomously oscillatory cells. Such biological rhythms have notable periodicity despite the internal and external noise present in each cell. Previous experimental studies indicate that the regularity of oscillatory dynamics is enhanced when noisy oscillators interact and become synchronized. This effect, called the collective enhancement of temporal precision, has been studied theoretically using particular assumptions. In this study, we propose a general theoretical framework that enables us to understand the dependence of temporal precision on network parameters including size, connectivity, and coupling intensity; this effect has been poorly understood to date. Our framework is based on a phase oscillator model that is applicable to general oscillator networks with any coupling mechanism if coupling and noise are sufficiently weak. In particular, we can manage general directed and weighted networks. We quantify the precision of the activity of a single cell and the mean activity of an arbitrary subset of cells. We find that, in general undirected networks, the standard deviation of cycle-to-cycle periods scales with the system size $N$ as $1/\sqrt{N}$, but only up to a certain system size $N^*$ that depends on network parameters. Enhancement of temporal precision is ineffective when $N>N^*$. We also reveal the advantage of long-range interactions among cells to temporal precision.
We numerically study the phase diagram of a three-state host-parasite model on the square lattice motivated by population biology. The model is an extension of the contact process, and the three states correspond to an empty site, a host, and a parasite. We determine the phase diagram of the model by scaling analysis. In agreement with previous results, three phases are identified: the phase in which both hosts and parasites are extinct (S_{0}), the phase in which hosts survive but parasites are extinct (S_{01}), and the phase in which both hosts and parasites survive (S_{012}). We argue that both the S_{0}-S_{01} and S_{01}-S_{012} boundaries belong to the directed percolation class. In this model, it has been suggested that an excessively large reproduction rate of parasites paradoxically extinguishes hosts and parasites and results in S_{0}. We show that this paradoxical extinction is a finite size effect; the corresponding parameter region is likely to disappear in the limit of infinite system size.
Humans and other animals can adapt their social behavior in response to environmental cues including the feedback obtained through experience. Nevertheless, the effects of the experience-based learning of players in evolution and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma games remain relatively unclear. Some previous literature showed that mutual cooperation of learning players is difficult or requires a sophisticated learning model. In the context of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we numerically examine the performance of a reinforcement learning model. Our model modifies those of Karandikar et al. (1998), Posch et al. (1999), and Macy and Flache (2002) in which players satisfice if the obtained payoff is larger than a dynamic threshold. We show that players obeying the modified learning mutually cooperate with high probability if the dynamics of threshold is not too fast and the association between the reinforcement signal and the action in the next round is sufficiently strong. The learning players also perform efficiently against the reactive strategy. In evolutionary dynamics, they can invade a population of players adopting simpler but competitive strategies. Our version of the reinforcement learning model does not complicate the previous model and is sufficiently simple yet flexible. It may serve to explore the relationships between learning and evolution in social dilemma situations.