arXiv subjects

Nathan G. Wood

Publications and source records attributed to Nathan G. Wood.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Practical Judgment, Virtue, and Intuition in the Use of Opaque AI-Enabled Systems

AI-enabled systems are seeing increasing deployment across numerous domains, with many being "black boxes" with respect to core functions and capabilities. I.e., many systems take inputs and give outputs, but without users having any ability to see how the former lead to the latter. AI-enabled systems are also being used to augment autonomy in systems, and autonomy coupled with opacity raises numerous concerns surrounding, e.g., the reliability of systems, their regularity in functioning, human ability to control them, or whether deploying opaque and potentially autonomous systems is in compliance with ethical and legal norms. In this article, we argue that many of these worries can be mitigated by leveraging practical judgment, virtue, and intuition in the deployment and use of opaque AI-enabled systems. We show that focusing on these distinctly human capabilities provides a means for bridging between the practical challenges created by opacity and the ethical, legal, and social norms underpinning particular domains. We argue that a core element in doing this is a recognition that many positive human traits are not quantifiable and we therefore must develop training regimen and guidelines on AI deployment anchored in humanistic but non-quantifiable values. Throughout the article, we focus on the military domain as an exemplar of the importance of practical judgment, virtue, and intuition as drivers for ethical and effective human decision-making surrounding AI deployments, but the underlying arguments apply to all domains where opaque and potentially autonomous systems are being deployed (subject to domain-specific alterations).

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

AI, Trust, and Teaming: The Humans-as-Handlers Approach for Autonomous and Opaque AI Systems

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming ubiquitous, and across domains, increasingly autonomous systems are carrying out tasks which raise significant ethical and legal challenges which demonstrate a need for strong human-machine teams rooted in trust. In this article, I argue that within highly impactful areas (such as medicine or warfighting) there are grounds for us initially treating autonomous and opaque systems as relevantly analogous to dogs (or other animals with which we have close relationships). Under this analogy, humans making use of these systems are not to be viewed as "users" or "deployers" of these systems, but instead take the role of "handlers". This recasting of roles shifts the way we view humans, AI-enabled and autonomous systems, and the relations between them, and moreover clarifies the clear and traceable lines of responsibility humans have for the outcomes brought about when using these systems. In developing this point, I clarify that the machine-animal analogy does admit disanalogous elements, but that its touch-points ground it as a starting point. I then explore how we can divest the humans-as-handlers approach of those aspects of our relationships with animals which are unfitting for how we engage with and make use of autonomous and AI-enabled systems. I conclude by arguing that the trajectory of human-machine teamings for autonomous and AI-enabled systems should be a state where we authentically view these not as artifacts which we simply make use of, but as collaborators with which we pursue complex goals and carry out complex tasks.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

Stop Saying "AI"

Across academia, industry, and government, ``AI'' has become central in research and development, regulatory debates, and promises of ever faster and more capable decision-making and action. In numerous domains, especially safety-critical ones, there are significant concerns over how ``AI'' may affect decision-making, responsibility, or the likelihood of mistakes (to name only a few categories of critique). However, for most critiques, the target is generally ``AI'', a broad term admitting many (types of) systems used for a variety of tasks and each coming with its own set of limitations, challenges, and potential use cases. In this article, we focus on the military domain as a case study and present both a loose enumerative taxonomy of systems captured under the umbrella term ``military AI'', as well as discussion of the challenges of each. In doing so, we highlight that critiques of one (type of) system will not always transfer to other (types of) systems. Building on this, we argue that in order for debates to move forward fruitfully, it is imperative that the discussions be made more precise and that ``AI'' be excised from debates to the extent possible. Researchers, developers, and policy-makers should make clear exactly what systems they have in mind and what possible benefits and risks attend the deployment of those particular systems. While we focus on AI in the military as an exemplar for the overall trends in discussions of ``AI'', the argument's conclusions are broad and have import for discussions of AI across a host of domains.

cs.CY↗