arXiv subjects

Natalie Sekerak

Publications and source records attributed to Natalie Sekerak.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

An Empirical Study on Remote Code Execution in Machine Learning Model Hosting Ecosystems

Model-sharing platforms, such as Hugging Face, ModelScope, and OpenCSG, have become central to modern machine learning development, enabling developers to share, load, and fine-tune pre-trained models with minimal effort. However, the flexibility of these ecosystems introduces a critical security concern: the execution of untrusted code during model loading (i.e., via trust_remote_code or trust_repo). In this work, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of custom model loading practices across five major model-sharing platforms to assess their prevalence, associated risks, and developer perceptions. We first quantify the frequency with which models require custom code to function and identify those that execute arbitrary Python files during loading. We then apply three complementary static analysis tools: Bandit, CodeQL, and Semgrep, to detect security smells and potential vulnerabilities, categorizing our findings by CWE identifiers to provide a standardized risk taxonomy. We also use YARA to identify malicious patterns and payload signatures. In parallel, we systematically analyze the documentation, API design, and safety mechanisms of each platform to understand their mitigation strategies and enforcement levels. Finally, we conduct a qualitative analysis of over 600 developer discussions from GitHub, Hugging Face, and PyTorch Hub forums, as well as Stack Overflow, to capture community concerns and misconceptions regarding security and usability. Our findings reveal widespread reliance on unsafe defaults, uneven security enforcement across platforms, and persistent confusion among developers about the implications of executing remote code. We conclude with actionable recommendations for designing safer model-sharing infrastructures and striking a balance between usability and security in future AI ecosystems.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

Assessing the Software Security Comprehension of Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in software development, but their level of software security expertise remains unclear. This work systematically evaluates the security comprehension of five leading LLMs: GPT-4o-Mini, GPT-5-Mini, Gemini-2.5-Flash, Llama-3.1, and Qwen-2.5, using Blooms Taxonomy as a framework. We assess six cognitive dimensions: remembering, understanding, applying, analyzing, evaluating, and creating. Our methodology integrates diverse datasets, including curated multiple-choice questions, vulnerable code snippets (SALLM), course assessments from an Introduction to Software Security course, real-world case studies (XBOW), and project-based creation tasks from a Secure Software Engineering course. Results show that while LLMs perform well on lower-level cognitive tasks such as recalling facts and identifying known vulnerabilities, their performance degrades significantly on higher-order tasks that require reasoning, architectural evaluation, and secure system creation. Beyond reporting aggregate accuracy, we introduce a software security knowledge boundary that identifies the highest cognitive level at which a model consistently maintains reliable performance. In addition, we identify 51 recurring misconception patterns exhibited by LLMs across Blooms levels.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

Large Language Models for Software Engineering: A Reproducibility Crisis

Reproducibility is a cornerstone of scientific progress, yet its state in large language model (LLM)-based software engineering (SE) research remains poorly understood. This paper presents the first large-scale, empirical study of reproducibility practices in LLM-for-SE research. We systematically mined and analyzed 640 papers published between 2017 and 2025 across premier software engineering, machine learning, and natural language processing venues, extracting structured metadata from publications, repositories, and documentation. Guided by four research questions, we examine (i) the prevalence of reproducibility smells, (ii) how reproducibility has evolved over time, (iii) whether artifact evaluation badges reliably reflect reproducibility quality, and (iv) how publication venues influence transparency practices. Using a taxonomy of seven smell categories: Code and Execution, Data, Documentation, Environment and Tooling, Versioning, Model, and Access and Legal, we manually annotated all papers and associated artifacts. Our analysis reveals persistent gaps in artifact availability, environment specification, versioning rigor, and documentation clarity, despite modest improvements in recent years and increased adoption of artifact evaluation processes at top SE venues. Notably, we find that badges often signal artifact presence but do not consistently guarantee execution fidelity or long-term reproducibility. Motivated by these findings, we provide actionable recommendations to mitigate reproducibility smells and introduce a Reproducibility Maturity Model (RMM) to move beyond binary artifact certification toward multi-dimensional, progressive evaluation of reproducibility rigor.

cs.SE↗