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Navya Garg

Publications and source records attributed to Navya Garg.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

One-Shot Multimodal Learning from Demonstration with Force-Constrained Elastic Maps

Robotic manipulation tasks often require simultaneous reasoning over motion and contact forces, yet most Learning from Demonstration (LfD) methods model only spatial trajectories and neglect force interactions with the environment. This limitation reduces robustness and can lead to unsafe or inconsistent task reproduction in force-constrained settings. We propose a novel one-shot multimodal LfD framework for the segmentation, encoding, and reproduction of force-inclusive demonstrations. First, we introduce a multimodal probabilistic segmentation method that adaptively weighs spatial and force modalities over time, enabling the automatic extraction of force-aware motion primitives. Second, we extend the elastic maps representation to incorporate external force constraints during skill encoding and formulate a convex optimization procedure for learning force-consistent trajectory models. The resulting skills reproduce both motion and contact characteristics from a single demonstration while promoting safer execution by accounting for demonstrated force profiles. We validate our approach on five real-world manipulation tasks across two distinct force-sensing configurations: wrist force sensing on a UR5e with a Robotiq 2f-85 gripper and finger force sensing on a Kinova Gen3 with an Openhand Model O gripper. Experimental results demonstrate robust multimodal segmentation, accurate force-aware reproduction, and cross-platform generality.

cs.RO

Fairly Dividing Non-identical Random Items: Just Sample or Match

We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for \textit{typical} or \textit{random} instances, meaning when the utility values of agents for the resources are drawn from certain distributions. If such allocations exist with high probability for typical instances, and furthermore if they can be computed efficiently, this would imply that we could quickly resolve a real world resource allocation scenario in a fair and efficient manner with high probability. This implication has made this setting popular and well studied in fair resource allocation. In this paper, we extend the previously studied formal models of this problem to non-identical items. We assume that every item is associated with a distribution $\mathcal{U}_j$, and every agent's utility value for the item is drawn independently from $\mathcal{U}_j$. We show that envy-free fair and maximum social welfare efficient allocations exist with high probability in the asymptotic setting, meaning when the number of agents $n$ and items $m$ are large. Further we show that when $m=O(n\log n),$ then by only sampling $O(\log m)$ or $O((\log m)^2)$ utility values per item instead of all the $n,$ we can compute these allocations in $\tilde{O}(m)$ time. Finally, we simulate our algorithms on randomly generated instances and show that even for small instances, we suffer small multiplicative losses in the fairness and efficiency guarantees even for small sized instances, and converge to fully optimal guarantees quickly.

cs.GT