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Navid Hashemi

Publications and source records attributed to Navid Hashemi.

22 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Distributionally Robust Tuning of Anomaly Detectors in Cyber-Physical Systems with Stealthy Attacks

Designing resilient control strategies for mitigating stealthy attacks is a crucial task in emerging cyber-physical systems. In the design of anomaly detectors, it is common to assume Gaussian noise models to maintain tractability; however, this assumption can lead the actual false alarm rate to be significantly higher than expected. We propose a distributionally robust anomaly detector for noise distributions in moment-based ambiguity sets. We design a detection threshold that guarantees that the actual false alarm rate is upper bounded by the desired one by using generalized Chebyshev inequalities. Furthermore, we highlight an important trade-off between the worst-case false alarm rate and the potential impact of a stealthy attacker by efficiently computing an outer ellipsoidal bound for the attack-reachable states corresponding to the distributionally robust detector threshold. We illustrate this trade-off with a numerical example and compare the proposed approach with a traditional chi-squared detector.

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Generalized chi-squared detector for LTI systems with non-Gaussian noise

Previously, we derived exact relationships between the properties of a linear time-invariant control system and properties of an anomaly detector that quantified the impact an attacker can have on the system if that attacker aims to remain stealthy to the detector. A necessary first step in this process is to be able to precisely tune the detector to a desired level of performance (false alarm rate) under normal operation, typically through the selection of a threshold parameter. To-date efforts have only considered Gaussian noises. Here we generalize the approach to tune a chi-squared anomaly detector for noises with non-Gaussian distributions. Our method leverages a Gaussian Mixture Model to represent the arbitrary noise distributions, which preserves analytic tractability and provides an informative interpretation in terms of a collection of chi-squared detectors and multiple Gaussian disturbances.

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Filtering Approaches for Dealing with Noise in Anomaly Detection

The leading workhorse of anomaly (and attack) detection in the literature has been residual-based detectors, where the residual is the discrepancy between the observed output provided by the sensors (inclusive of any tampering along the way) and the estimated output provided by an observer. These techniques calculate some statistic of the residual and apply a threshold to determine whether or not to raise an alarm. To date, these methods have not leveraged the frequency content of the residual signal in making the detection problem easier, specifically dealing with the case of (e.g., measurement) noise. Here we demonstrate some opportunities to combine filtering to enhance the performance of residual-based detectors. We also demonstrate how filtering can provide a compelling alternative to residual-based methods when paired with a robust observer. In this process, we consider the class of attacks that are stealthy, or undetectable, by such filtered detection methods and the impact they can have on the system.

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A Comparison of Stealthy Sensor Attacks on Control Systems

As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term stealthy has come to encompass a variety of techniques that attackers can employ to avoid detection. Here we show how the states of the system (in particular, the reachable set corresponding to the attack) can be manipulated under two important types of stealthy attacks. We employ the chi-squared fault detection method and demonstrate how this imposes a constraint on the attack sequence either to generate no alarms (zero-alarm attack) or to generate alarms at a rate indistinguishable from normal operation (hidden attack).

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